Volume 8 Issue 1 by Sustainable
Development
Law & Policy
Sustainable Development Law & Policy
Volume 8
Issue 1 Fall 2007: Federal Environmental Policy Article 1
Volume 8 Issue 1
Sustainable Development Law & Policy
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/sdlp
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Entire Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @
American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sustainable Development Law & Policy by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sustainable Development Law & Policy, Fall 2007, 1-92.
SuStainable
Development
law & policy
 
 Volume VIII, Issue 1 Fall 2007
In ThIs Issue: SuStainable DirectionS in u.S. environmental law
1 | eDitorS’ note by Marcel De Armas & Maria Vanko
2 |  overview: SuStainable DirectionS for DomeStic environmental law  
by Senator Barbara Boxer
3 | Governor romney’S policy Statement by Governor Mitt Romney
4 |  achievinG enerGy inDepenDence & StoppinG Global warminG throuGh a new enerGy economy  
by Senator John Edwards
5 | State effortS to promote renewable enerGy: trippinG the horSe with the cart?  
by Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper
13 | the role of renewable portfolio StanDarDS in the context of a national carbon cap-anD-traDe 
proGram by Neal J. Cabral
19 | the next level of environmental protection: buSineSS StrateGieS anD Government policieS  
converGinG on SuStainability by Dr. Alan D. Hecht
27 | the StateS anD the worlD: twin leverS for reform of u.S. feDeral law on toxic chemicalS  
by Daryl W. Ditz
31 | tSca anD enGineereD nanoScale SubStanceS  
by Lynn L. Bergeson & Ira Dassa
38 | a roaD map to a better nepa: why environmental riSk aSSeSSmentS ShoulD be uSeD to  
analyze the environmental conSequenceS of complex feDeral actionS  
by Sonja Klopf, Nada Wolff Culver, & Pete Morton
47 | the eu aDoptS an inteGrateD maritime policy anD action plan: iS the u.S. far behinD or aheaD?  
by Joan M. Bondareff
54 | DefenDinG State’S riGhtS unDer the coaStal zone manaGement act— 
State of California v. norton by Linda Krop
61 | preparinG for the Day after tomorrow: frameworkS for climate chanGe aDaption  
by Ira R. Feldman & Joshua H. Kahan
http://www.wcl.american.edu/org/sustainabledevelopment
Exploring How Today’s dEvElopmEnT affEcTs fuTurE gEnEraTions around THE globE
1 susTaInable DevelopmenT law & polIcy
Modern elections have found a new issue upon which to engage voters. Over the past few years, electorates around the globe are voting in response to environ-
mental issues in general and climate change in particular. The 
impact of these elections will have profound effects far into the 
future, they will decide when and how we decide to cap carbon 
emissions, how we will supply our future energy needs—wind, 
hydro, nuclear—if we should pursue environmental restoration 
projects, or provide greater protections for our coastal areas and 
marine resources. 
With an eye to the future, Sustainable Development Law & 
Policy decided to focus on the direction domestic environmen-
tal policy is taking and should take. We asked all presidential 
candidates for a brief statement stating their priorities and hopes 
for the nation’s environmental policy if they were elected presi-
dent. In this issue you will find Senator Edwards’ and Gover-
nor Romney’s responses, the only two candidates to reply to our 
request. In addition, we have placed the link to each presidential 
candidate’s website that states their environmental and/or energy 
policy. 
Australians recently voted for a new Prime Minister in an 
election coined the “Climate Change Election.” Perhaps the 
changing climate will similarly motivate Americans in 2008. 
With less than a year until the United States decides who its next 
president will be, the American electorate will soon show how 
committed it is to supporting the environment and combating 
climate change. We hope this issue of Sustainable Development 
Law & Policy serves as a useful tool for those in the legal com-
munity, policy makers, and the public in general when making 
their decisions for the future of this country and the world. 
Marcel De Armas
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* Chairman, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works
Over the past six years the Environmental Protection Agency, under the guise of the Bush Administration, has rolled back countless environmental regulations 
that protect the air we breathe, the water we drink, and ensure 
the very health of our communities. Meanwhile, the rest of the 
world is moving ahead to address the greatest challenge of our 
generation—global warming. 
Historically, our nation has swiftly responded to scientific 
consensus to solve major environmental problems. When sci-
entists told us that the reason the Cuyahoga River caught fire in 
Ohio in l969 was because toxic pollution was accumulating there, 
we didn’t walk away from the challenge or await further study: 
we passed the Clean Water Act. When scientists told us why the 
air had become so polluted we could see it and were choking on 
it, we didn’t walk away from the challenge: we passed the Clean 
Air Act in l970. When scientists told us that contaminated tap 
water was causing widespread waterborne disease and exposing 
people to cancer, we didn’t walk away from the challenge: we 
passed the Safe Drinking Water Act in 1974. In none of these 
instances did the federal government ignore the challenge and in 
every one of these cases we are a better nation for it.
an overview of thiS iSSue:  
SuStainable DirectionS for DomeStic environmental law
by Senator Barbara Boxer*
At the moment, there are numerous environmental chal-
lenges facing our nation and the entire world; yet none greater 
than global warming. It is a challenge we should meet with hope 
and not fear. It is a challenge that will make us stronger as a nation 
if we meet it head-on. In order to meet the challenge of global 
warming, we need to cap and eventually reduce our greenhouse 
gas emissions by at least 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050. 
This will require action by all sectors of our economy. 
We must become far more energy efficient and cleaner. It 
is the federal government’s role to create incentives for new and 
green technologies. Electricity providers must look to renew-
able energy sources like wind and solar power, or capture and 
sequester their global warming emissions. Our national automo-
bile fleet must become dramatically more efficient. Our indus-
tries and buildings must become state-of-the-art energy savers 
through retrofitting existing stock and incorporating green design 
in new construction. 
America must lead the world in clean technology develop-
ment and renewable energy. It is essential for our economy’s 
ability to grow and remain internationally competitive. Other 
countries should become dependent on our clean technologies. It 
will be these technologies that will free us from our dependencies 
on foreign energy sources and will enable other economies to 
achieve development in a carbon-constrained world. 
It is also the federal government’s role to lead the inter-
national community. We will soon become the only industri-
alized country not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. If we become 
reengaged with the international community and take the lead 
on climate change, other nations like India and China will fol-
low. Combating climate change will also help avoid other envi-
ronmental disasters like species extinction and prevent global 
political instability from floods, diseases, mass migration, and 
conflicts over water, food, and other natural resources. By facing 
this challenge now, we can maximize our chances of avoiding 
the most dangerous effects of climate change and capitalize on 
the tremendous opportunities that lie ahead. 
Our country’s response to global warming is not only a mea-
surement of international leadership, but also a reflection of our 
national character. From the National Environmental Policy Act 
to the very idea of a “cap-and-trade” this country has been a pio-
neer in environmental policy. The time has come for the United 
States to reclaim its position as the preeminent world leader in 
environmental policy—and not just global warming. 
Overview: continued on page 3
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Governor romney’S policy Statement
by Governor Mitt Romney
While I believe that any effective CO2 emission reduc-tion program should be global, I believe in a “no regrets” approach to improve our energy efficiency, 
reduce our CO
2
 emissions, and end our dependency on foreign 
oil. America needs an energy plan that includes reducing our 
consumption of oil; increasing our use of alternative sources of 
energy like nuclear, ethanol, and biodiesel; and investing in the 
necessary research and development programs for alternative 
energy, energy efficiency, and low-carbon technologies. These 
actions will enable us to heat our homes, drive our vehicles, and 
run our businesses with a much smaller environmental footprint 
than ever before.
I believe we must become energy independent. As I always 
do when I look for solutions to America’s problems, I look to 
America’s greatest source of strength—the American people. 
We need to be fostering American ingenuity and innovation to 
develop new technologies. The government can play an impor-
tant role. It is imperative that we increase our energy research 
funding. We need to initiate our generation’s equivalent of the 
Manhattan Project to develop these new technologies. We must 
create new economic sources of energy—clean energy, as well 
as new energy-efficient technologies. We should be licensing 
these technologies to other countries as well as employing them 
here at home. The government should be working with industry 
to accelerate the rate at which these technologies enter the mar-
ket. These actions will enable us to heat our homes, drive our 
vehicles, and run our businesses with a much smaller environ-
mental footprint than ever before.
republican canDiDateS’ enerGy anD environment StatementS
Rudy Giuliani:
No issue statement found on campaign website.
Mike Huckabee:  
Energy:          http://www.mikehuckabee.com/index.cfm?FuseAction=Issues.View&Issue_id=21
Duncan Hunter: 
No issue statement found on campaign website.
John McCain:
Environment: http://www.johnmccain.com/Informing/Issues/65bd0fbe-737b-4851-a7e7-d9a37cb278db.htm
Mitt Romney: 
Energy: http://www.mittromney.com/Issue-Watch/Energy
See also Governor Romney’s statement above.
Ron Paul: 
Environment: http://www.ronpaul2008.com/issues/environment/
Fred Thompson:
Energy:  http://www.fred08.com/Principles/PrinciplesSummary.aspx?View=OnTheIssues
This issue of Sustainable Development Law & Policy 
examines critical domestic issues requiring the attention of envi-
ronmental policymakers and this Congress. The issue examines 
the impact a harmonized federal renewable portfolio standard 
would have on the electricity sector. The issue also looks to the 
role a renewable portfolio standard should play within the con-
text of a carbon dioxide cap-and-trade regime. This issue also 
explores the need to move the domestic and international cli-
mate discussion toward adaptation policies. Articles also look to 
global environmental legal developments to highlight the United 
States’ need to update our chemical management and oceans 
governance structures. The federal Coastal Zone Management 
Act is also explored within the context of California’s offshore 
oil drilling battle with the federal government. The need to ade-
quately fulfill the National Environmental Policy Act require-
ments to examine the impact of increases in oil and gas drilling, 
or tar sands and oil shale development and other interesting top-
ics are also explored in this issue.
Overview: continued from page 2
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Global warming is a crisis. We now know that global warming is happening and that human activity is to blame. If we don’t change course, within decades we 
could be living on a fundamentally different planet—one with 
tens of millions of people facing starvation or forced to become 
refugees. 
For too long, many in Washington have turned a blind eye 
to problems when the solutions were right in front of us. In part, 
that’s because powerful special interests want to keep things the 
way they are. Oil companies running gas stations don’t want to 
carry alternative fuels. Utilities making money by selling more 
power don’t want to use it more efficiently. Automakers squeez-
ing profits out of high-polluting SUVs don’t see the need to 
develop the cars of the future.
But this crisis is also an opportunity. With strong leader-
ship, we can emerge from the crisis of global warming with a 
new energy economy that embraces innovation and creates more 
than 1 million jobs.  
To achieve energy independence and halt global warming, 
I will cap the emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse 
gases starting in 2010 to reduce emissions by 20 percent by 2020 
and by 80 percent by 2050. Because all nations must join the 
effort, I will share clean energy technology with cooperating 
nations and, if necessary, require climate-change commitments 
in our trade deals.
To cut oil imports by 7.5 million barrels a day by 2025, I 
will promote improvements in fuel economy, ethanol use, and 
hybrid cars. I will raise fuel economy standards to 40 miles per 
gallon by 2016 and will invest $1 billion a year in helping U.S. 
automakers advance and apply the latest technology. 
achievinG enerGy inDepenDence &  
StoppinG Global warminG throuGh a  
new enerGy economy
by Senator John Edwards
Renewable energy sources like wind, solar power, bio-
mass and ethanol are cleaner and can be cheaper than traditional 
sources of energy. I will require their use to generate 25 percent 
of the nation’s electricity by 2025 and invest more resources in 
researching and encouraging these clean forms of energy.  
I will also open the electricity grid to competition. Thou-
sands of smaller producers of electricity could spark innovation 
and generate cleaner, cheaper, more reliable power. I will sup-
port local renewable power and require utilities to buy it from 
homes and entrepreneurs. 
Energy technology can create a nationwide economic boom, 
including clean tech investments from Silicon Valley, jobs in 
renewable energy in rural America, a revitalized manufacturing 
base and “green-collar” jobs. I will create a $13 billion a year 
New Energy Economy Fund to invest in renewable energy and 
energy-efficient technology. The Fund will be financed by a cap-
and-trade system that uses market forces to reduce pollution in a 
cost-effective and flexible manner.
None of this will happen unless we demand it. The oil com-
panies won’t do it. The utilities won’t do it. The mining compa-
nies won’t do it.  
Our generation must do it—we can’t wait for someone else 
to take responsibility. Our generation must be the one that says, 
“We must halt global warming.” Our generation must be the 
one that says “yes” to alternative, renewable fuels and ends our 
dependence on foreign oil. If we don’t act now, it will be too 
late. It won’t be easy, but it is time for Americans to be patriotic 
about something other than war.
Democratic canDiDateS’ environment, climate, anD enerGy StatementS
Joe Biden: 
Energy:  http://biden.senate.gov/documents/ 
 BidenRecordEnergy.pdf
Climate:  http://www.joebiden.com/issues?id=0011
 
Hillary Clinton: 
Energy:  http://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/energy/ 
 
Christopher Dodd: 
Energy:  http://chrisdodd.com/issues/energy_independence/ 
John Edwards: 
Environment:  http://johnedwards.com/issues/energy/
See also Senator Edwards’ statement above.
Mike Gravel: 
Climate:  http://www.gravel2008.us/issues.php
 
Dennis Kucinich: 
Environment:  http://www.dennis4president.com/go/issues/a-sustainable-future/ 
 
Barack Obama: 
Energy:  http://www.barackobama.com/issues/energy/ 
Environment:  http://www.barackobama.com/issues/environment/ 
 
Bill Richardson: 
Energy:  http://www.richardsonforpresident.com/issues/energy 
Environment:  http://www.richardsonforpresident.com/issues/environment
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InTroDucTIon
Conventional electricity generation is by far the largest source of air pollutants that harm human health and con-tribute to global warming. For instance, emissions from 
just nine conventional power plants in Illinois directly contrib-
uted to 300 premature deaths, 14,000 asthma attacks, and more 
than 400 thousand daily incidents of upper respiratory symptoms 
per year among the 33 million people living within 250 miles of 
the plants.1 Moreover, fossil-fueled power plants in the United 
States emitted 2.25 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide (“CO
2
”) 
in 2003, more than ten times the amount of CO
2
 compared to the 
next-largest emitter, iron and steel production.2 Of all American 
industries, electricity generation is—by substantial margins—
the single largest contributor of the pollutants responsible for 
global warming. 
For these and other sobering reasons, many state govern-
ments promote renewable energy technologies though policies 
such as renewable portfolio 
standards (“RPS”) and fees such 
as a systems benefit charges 
(“SBCs”). By these mecha-
nisms, state regulators intend to 
correct three major failures of 
the existing “free” market for 
electricity fuels. First, electricity 
prices do not reflect the social 
costs of generating power. Hid-
den costs, or negative externali-
ties such as the need to secure 
foreign imports of fuel, environmental damage from resource 
extraction, air and water emissions, medical expenses associated 
with air pollution, and the risk of climate change, are not typi-
cally reflected in the rates Americans pay for electricity. 
Second, energy subsidies create an unfair market advantage 
for conventional energy technologies. A majority of the federal 
budget for energy research and development over the past fifty 
years has gone to conventional fossil fuel and nuclear industries 
and not toward renewable energy technologies. From 1948 to 
1998, for instance, roughly eighty percent of U.S. Department of 
Energy appropriations for research and development (“R&D”) 
have gone to nuclear and fossil fuel technologies.3 Even though 
coal, natural gas, and nuclear energy industries are relatively 
mature sectors, federal R&D expenditures continue to favor 
these industries. In fiscal year (“FY”) 2006, for example, the 
federal government allotted $580 million in R&D funds to fossil 
fuels and $221 million to the nuclear industry. The wind indus-
State effortS to promote renewable enerGy:
trippinG the horSe with the cart?
by Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper*
* Dr. Benjamin K. Sovacool is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Asia and 
Globalization at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University 
of Singapore. He serves as a Senior Research Fellow for the Network for New 
Energy Choices in New York and is an Adjunct Assistant Professor at the Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute & State University in Blacksburg, VA. He can be reached at 
bsovacool@nus.edu.sg. Christopher Cooper is the Executive Director of the Net-
work for New Energy Choices, a national nonprofit organization committed to 
reforming U.S. energy policy to expand the energy choices of American consumers 
and promoting creative ideas for financing community-based energy projects and 
advocates for progressive utility policy reform. He can be contacted at Chris@
NewEnergyChoices.org.
try, in contrast, received only $38.3 million.4 
Third, renewable energy generation is subject to a free 
rider problem. Since everyone benefits from the environmental 
advantages of renewable energy, private companies that invest 
millions of dollars in researching and developing clean energy 
technologies are often unable to recover the full profit of their 
investments. Inevitably, the market allows some consumers to 
be free riders, benefiting from the investments of others without 
paying for them. 
sTaTe GovernmenT mechanIsms For  
promoTInG renewable enerGy
State policy interventions intend to stimulate a market for 
renewable resources and spur additional research, development, 
and implementation of renewable energy technologies. So far, 
state governments in the United States have relied predomi-
nately on RPSs and SBCs to level the playing field by neutral-
izing a legacy of unequal federal subsidies and directly requiring 
renewable energy. While state 
policies are innovative and well 
intentioned, the time has come 
to shift to federal regulation and 
intervention. Continued reliance 
on state-based activity alone will 
ironically promote more market 
externalities and “free riding” 
than harmonized federal action.
SyStem benefit charGeS
Systems benefit charges 
(also called public benefit funds, 
system benefit funds, and clean energy funds) originated in the 
1990s at a time when state policy makers were considering elec-
tric utility restructuring legislation. Afraid that gains made in 
pursuing research, development, and implementation of envi-
ronmentally-preferable renewable energy technologies would 
end after markets were deregulated, advocates of the novel 
Energy subsidies create an 
unfair market advantage 
for conventional energy 
technologies.
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technologies won concessions in some states for a new funding 
mechanism for high-risk or long-term projects. A SBC places a 
small tax on every kilowatt hour (“kWh”) of electricity gener-
ated and utilizes those funds to pursue socially-beneficial energy 
projects.5 Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory estimates that 
SBCs have been responsible for promoting 1,117 megawatts 
(“MW”) of renewable energy capacity.6
SBCs were first implemented in Washington State in 1994 
and were endorsed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion in 1995 as a way to fund services that had previously been 
included in customers’ bills from regulated utility companies.7 As 
part of the negotiations for California’s restructuring law, envi-
ronmental advocates won a provision for a public benefit fund 
that would expend at least $872 million on energy-efficiency 
work from 1998 to the end of 2001 and would allocate $540 
million on renewable energy projects.8 To develop renewable 
energy technologies and other programs expected to struggle 
after deregulation, the California Energy Commission created its 
Public Interest Energy Research program, which initially drew 
about $62 million annually from the state’s SBC.9
By 2006, fifteen states created SBCs. The seventeen orga-
nizations that administer the funds, which are scheduled to total 
$4 billion by 2017, collaborate through a nonprofit organization 
called the Clean Energy States Alliance. The organization spon-
sors original research, collects information and analyses, and 
seeks to expand the use of clean energy technologies with a spe-
cial emphasis on solar, wind, and fuel cells. Moreover, the group 
seeks to increase the efficiency of state research by eliminating 
duplication of efforts and by providing forums for the states to 
share knowledge and insights.10 
renewable portfolio StanDarDS
An RPS is a legislative mandate requiring electricity sup-
pliers (often referred to as “load serving entities”) in a given 
geographical area to employ renewable resources to produce a 
certain percentage of power by a fixed date.
An RPS program transfers the risk of renewable energy 
investments from regulators to investors.11 RPS uses the mar-
ket as a mechanism to determine the efficacy of any given tech-
nology; as a result, higher costs, if they occur, are distributed 
evenly throughout society to those that benefit from them, and 
are blended with the lower costs of existing conventional gen-
eration. 12
Unlike instruments developed by public utility commissions 
with long and complex procedures, often followed by litigation, 
RPSs are bureaucratically simple.13 RPSs enable customers to 
pay producers directly for renewable energy, obviating the need 
for the administration of funds by government agencies. And, 
unlike a one-time award for funds, no project is guaranteed a 
place in the market.14 
First implemented by Iowa and Minnesota in the 1980s, 
twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have already 
passed RPS laws requiring utilities to use renewable resources 
as a portion of their overall provision of electricity.15 Four other 
states have nonbinding renewable energy goals.16 Five more 
states—Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Nebraska, and Utah—are 
considering mandating some form of RPS. Of the approximate 
9,000 MW of wind energy in the United States, roughly fifty 
percent, or 4,500 MW, have been promoted directly by RPS pol-
icies, whereas ten percent, or 900 MW, have been promoted by 
SBCs from 2001 to 2006.17
FIGure 1: annual u.s. wInD enerGy DevelopmenT by sTaTe 
polIcy mechanIsm, 2001 To 2006
The case For FeDeral InTervenTIon
There are three reasons, however, why continued reliance 
on state-based efforts such as SBCs and RPSs will be insuffi-
cient to promote renewable energy technologies in the United 
States on the scale needed to fight climate change.
improvinG reliability
First, federal intervention is needed to improve electric-
ity reliability. Contrary to what some opponents of renewable 
energy assert, the variability of renewable resources becomes 
easier to manage the more they are deployed. Electrical and 
power systems engineers have long held the principle that the 
larger a system becomes, the less reserve capacity it needs. 
Demand variations between individual consumers are mitigated 
by grid interconnection in exactly this manner. When a single 
electricity consumer, for example, starts drawing more electric-
ity than the system allocated for each consumer, the strain on the 
system is insignificant because so many consumers are drawing 
from the grid that it is entirely likely another consumer will be 
drawing less to make up the difference. This “averaging” works 
in a similar fashion on the supply side of the grid. Individual 
wind turbines average out each other in electricity supply.18 So 
when the wind is not blowing through one wind farm, it is likely 
blowing harder through another. 
Because the technical availability of one wind turbine rivals 
that of a single conventional power plant, wind farms of hundreds 
or thousands of turbines have even greater reliability because it 
is unlikely that all turbines would be down at the same time. Fur-
thermore, when turbines do malfunction, they take far less time 
to recover than massive conventional power plants or nuclear 
reactors that have literally millions of individual components, 
arranged in complex circuits prone to mechanical failure.19 Ana-
lysts already confirmed the benefit of wind power’s greater tech-
nical availability in the United States. Indeed, a November 2006 
study assessing the widespread use of wind power in Minnesota 
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concluded that “wind generation does make a calculable con-
tribution to system reliability” by decreasing the risk of large, 
unexpected outages.20 
Improved reliability of supply is important, as blackouts and 
brownouts exact a considerable toll on the American economy. 
The U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”) estimates that while 
power interruptions often last only seconds or minutes, they cost 
consumers an average of $150 to 400 billion every year.21 The 
Electric Power Research Institute projects the annual costs of 
poor power reliability at $119 billion, or forty-four percent of all 
electricity sales in 1995.22
However, to capture such benefits, renewable energy tech-
nologies must be spatially deployed in every state and must have 
national penetration rates above ten percent. Penetration rates of 
renewable energy technologies nationwide are still low—around 
three percent of overall installed electricity capacity in 2007. 
Collective state efforts are expected to increase this amount to 
only around four percent by 2015 and five percent by 2030, but 
the environmental benefits of renewable energy only really start 
to accrue at penetration rates well above this rate. Federal inter-
vention in the form of a nation-wide SBC or RPS aiming for tar-
gets of ten to twenty percent by 
2020 would expand the diversity 
of technologies used to access 
renewable resources. 
improvinG enerGy  
Security
Second, larger penetration 
rates are needed to ensure energy 
security. This is because the 
geographical dispersion of gen-
erators not only improves their 
overall reliability; it makes them 
more secure—and thus resilient 
to accidental power outages and 
failure, or intentional attack and disruption. Notwithstanding 
intense media focus on the security dangers from nuclear reac-
tors and natural gas facilities, the nation’s power grid represents 
an equally serious threat to energy security. The security issues 
facing the modern electric utility grid are almost as serious as 
they are invisible. 
For example, in 1975 the New World Liberation Front 
bombed assets of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company more 
than ten times, and members of the Ku Klux Klan and San 
Joaquin Militia have been convicted of attempting to attack elec-
tricity infrastructure.23 Internationally, organized paramilitaries 
such as the Farabundo-Marti National Liberation Front were 
able to interrupt more than ninety percent of electric service in El 
Salvador and even had manuals for attacking power systems.24 
Some caution that all it would take to cause a “cascade of 
power failures across the country,” costing billions of dollars in 
direct and indirect damage, is a few motivated people with mini-
vans and a couple of mortars and balloons, which they would 
use to chaff substations and disrupt transmission lines.25 A delib-
erate, aggressive, well-coordinated assault on the electric power 
grid could devastate the electricity sector. Replacement time 
would be “on the order of Iraq,” not “on the order of a lineman 
putting things up a pole.”26 
Several recent trends in the electric utility industry have 
increased the vulnerability of its infrastructure. To improve their 
operational efficiency, many utilities and system operators have 
increased their reliance on automation and computerization. 
Low margins and various competitive priorities have encour-
aged industry consolidation, with fewer and bigger facilities and 
intensive use of assets in one place. As the National Research 
Council noted, “control is more centralized, spare parts inven-
tories have been reduced, and subsystems are highly integrated 
across the entire business.”27
Federal promotion of renewable energy on a national scale 
can improve the security of the grid by decentralizing electric-
ity generation. Even when renewable resources like wind and 
solar are concentrated, the tendency for them to produce power 
in incremental and modular amounts makes it much more dif-
ficult to disrupt large segments of generation. The International 
Energy Agency has noted that centralized energy facilities create 
significant targets for terrorism because attacking a few facilities 
can cause large power outages.28 
In contrast to the security risks 
of large centralized generators, 
decentralizing energy facilities 
and providing power through 
more modular and distributed 
energy systems minimizes the 
risk of accidents and grid fail-
ures, and does not require trans-
porting or storing hazardous or 
radioactive materials. Analysts 
have tended to refer to renew-
able energy systems (and other 
forms of distributed generation 
such as fuel cells and small-scale cogeneration units) as “supple” 
power technologies because they are modular suited to dispersed 
siting.29 A national RPS or SBC promoting renewables could 
greatly contribute to the overall security of the nation’s electric 
infrastructure by forcing more technologies into the portfolio of 
all American utilities. 
proviDinG climate benefitS
Third, and perhaps most important, federal intervention is 
needed to fight climate change and minimize “free-riding” going 
on in states that have chosen to rely on nuclear and fossil fuels 
to generate electricity, instead of promoting renewable energy. 
The DOE has already determined that only “the imposition of [a 
national] RPS would lead to lower generation from natural gas 
and coal facilities.”30 Examinations of fuel generation in several 
states confirm this finding, as well as the tendency for a national 
RPS to displace oil-fired generation, which is still a significant 
source of electricity in Florida, New York, and Hawaii. Equally 
important, but often overlooked, is how SBC- or RPS-induced 
renewable generation would offset nuclear power in several 
regions of the United States. 
A deliberate, aggressive, 
well-coordinated assault 
on the electric power grid 
could devastate the  
electricity sector.
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Researchers in North Carolina, for example, determined 
that a state-wide RPS would displace facilities relying on 
nuclear fuels and minimize the environmental impacts associ-
ated with the extraction of uranium used to fuel nuclear reac-
tors.31 In Oregon, the Governor’s Renewable Energy Working 
Group analyzed a twenty-five percent statewide RPS by 2025 
and projected that every fifty MW of renewable energy would 
displace approximately twenty MW of base-load resources, 
including nuclear power.32 Environment Michigan estimates that 
a twenty percent RPS by 2020 would displace the need for more 
than 640 MW of power that would have otherwise come from 
both nuclear and coal facilities.33 
By offsetting the generation of conventional and nuclear 
power plants, only large-scale renewable energy penetration 
rates would avoid many of the environmental and social costs 
associated with the mining, processing, transportation, com-
bustion, and clean-up of fossil and nuclear fuels. By promot-
ing technologies that displace conventional forms of electricity 
generation, federal promotion of renewable energy would sub-
stantially decrease air pollution in the United States. A single one 
MW wind turbine running at only thirty percent of capacity for 
one year displaces more than 1,500 tons of carbon dioxide, 2.5 
tons of sulfur dioxide 3.2 tons of 
nitrous oxides, and 60 pounds of 
toxic mercury emissions.34 
One study assessing the 
environmental potential of a 580 
MW wind farm located on the 
Altamont Pass near San Fran-
cisco, California, concluded that 
the turbines displaced hundreds 
of thousands of tons of air pol-
lutants each year that would 
have otherwise resulted from 
fossil fuel combustion. 35 The study estimated that the wind farm 
would displace more than twenty-four billion pounds of nitrous 
oxides, sulfur dioxides, particulate matter, and carbon dioxide 
over the course of its twenty-year lifetime—enough to cover 
the entire city of Oakland, California in a pile of toxic pollution 
forty-stories high.36
Renewable energy technologies possess an even greater abil-
ity to mitigate climate change. The International Atomic Energy 
Agency estimates that when direct and indirect carbon emis-
sions are included, coal plants are around ten times more carbon 
intensive than solar technologies and more than forty times more 
carbon intensive than wind technologies. Natural gas fares little 
better, at three times as carbon intense as solar and twenty times 
as carbon intensive as wind.37 The Common Purpose Institute esti-
mates that renewable energy technologies could offset as much as 
0.49 tons of carbon dioxide emissions per every MWh of gen-
eration. According to data compiled by the Union of Concerned 
Scientists, a twenty percent RPS would reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions by 434 million metric tons by 2020—a reduction of 
fifteen percent below “business as usual” levels, or the equivalent 
to taking nearly seventy-one million automobiles off the road.38 
FIGure 2: DIrecT anD InDIrecT carbon emIssIons  
by elecTrIcITy TechnoloGy  
(equIvalenT Grams oF co
2
/kwh) 39
These estimates are not simply theoretical. Between 1991 
and 1997 renewable energy technologies in the Netherlands 
reduced that country’s annual emissions of CO
2
 between 4.4 
million and 6.7 million tons. Renewable technologies were so 
successful at displacing greenhouse gas emissions that Europe 
now views renewable energy as “the major tool of distribution 
utilities in meeting industry CO
2
 reduction targets.”40 
conclusIon
Given such obvious and 
overwhelming advantages, it is 
hard to believe that many utili-
ties and policymakers diligently 
oppose national promotion 
on renewable energy, repeating 
myths that have long since been 
debunked. Largely, the remain-
ing objections to federal inter-
vention constitute a diminishing 
series of canards that mischarac-
terize a national SBC or RPS as an unnecessary federal inter-
vention in a relatively free market. Forgetting that a majority of 
states are well on their way to imposing their own clunky, over-
lapping, inconsistent, competing, and sometimes irrational mess 
of mandates, opponents churn out four war-torn myths every 
time the issue is considered:
The first criticism is that a national SBC or RPS would cre-
ate “winners and losers.” In reality, all states have renewable 
resources they can affordably develop. However, under the 
current system of state mandates, some states are “losers” by 
subsidizing the cheap, polluting electricity in other states. Other 
states are victims to inconsistencies between state mandates that 
produce perverse predatory trade-offs and require them to export 
their cheap in-state renewable electricity in exchange for more 
expensive electricity or renewable energy credits. A national 
mandate would level the playing field by creating consistent, 
uniform rules and by allowing utilities to purchase renewable 
energy credits or develop renewable resources anywhere they 
are cost competitive.
The second criticism is that a national mandate would 
increase electricity rates. However, in most states, renewable 
An RPS program transfers 
the risk of renewable  
energy investments from 
regulators to investors.
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energy mandates have not significantly increased rates and a 
consensus of economic models predict that a national policy 
would generate substantial consumer savings over the existing 
patchwork of state programs. By expanding the amount of 
energy that would offset gas-fired generation, a federal inter-
vention would reduce demand on a strained and volatile natural 
gas market. Renewable energy units with markedly faster lead-
times than conventional and nuclear reactors speeds the cost 
recovery of critical transmission investments and reduces the 
rate increases needed to pay for new transmission.
Another common criticism is that a federal mandate would 
harm the utilities sector in the form of future profits they will 
not be able to recover from consumers through higher electricity 
rates. For policymakers, balancing utility profits with electric-
ity prices is one of the hard decisions we elect them to make. 
However, elected officials should consider that utility claims of 
lost profit are short-sited and strategically unsound. In reality, a 
more predictable regulatory environment decreases utility litiga-
tion and compliance costs relative to a growing tangle of vague 
and unstable state mandates. Expanding the universe of eligible 
renewable resources and establishing clear, uniform trading rules 
creates far more flexibility for regulated utilities and rewards 
utility investments on the basis of smart market strategy. By 
promoting a robust domestic renewable energy manufacturing 
sector, a national mandate reduces the costs utilities pay in unfa-
vorable exchange rates for foreign parts and labor and redirects 
those investments to the U.S. labor market.
A final criticism is that a national RPS or SBC would pro-
mote only least-cost options such as wind turbines and land-
fill gas generators (and not solar photovoltaic, solar thermal, 
small-scale hydroelectric, and geothermal plants). Existing state 
programs, however, reveal that mandates with broad qualify-
ing resource eligibility actually have led to the development of 
many different renewable resources. Utilities have already dem-
onstrated that they can meet state requirements by deploying a 
diverse portfolio of renewable resources that best match their 
service areas. By geographically and monetarily expanding the 
market for renewable resources, a national RPS is likely to fur-
ther diversify the deployment of renewable energy technologies. 
In Nevada, geothermal energy may be cheaper to develop than 
wind. In the Pacific Northwest, incremental hydroelectric power 
may be cheaper than solar. In the Southeast, biomass may be the 
most affordable. A national RPS mandate with a fuel-based defi-
nition of eligible renewable resources ensures that free market 
principles, rather than regulatory set-asides or political patron-
age, determine which technologies will be most cost competitive 
in certain areas of the country. An added bonus is that a national 
RPS decreases compliance costs for regulated utilities, since a 
technology-neutral mandate allows utilities to meet RPS obliga-
tions using the technology that is most cost competitive for the 
fuels available.
Ultimately, by establishing a consistent, national mandate 
and uniform trading rules, a national SBC or RPS can create a 
more just and predictable regulatory environment for utilities 
while jump-starting a robust national renewable energy technol-
ogy sector. By offsetting electricity that utilities would other-
wise generate with conventional and nuclear power, a federal 
action would decrease electricity prices for American consumers 
while protecting human health and the environment at a scale 
and magnitude not possible with state programs.
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Wind turbines are often criticized for posing a signifi-cant risk to surrounding bird life. As certain numbers indicate, this argument has some merit. A 2001 study 
estimated that 33,000 birds are killed in the United States each 
year by wind turbines.1 More troubling is the fact that of those 
33,000, an estimated 28,500 are protected species.2 Birds may 
collide with the structure itself, be struck by a spinning blade, 
or, if flying close enough, be pulled into the turbine’s wake.3 
Though these numbers seem troublesome at first glance, they are 
an inaccurate depiction of modern wind turbine sites nor do they 
constitute a valid reason to discourage wind turbine construc-
tion.
The most often criticized wind farm is California’s Altamont 
Pass wind power site. Figures suggest that since its construction 
in the early 1980s, the 7,000 turbine site has been responsible 
for killing 22,000 birds, including 400 golden eagles.4 Altamont 
Pass represents an older generation of wind sites and by examin-
ing the factors that set it apart from modern sites, one can under-
stand the causes of avian mortality.
The first factor is the site’s location. Had an adequate envi-
ronmental impact assessment taken place at Altamont Pass, it 
would have shown that it is an important migration route, as 
well as a wintering place for many species of raptors.5 Its craggy 
landscape and various canyons make it an ideal setting for birds 
of prey, many of which are listed on the endangered species list.6 
Properly situating turbine sites in areas with low bird popula-
tions would drastically reduce collision rates simply by placing 
the turbines where there are less 
birds to fly into them. Today it 
is common practice to study bird 
traffic at proposed sites before 
construction begins. If the stud-
ies find that the proposed site 
is heavily trafficked, operation 
schedules can then take into 
account peak migratory periods.
The second factor is tech-
nology. The turbine designs at 
Altamont are considerably outdated. It takes fifteen Altamont 
turbines to produce the same energy as one modern, larger tur-
bine.7 Newer turbines, with rotor diameters in excess of one hun-
dred meters, sweep a larger patch of sky and therefore need not 
spin as fast as small turbines.8 The slower the rotation speed, 
the easier it is for flying birds to dodge the blades. Though more 
costly, large turbines reduce bird fatalities and generate energy 
more efficiently. Fortunately, there are plans to replace all of the 
the truth about winD turbineS anD  
avian mortality
by Michael Distefano*
* Michael Distefano is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University, 
Washington College of Law.
Altamont turbines with larger, more efficient units within the 
coming decade.9
To put these factors in perspective, consider the Maple Ridge 
Wind Farm in upstate New York. In the last year or so 195 tur-
bines have come online and collectively they produce 320 mega-
watts of electricity per year.10 By contrast, the Altamont Pass 
wind farm generates approxi-
mately 600 megawatts per year 
but employs 7,000 turbines to 
do so.11 The Maple Ridge Wind 
Farm enjoys an efficiency rate 
almost twenty times that of the 
Altamont Pass. Because fewer 
turbines equal reduced chances 
of collision, every gain in effi-
ciency reduces the occurrence of 
avian mortality. 
Concerns have been raised with the possible increase in 
avian mortality, if wind energy were to experience a sudden 
boom and turbines increased by the thousands However, it is 
not clear that an increase in wind energy will cause an avian 
mortality incidence swell. In absolute numbers bird fatalities 
Is not clear that an  
increase in wind energy 
will cause an avian  
mortality incidence swell.
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would undoubtedly rise. But bird fatalities per turbine drop 
the more we learn about turbine technology and operation. As 
long as wind turbines can produce a substantial portion of our 
energy without posing an unnecessarily large risk to birds, their 
use is warranted. Our measure of success must be the next best 
alternative. Conventional energy 
resources such as coal and petro-
leum also pose a substantial dan-
ger to birds. Acid rain has done 
considerable damage to avian 
habitats and climate change has 
disrupted migratory patterns and 
synchrony with food sources.12 
Environmental catastrophes like 
the Exxon Valdez, though rare, 
continue to pose threats not just 
to individual birds, but entire 
ecosystems. There is no question that the use and extraction of 
coal and other fossil fuels has had and will continue to have a 
tremendous negative effect on birdlife.13 
The Altamont Pass has been a learning experience not only 
for the California Energy Commission but for the renewable 
energy community as a whole. By improving wind turbine tech-
The most often criticized 
wind farm is California’s 
Altamont Pass wind  
power site.
nology and properly choosing and operating turbine sites, the 
incidence of avian mortality can be reduced. Even concerned 
organizations, such as the American Bird Conservancy and 
Sierra Club, have pledged their support in favor of wind energy 
as long as proper attention is given to its location, design, and 
operation.14
Wind farms are, by their 
very nature, large industrial 
projects. It would be impossible 
to completely mitigate their 
impacts on wildlife and habitats 
but with careful attention those 
impacts can be reduced. Wind 
energy should be viewed within 
its larger context—that of the 
urgent need for diversified and 
renewable energy resources. As 
the United States and other countries begin to explore energy 
alternatives, wind’s role should not be sidelined because of this 
unfortunate consequence. Wind turbines will always pose a 
degree of danger to birdlife but the value to be gained from their 
responsible use is undeniable.
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The debate over U.S. federal climate change policy has never been stronger. While a federal climate policy is being formulated, the states are developing climate expe-
rience and expertise that the federal government can leverage. 
This trend begs the question of whether state policies should be 
used as a template for federal climate policy.
One area where states have developed expertise is in the 
registration and tracking of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions. 
Even though tracking GHG emissions has recently become a 
mainstream federal issue, Wisconsin has long been a leader in 
this area. Since 1993, Wisconsin has required any facility that 
emits more than 100,000 tons 
of carbon dioxide (“CO
2
”) to 
report its emission levels to the 
state Department of Natural 
Resources. It is the only state 
with such a requirement.1 Addi-
tionally, dozens of sources that 
fall well below the threshold 
voluntarily report their emis-
sions, providing the state with 
a detailed, multi-year profile of 
its major CO
2
 sources. The pro-
file includes most major electric 
utilities in the state, a wide range 
of large industries, and a mixture of smaller sources.2
Moreover, several states have developed “carbon adders” 
to compare investment options with respect to the possible 
future costs of mitigating GHG emissions.3 A carbon adder is an 
expected future cost of CO
2
 equivalent assumed during invest-
ment comparisons. Due to the highly uncertain and controversial 
nature of future damages of climate change, a carbon adder esti-
mates only the future compliance costs of carbon restraint rather 
than the economic impacts of future climate change.4 
Of the states with carbon adders, Oregon’s is the most 
broadly applied. The Oregon Public Utility Commission 
(“PUC”) requires all regulated utilities to include analysis on 
a range of carbon costs in their integrated resource planning 
process since 1993.5  Similarly, the California PUC requires the 
state’s investor-owned utilities to include a carbon adder in their 
resource plans.6 Colorado’s carbon adder only applies to one 
utility because the carbon adder resulted from a litigation settle-
ment agreement with environmental groups.7 
States have often led in policy development, which can 
influence federal action. States are often better positioned to 
reach consensus and act more quickly than the federal gov-
tranSlatinG State experience into  
feDeral climate policy
by Jennifer M. Rohleder*
* Jennifer Rohleder is a JD candidate, May 2008, at American University, Washing-
ton College of Law. Ms. Rohleder welcomes comments at jp1845a@american.edu.
States are often better  
positioned to reach  
consensus and act more 
quickly than the  
federal government.
ernment. The political interests of most states are relatively 
cohesive when compared to the national policy-making pro-
cess. State government units are smaller and closer to affected 
constituencies, thus states are better able implement policy 
responses more quickly.
Policy diffusion from the state to the federal level is known 
as vertical diffusion.8 Expanding effective state-level energy and 
climate policies to the national level seems to be a logical and 
efficient method of developing federal climate policy. The ques-
tion is: how do we translate state experience into federal policy? 
The World Resources Institute conducted a study on how state 
policies influence federal regula-
tions. The study identified and 
evaluated several factors that 
contributed to successful verti-
cal diffusion, the most important 
of which, particularly for envi-
ronmental/energy issues, was 
state officials championing the 
cutting-edge policies their states 
have implemented in the federal 
policy debate.9 The study con-
cluded that states can play a sig-
nificant role in the development 
of a national policy. However, 
no single factor can guarantee vertical diffusion although certain 
factors, such as the power of example and the extent of horizon-
tal policy diffusion (from state to state) are cited strong factors 
informing federal policy. 
States are considered the laboratories of democracy, testing 
new ideas and innovative policies that can be used by national 
policy-makers. Vertical diffusion is only effective if the federal 
policymakers learn from the experiences of the states and pull 
the best features together into an overarching national policy. 
Unfortunately for states, as climate policy discussions expand to 
the national level states risk losing their leadership status with 
respect to the policy agenda. In addition, a national discussion 
invites broader interests to the negotiating table. Further compli-
cating vertical diffusion is the fact that states can only maintain 
their role as policy incubators and innovators so long as federal 
policy does not preempt state actions.
Endnotes: Translating State Experience Into Federal Climate Policy 
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InTroDucTIon
As the Senate prepares to take up a measure, passed by 
the House of Representatives, for a national renewable energy 
portfolio standard (“RPS”),1 and continues serious deliberations 
about a mandatory greenhouse gas (“GHG”) reduction pro-
gram, it is an appropriate time to examine what role a national 
RPS would have within a mandatory GHG reduction program. 
Because Congress seems to prefer a broad cap-and-trade pro-
gram as the best least-cost vehicle with which to implement a 
mandatory carbon reduction program, tension exists between 
a market-oriented cap-and-trade program and a command and 
control RPS mandate. This debate does not take place within a 
vacuum, as almost half the states have adopted an RPS or similar 
renewable energy targets.2 A national RPS calls into question the 
role such state RPS programs would have both within a national 
RPS and within the context of 
a national carbon cap-and-trade 
program.
Three primary bases for ten-
sion exist between an RPS and 
a cap-and-trade program. First, 
renewables, as imposed through 
an RPS, are typically not the 
least-cost compliant solution 
to carbon reductions, particu-
larly in the earlier stages of any 
carbon cap-and-trade program 
where the required reductions are expected to be relatively mod-
est. Second, once a carbon cap-and-trade program is enacted, the 
purpose of an RPS program becomes more uncertain because 
renewable power purchased pursuant to an RPS program will 
no longer provide any additional carbon reductions beyond 
those required by the cap. Third, it is difficult to integrate RPS 
requirements into a carbon cap-and-trade program in a way that 
produces relatively fair results with respect to the entities that 
purchase the renewables and, therefore, bear their costs. 
Taken together, these three tensions between an RPS pro-
gram and a least-cost carbon cap-and-trade policy tend to weaken 
the current standard rationales for enacting RPS programs. In 
order to properly sort out these issues and develop a coordinated 
and sound national carbon policy that includes a renewables 
component, legislators must evaluate and agree on the specific 
purposes for enacting an RPS program in the context of an 
expected carbon cap-and-trade program. They must also struc-
ture both programs to meet the defined objectives of the RPS. 
the role of renewable portfolio  
StanDarDS in the context of a national  
carbon cap-anD-traDe proGram
by Neal J. Cabral*
That RPS mandates  
are primarily carbon  
reduction mandates seems 
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reasons For enacTInG an rps
An RPS requires that electric generators or suppliers source 
a defined percentage of their power from renewable energy 
facilities.3 Qualifying renewables vary by program, but typi-
cally include wind, biomass, solar, geothermal, landfill gas, and 
sometimes hydropower.4 Although renewable energy is a term 
intended to describe energy sources that are considered renew-
able because they are powered by energy coming from an inex-
haustible source, or from sources that regenerate fast enough 
that they will not be depleted, RPS can also include sources that 
do not fit that description. However, all qualifying RPS sources 
currently under the various state standards and proposed federal 
standard are also at least low-carbon or carbon-neutral sources 
of power, and it is this defining attribute that, from a policy per-
spective, is probably the most important aspect of renewables. 
That RPS mandates are pri-
marily carbon reduction man-
dates seems relatively clear. 
Although RPS requirements are 
almost never enacted primar-
ily as specific carbon reduc-
tion programs, probably due to 
political concerns, this seems to 
be their primary perceived ben-
efit. In other words, while states 
and Congress apparently count 
RPS programs as an important 
contributor to GHG reductions, they rarely discuss any specific 
carbon-based programmatic aspects of an RPS, such as explain-
ing how the RPS would fit within specifically adopted carbon 
reduction goals.
Instead, proponents often tout renewables as a sound pol-
icy measure because, in addition to being green from a gen-
eral emissions perspective, they also provide other ancillary 
benefits. For example, renewables are said broadly to promote 
energy security. While renewables do promote certain aspects 
of energy security through supply diversity, they do not tend 
to reduce fuel imports since the power sector generally imports 
only a very small amount of fuel from outside North America. 
Studies on whether renewables contribute importantly to energy 
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price stability also conflict. 5 In general, the International Energy 
Agency has concluded that while “environmental objectives will 
be uppermost,” RPS can provide some energy security enhance-
ments.6 
However, these ancillary reasons for promoting an RPS do 
not appear themselves to be sufficiently compelling to support 
national RPS legislation. Instead, the carbon reduction element 
of RPS requirements appears to be the driving force. That con-
clusion seems obvious when one considers whether states would 
ever adopt RPS programs if qualifying emission sources met all 
of the non-carbon benefits that RPS advocates purport renew-
ables provide, but were in fact carbon-based sources of power. 
In such a case, little advocacy for RPS programs would exist 
at all, and few would be adopted. We can see this quite readily 
when we consider coal-to-liquids plants. In fact, such plants 
do rather efficiently reduce dependence on foreign energy 
supplies such as oil for mobile sources, diversify domestic 
energy facilities, and promote new technological developments, 
but they hardly receive support, and are instead typically 
opposed, because the process is very carbon-intensive.  
If the policy support for an RPS primarily tends to be based 
on the carbon reduction component, it makes sense from a policy 
perspective to evaluate the efficacy and role of an RPS require-
ment within a larger national carbon reduction strategy. Based 
on congressional deliberations to date and proposed legislation,7 
it seems clear that Congress’ current preference to address car-
bon nationally is through a broad cap-and-trade program. Hence, 
an evaluation of the efficacy and role of an RPS program should 
include an evaluation of how an RPS fits within a national GHG 
cap-and-trade program. 
rps unDer a cap-anD-TraDe proGram
Because RPS programs seem largely intended to reduce 
carbon emissions, despite the fact that they do not actually tar-
get carbon emissions, but rather fuel choice, their approach is 
a potentially inefficient command-and-control mandate at odds 
with a market-based cap-and-trade program. Market-based cap-
and-trade programs hold, as their fundamental premise, that 
allowing the regulated community to determine its own solutions 
to meet a mandatory emissions cap is far more cost-effective and 
more certain than a one-size fits all series of command-and-con-
trol mandates, which instead set specific performance or tech-
nology standards.8 As a consequence, cap-and-trade programs 
are expected to provide least-cost solutions to emission reduc-
tion goals. 
benefitS of a cap-anD-traDe proGram
Cap-and-trade programs have two fundamental benefits as 
compared with command-and-control emission reduction pro-
grams. First, by allowing trading, the program does not decide 
who has to make reductions. This allows sources to take emis-
sions reduction steps when the costs are favorable to the source 
and to forgo that option and instead purchase emissions allow-
ances or credits when the costs are unfavorable to a source. 
Second, a cap-and-trade program does not decide what those 
reductions must be or how the source achieves the reduction. 
Instead, the regulated community is free to determine what steps 
should be taken to meet the overall cap. Consequently, then, it 
can develop and pursue the least-cost solutions.
The sulfur dioxide emissions trading approach established 
under the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments9 produced vast 
compliance cost savings primarily because the U.S. power 
industry figured out how to burn low-sulfur coal in units not 
designed for such coal, and thereby avoided the costs associated 
with the assumed need to widely employ more expensive scrub-
bing control technology.10 In other words, the market figured 
out a method of compliance that was not anticipated when the 
requirements were adopted. This method likely would have been 
unavailable had a command-and control-mandate based on the 
performance of scrubber technology been adopted. 
Notably, the least-cost result expected under a cap-and-trade 
program is not an end in itself, but rather allows policy makers to 
set more ambitious and more certain emissions reduction targets 
than they might otherwise be able to obtain. EPA observed:
[T]he cost-minimizing feature of cap and trade has 
long-term environmental benefits. Driving down the 
cost of reducing a unit of pollution means that policy-
makers and regulating authorities can set targets that 
reduce more pollution at the same cost to society. This 
system makes it economically and politically feasible 
to achieve greater environmental improvement.11
Given Congress’ concern about the overall impact of any 
national carbon reduction strategy on the health of the U.S. 
economy, the costs of any specific carbon reduction program 
become an important political question. 
effectS of an rpS conflict with cap-anD-traDe
A national RPS program, as a command and control man-
date, could conflict with a market-based cap-and-trade program. 
That conflict is primarily relevant if a known cost discrepancy 
actually exists between renewables as a carbon compliance 
option and other available methods of carbon reduction. The con-
flict emerges clearly in the case of an RPS because renewables 
in fact cost more in the aggregate than other carbon reduction 
options that might be employed, at least until the cap tightens 
over time. 
The relative cost-effectiveness of a national RPS as a car-
bon reduction strategy has been evaluated a number of times. 
Most notably, the 2002 Parer Report to the Council of Aus-
tralian Governments on national energy reform concluded that 
Australia’s national RPS program should be abolished and 
replaced with a national cap-and-trade policy for carbon because 
the RPS proved a cost-ineffective method of obtaining carbon 
reductions when compared with a cap-and-trade program.12 Sub-
sequent analyses of the Australian RPS program concluded that: 
(1) the dollar per ton cost of carbon reductions associated with a 
ten percent RPS standard would support four times the amount 
of carbon reductions if imposed instead as a carbon reduction 
requirement under a cap-and-trade program; and (2) an amount 
of carbon reductions equivalent to what a ten percent RPS stan-
dard would obtain could be achieved through a cap-and-trade 
program at a third of the price.13 
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Similar studies have been performed for a U.S. national 
RPS, and the conclusions are the same. One unpublished study 
concludes that the carbon reductions associated with an RPS 
that rises to ten percent cost more than four times as much as 
would be the case if a cap-and-trade program were placed on the 
power generation sector.14 Another study concluded that an RPS 
is “less cost-effective as a mechanism for reducing carbon emis-
sions from electricity generators than a policy designed specifi-
cally to limit carbon emissions.”15 
As these cost studies make clear, a carbon-cap-and-trade 
program is generally insufficient to sustain widespread penetra-
tion of renewables at higher RPS levels simply as a result of 
power price increases resulting from the cap. If that were true, 
then renewables would be the compliance option of choice in 
the economic modeling described above. Instead, it is generally 
energy efficiency and conservation measures, which often have 
a positive payback over time and thus cost nothing, that tend to 
replace renewables as a more cost-effective compliance option. 
However, some renewable projects remain cost-effective, and 
are undertaken even under a cap-and-trade program, where 
the cost of carbon raises power prices. All of these results can 
change when the stringency of the cap is increased, or if the cap-
and-trade program provides specific incentives to renewables 
through a favorable allowance 
allocation. 
In sum, an RPS appears to 
be, at bottom, largely intended 
as a carbon reduction policy and 
should be explicitly treated as 
such, including open discussion 
of how it fits into any national 
carbon policy, such as a cap-
and-trade program; and an RPS 
mandate is a more expensive and less-cost effective method of 
carbon reduction than simply adopting a cap-and-trade program 
with no such command and control mandates. Because Congress 
has expressed great concern over the cost and broad economic 
impact of a mandatory carbon program, and intends to seek least 
cost solutions where available, the higher cost of an RPS ver-
sus alternatives to produce equivalent carbon reductions would 
seem to argue for a careful assessment of the specific goals and 
benefits of an RPS program in light of an expected mandatory 
carbon cap-and-trade requirement. 
In addition, maintaining an RPS as a requirement indepen-
dent of a cap-and-trade program does not provide more or addi-
tional carbon reductions. This is due to the fact that the carbon 
reductions from the RPS program are simply factored into the 
reductions needed to meet the cap, and therefore become a part 
of the compliance portfolio. As carbon reductions from renew-
ables occur, alternative reductions that would otherwise have 
occurred to meet the cap are forgone. In general, most renew-
able energy produces carbon reductions because a power gen-
erator somewhere reduces its level of fossil fuel consumption, 
often natural gas, in an amount equal to the amount of renewable 
power that is added to the grid. The fossil fuel power genera-
tor that reduces its output is now left with allowances to sell or 
use itself under the cap. This results in an increase in carbon 
emissions somewhere that equals the carbon reductions caused, 
and emission allowances “freed up,” by the use of renewable 
power. Thus, overall emissions remain equal to the level permit-
ted under the cap. 
impactS of an rpS unDer a cap-anD-traDe proGram
While RPS requirements do not provide additional reduc-
tions under a cap-and-trade program, they do define renewable 
power as a specific method of obtaining part of the reductions 
that will be achieved under the cap. This is true because a cer-
tain percentage of renewable power must be purchased under the 
RPS without regard for the cap. Additionally, the cost-ineffec-
tiveness of an RPS is confined to, and incurred by, entities that 
must comply with the RPS mandate, and this occurs outside the 
cap. Thus, the cost of compliance within the cap itself is low-
ered, although the overall cost to meet the cap is higher when 
factoring in RPS costs. 
In this light, RPS programs lose much of their stated pol-
icy support because, upon implementation of a cap, they are 
no longer a carbon reduction policy. Instead, an RPS becomes 
a mandate that a certain amount of reductions to be achieved 
under a carbon cap must come 
from renewable power. Thus, 
the question for policy makers 
to debate is whether renewables, 
despite their cost, are sufficiently 
important to an overall national 
carbon reduction strategy so 
that they should be mandated 
as a carbon compliance mecha-
nism? Despite the importance of 
these issues, virtually no serious 
debate about them has taken place in the United States. Instead, 
the benefits of renewables as part of national carbon policy are 
largely assumed, and their drawbacks ignored.
polIcy consIDeraTIons supporTInG an rps
While good public policy requires a careful assessment of 
both the benefits and drawbacks of an RPS within the context 
of an expected national carbon reduction mandate, the Austra-
lian experience tells us this consideration is also important as a 
practical matter. After the issuance of the Parer Report, recom-
mending that that the Australian RPS be abolished and replaced 
with a more cost-effective cap-and-trade program, investment 
in renewables slowed due to the obvious regulatory uncertainty. 
That uncertainty remained unresolved for another two years as 
Australia reviewed the issues and decided to recommit to the 
RPS, albeit with some adjustments. Therefore, in order to pro-
vide long term certainty in renewables markets, the fact that an 
RPS requirement is not a least-cost solution to carbon reduc-
tion and does not provide any additional reductions beyond what 
a cap would require should be recognized and accepted after 
debate, so as not to cause surprises and associated uncertainty 
later.
RPS obligations often  
fall on the company that 
distributes power.
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Notably, the Australian evaluation of whether to continue 
with an RPS or replace it with a carbon cap-and-trade program 
provides some insight into specific policies that would support 
continuation of the renewables mandate. The primary reasons 
articulated for continuing the RPS in Australia were based on the 
expectations that renewables would become a more cost-effec-
tive carbon reduction option as the cap tightened over time and 
as the costs of renewables decreased through continued build-
out, and, perhaps more importantly, that renewables presented 
an attractive hedge against future technology or other failure for 
other carbon reduction measures.16 Similarly, the United States 
could also conclude that renewables do promote greater future 
compliance certainty and provide an expectation of lower rela-
tive costs over time, and that those are sufficient reasons to sup-
port continued investment in renewables now so as to preserve 
these future benefits. 
These benefits, rarely articulated forcefully in the limited 
U.S. debate over the role of renewables in a carbon cap-and-
trade program, do provide powerful policy arguments to support 
continuation of renewables programs. In essence, the primary 
attraction of renewables is that the technology is well under-
stood, is fairly readily deployed, and can provide relatively large 
reductions, or avoided emissions, on a project basis. Indeed, it 
is these aspects of renewables that may make them attractive to 
industry. Despite the cost issue, industry has not yet objected to 
renewable mandates on any broad or sustained basis as a cost-
ineffective method of carbon reduction, however industry has 
frequently raised other objections. This may simply reflect the 
fact that while the attributes of familiarity and certainty pro-
vide tangible benefits, they are not recognized in economic cost 
models. Further, as one compares a suite of specific and discrete 
renewables projects with a suite of ubiquitous energy efficiency 
projects that must be undertaken by third parties, namely power 
company customers, ease of implementation for renewables 
may prove to be an important factor in tacit acceptance of RPS 
programs. 
Another benefit of an explicit legislative assessment of 
whether to promote higher-cost renewables requirements when 
a national carbon trading program is expected to follow is that 
specific policy reasons to adopt the higher cost alternative can be 
articulated, and the RPS program tailored to promote the iden-
tified objectives. For example, if one of the reasons advanced 
for an RPS is to make the United States a technology leader 
in renewables, then Congress should evaluate whether renew-
ables research and development programs would help promote 
that objective. Similarly, if one of the articulated reasons for 
employing an RPS mandate is to help the renewables industry 
achieve critical economies of scale and so reduce the cost of 
renewables, then the RPS should be sized to specifically pro-
mote that objective, and no more. 
Perhaps most importantly, if an RPS is to be adopted, leg-
islation should provide a comprehensive package that also 
removes obstacles to broad renewables penetration and ensures 
the renewables target can be met. It is no secret that renewables, 
as intermittent sources often concentrated in specific geographic 
regions of the country favorable to the type of generation at 
issue, require important and large-scale changes to the existing 
transmission and distribution grids in order to achieve signifi-
cant levels of penetration. The Electric Power Research Insti-
tute recently published a paper that specifies precisely what sorts 
of large-scale grid and other technology improvements would 
be necessary to accommodate significant penetration of renew-
ables.17 It is well known that grid improvements are difficult to 
make, take years to permit, and often are not favored invest-
ments by power companies. In addition, newer and better power 
storage technologies will be needed to accommodate large-scale 
renewables penetration.18 Hence, legislative packages seeking to 
address the research, permitting and financing issues associated 
with such improvements would seem to be a critical aspect of 
any sensible and realistic RPS objectives.
promoTInG renewables unDer a  
cap anD TraDe proGram
If it is decided as a policy matter that renewables should 
be promoted as part of a national cap and trade program, there 
are a variety of ways to do this. This Article has focused on an 
RPS because Congress is currently considering such a mandate, 
although other options to promote defined renewables goals are 
also available. An RPS program does have the benefit of provid-
ing certainty that a minimum amount of renewable power will 
be produced. However, that approach does limit the extent of 
renewables penetration to the amount of the RPS, at least until the 
time that renewables become competitive as a power source due 
to a rise in power prices as a result of a tightening carbon cap. 
However, a certain inequity exists associated with RPS 
mandates, in that there is often a disconnect between the renew-
able purchases and the actual carbon reduction, or carbon avoid-
ance. The power company purchasing the renewable power to 
meet RPS requirements has paid for the carbon reduction in the 
form of the cost difference between otherwise available fossil 
power and the renewable power. However, that company often 
cannot use the carbon reduction associated with the renewable 
power purchase for compliance under a carbon cap because the 
power plant that reduces its load to accommodate the renew-
able power is often a different company than the renewable 
power purchaser. Instead, it is either the power generator, which 
reduces its load that obtains the carbon benefit even though it did 
not pay for the carbon reduction, or the entire carbon market in 
general, which obtains a benefit because of lowered demand for 
allowances and greater availability of lower cost carbon reduc-
tions, which are not used in lieu of higher cost renewable power 
reductions (i.e., some of the costs of compliance with the cap are 
transferred to the RPS program).19 
The reason for this inequity is twofold. First, RPS obliga-
tions often fall on the company that distributes power, and that 
company may not own any generating facilities. Second, and 
more importantly, RPS mandates can typically be met by pur-
chasing renewable energy credits. Use of such credits allows 
renewable power sources to situate geographically at the least-
cost sites for the power produced, and renewable power purchas-
ers, located far away from renewable resources, to readily and 
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cost-effectively buy renewable power. The consequence of this 
is that companies obligated to comply with RPS requirements 
can suffer a double hit, in the form of mandatory purchases of 
often higher cost renewable power and the general inability to 
take carbon credit for those purchases under a carbon cap. If 
Congress elects to pass an RPS and/or to allow states to maintain 
RPS requirements after implementation of a carbon cap-and-
trade program, careful thought need be given to identifying and 
accommodating, as best as possible, the impacts an RPS could 
have on cap equities.   
Instead of an RPS, renewable incentives could be added 
in the cap-and-trade program itself by allocating allowances to 
renewable plants through a renewables set-aside, by allocating 
allowances to the power sector based on power output and not 
emissions, or by directing a portion of revenues from any allow-
ance auction to renewables. Each of these mechanisms has indi-
vidual benefits and complications. 
The allowance approach has some appeal in that it provides 
some cost limits on what renewable power will be sold, thus 
renewable power is transformed from a power purchase obliga-
tion under an RPS to subsidized power that will be bought if 
the subsidized price is competitive. However, this approach also 
does not guarantee that a specific amount of renewable power 
will be produced or that the renewable policy objectives will be 
met. Other possibilities abound. For example, in some European 
countries, renewables are promoted outside of the carbon cap by 
feed-in tariffs or other mechanisms providing price supports.20 
These price supports begin to decline over time to reflect the 
expectation that renewable costs should decrease as market pen-
etration increases. Whatever solution is decided upon, experi-
ence has shown that renewable investment is very sensitive to 
regulatory uncertainty, and thus, care must be taken to ensure 
that regulatory support for renewables is not attenuated by the 
form of the mechanism selected to support it. 
It is also important to consider the role and impact of exist-
ing state RPS standards, which present their own complexities 
and may have less well-defined roles once a carbon cap is put in 
place. Thorough discussion of that issue is beyond the scope of 
this Article. However, it should be noted that state RPS programs 
may also warrant reevaluation and refocus once a national car-
bon cap is adopted because these programs also will not produce 
any carbon reductions beyond the level of the national cap. 
conclusIon
It seems premature for Congress to pass a national RPS 
in the face of an expected least-cost national carbon cap-and-
trade program without first evaluating the costs and benefits of 
renewables, and assessing what role renewables should play in 
a national carbon strategy. Renewables are expected to play an 
important role in any national carbon strategy, and good policy 
reasons exist to support that conclusion. However, the debate 
over that issue should be open and clear, and should fully recog-
nize the costs and other issues associated with reliance on renew-
ables as a carbon compliance mandate, to ensure that specific 
policy objectives for renewables can be identified and agreed 
upon, legislation adopted to address those goals, and renewables 
markets provided with certainty. 
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Endnotes: Nuclear Power continued on page 78
Thirty years of cost overruns,
1 power outages,2 gaps in 
oversight,3 security lapses,4 a number of high-profile acci-
dents, and unaddressed concerns about the temporary and 
permanent storage of radioactive waste,5 make nuclear power the 
bête noire of the U.S. energy sector. But growing popular con-
cern about the threats posed by global climate change and the 
emerging support for a carbon tax or a cap on greenhouse gas 
(“GHG”) emissions is changing the cost-benefit analysis tradi-
tionally applied to nuclear power.6 Proponents are heralding the 
return of nuclear power as a “new day for energy in America.”7
The latest evidence of a nuclear renaissance comes with the 
recent license application by NRG Energy, Inc. (“NRG”) to the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) to build and operate 
two new reactors at its facility in Bay City, Texas—the first appli-
cation filed with the NRC in thirty years, and the first of twenty-
one such applications the NRC anticipates receiving over the 
next eighteen months.8 One of the principal arguments for this 
expansion is that by replacing coal and gas-fired electricity gen-
eration capacity nuclear reactors could slow the overall growth 
of GHG emissions.9 Nonetheless, nuclear power has financial 
and legal hurdles to clear before it can assume a role as a cred-
ible program to combat global warming. 
Nuclear plants are economical to fuel and operate but pro-
hibitively expensive to build. Thus, renewed investment in 
commercial nuclear power will only come when “the cost of 
producing electricity using nuclear apower will be lower than 
the risk-adjusted costs associated with alternative electric gener-
ation technologies.”10 Moderate reductions in construction cost, 
construction time, operation costs, and capital costs could, theo-
retically, make nuclear competitive with coal and natural gas.11 
Nuclear electricity generation could also become more competi-
tive if the externalities associated with carbon-emitting fuels are 
internalized through either a carbon tax, a cap-and-trade system, 
or a tax credit for carbon-free electricity generation.12 Also, the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 provides for a clean-energy loan pro-
gram that would guarantee up to eighty percent of total project 
cost of innovative technologies—including nuclear power—that 
avoid “anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases.”13 Leav-
ing aside the question of health and human safety, the competi-
tiveness of nuclear power may ultimately depend on whether the 
federal government imposes additional costs on coal and natural 
gas—a notion with considerable political momentum.
Moving forward, the salient issue will not be financing, but 
safety. Due to the magnitude of the harm presented by nuclear 
materials, the frequency with which that harm can occur, and 
the limited prospects for mitigating it, a dramatic expansion of 
the nuclear power industry would pose considerable risks to the 
health and human safety of the American public.14 At its current 
level of operation, commercial U.S. reactors will discharge at 
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least 105,000 metric tons of spent fuel by 2035.15 So far only two 
countries have identified specific sites to deposit this waste—the 
United States (Yucca Mountain) and Finland (Olkiluoto). Nei-
ther facility will be ready to receive material for at least another 
decade.16 Since 1998, utilities have brought dozens of breach-
of-contract suits against the U.S. government because the NRC 
has failed to honor its Standard Contract commitments to remove 
waste from temporary on-site storage facilities pursuant to the 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act;17 the NRC has argued that it cannot 
be obligated to remove waste before it has a place to store it 
permanently.18 No doubt methods will be developed to reduce 
the volume of waste and to improve the overall safety of the 
nuclear fuel cycle. Alternative disposal techniques, such as deep 
bore geologic disposal, might also be viable. Until then, waste 
disposal will remain an open question and a potential hazard.
Primary responsibility for nuclear safety belongs to the 
NRC.19 Unfortunately, the NRC’s decisions to outsource security 
functions to private contractors, to rely on voluntary reporting 
standards, and to enforce its regulations selectively have shaken 
public confidence.20 Nonetheless, when it comes to forcing higher 
safety standards, the states’ hands are tied.21 State authority to 
regulate the safety of radiological materials either under state 
or federal statutes is pre-empted by the Atomic Energy Act.22 
Private citizens can bring suits under the Price-Anderson Act, 
but such suits have little effect in forcing higher safety standards 
when operators are held to a federally determined standard of 
care (not strict liability) and citizens are barred from seeking 
punitive damages.23 Moreover, new standing requirements for 
challenging plant licensing will make it more difficult for private 
citizens’ groups to challenge the construction of new plants.24 
Absent changes in federal law, the effectiveness of safety stan-
dards for the operation of plants and the disposal of waste will 
depend primarily on the NRC’s careful stewardship.
The nuclear industry is asking environmentalists to pick their 
poison—global warming or nuclear power—and some are cau-
tiously opting for the latter.25 Climate change has given nuclear 
power a second hearing. Rigorous safety standards, a plan for 
their robust enforcement, and a fail-safe scheme for permanent 
waste storage have the potential to create broad public support 
for nuclear power;26 a single accident, on the other hand, could 
erase that support overnight.27 By taking the lead and insisting 
on stricter safety standards and a plan for permanent storage 
of reactor waste materials, the industry could prevent a nuclear 
renaissance from becoming what the public will view pessimis-
tically as a “relapse” for nuclear power in the United States.
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InTroDucTIon
The ability to understand current risks and pressures and predict new ones is a prerequisite for developing success-ful sustainable business strategies and supportive govern-
ment policies. Today, the future business-government landscape 
seems clearer than at any time in the past: a good opportunity for 
business and government to shape the future, rather than react 
to it. Climate change is only one of many pressures that affect 
overall business strategies and public policies. The following 
discussion highlights a broad range of social and environmental 
goals, including biomass and clean energy, access to safe water 
and sanitation, protection from chemical toxics, and protection 
of ecosystem services. 
Sustainable development fosters policies that integrate 
environmental, economic, and social values in decision-making. 
From a business perspective, sustainable development favors an 
approach based on capturing system dynamics, building resilient 
and adaptive systems, anticipating and managing variability and 
risk, and making a profit.1 Sustainable development reflects not 
the trade-off between business and the environment, but the syn-
ergy between them. 
As discussed in this Article, the movement toward sustain-
able development is inevitable and has important implications 
for U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) research, 
regulations, and policies that together suggest that the next level 
of environmental protection will arise not only from disincen-
tives to pollute, but also from the positive economic benefits of 
sustainability. 
moDelInG InTeracTIons amonG socIeTy,  
busIness, anD GovernmenT
A schematic representation of the factors contributing to 
the convergence of business strategies and government policies 
toward sustainability appears in Figure 1. The figure’s three col-
umns depict how social and environmental pressures are affect-
ing four groups of stakeholders and policy makers, shaping 
business strategies and government policies. Each element in 
Figure 1 is part of a dynamic system with positive and negative 
feedback loops. In a systems analysis, lines would connect each 
of the elements, displaying complex feedback among them. This 
system would have lags and leads as each set of decision makers 
responds to the others, and would contain non-linear feedback as 
critical thresholds are reached. 
Although my discussion proceeds from left to right in Fig-
ure 1, I recognize that current business strategies and public pol-
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icies are themselves affecting social and environmental factors, 
thus creating a closed loop for the whole system. For example, 
increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases (“GHGs”)—a 
result of current business and government policies—are affect-
ing insurance practices, corporate strategies, and government 
policies. Investors and financial managers reacting to climate 
risks are encouraging companies to reduce their carbon foot-
print. Government feedback is both positive, e.g., in setting tar-
gets for emission reduction or GHG intensity, and negative, e.g., 
in resisting certain business and/or international pressures. 
FIGure 1: converGence oF susTaInable busIness sTraTeGIes 
anD GovernmenT polIcIes 
Social anD environmental preSSureS
Concern for social and environmental well-being affects 
business strategy and government policies. Table 1 presents 
current United Nations (“UN”) statistics on distressing social 
conditions that especially affect the inhabitants of developing 
countries. The UN Millennium Development Goals2 aim to 
reverse many of the undesirable trends, but progress to date has 
been uneven.3
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Risk Management/
Insurers
Regulations/
Regulators
Finance/
Investors
UN/Global
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Table 1: sTaTe oF The worlD’s populaTIon4
	 •	 World	 population	 growing	 by	 approximately	 80	million	
people per year (9 billion projected total by 2050)
	 •	 2.9	billion	living	in	urban	environment	(5	billion	estimated	
by 2030)
	 •	 972	million	living	on	less	than	$1	per	day
	 •	 2.6	billion	without	access	to	proper	sanitation
	 •	 1.1	billion	without	access	to	safe	drinking	water
	 •	 924	million	“slum	dwellers”	(expected	to	grow	by	27	mil-
lion per year to 2020) 
	 •	 829	million	chronically	undernourished,	including	180	mil-
lion children
	 •	 790	million	lacking	health	services
	 •	 39	million	adults	and	children	living	with	HIV-AIDS
Michael Porter and Mark Kramer call the impact of these 
external social conditions on business “outside-in linkages.”5 
The social distress of the world’s less fortunate people affects 
not only the stability of nations but business operations, with 
the result that a company like Unilever, which operates in many 
developing nations, must find ways to address these issues in 
order to maintain its “license to operate.”6
Such social conditions can also shape future business oppor-
tunities. Many social stressors affect those at the “bottom of 
the economic pyramid”—the four billion people in developing 
countries with annual income less than three thousand dollars 
in local purchasing power.7 While their individual daily income 
is very low, these four billion people have aggregate purchasing 
power of $5 trillion.8 Firms that want to capture this emerging 
market must adopt socially relevant business strategies.9
The health of the environment also affects the behavior of 
business and government. The need for access to clean water 
and sanitation and the danger of ecosystem destruction are also 
powerful drivers. Fifteen of the twenty-four ecosystem services 
examined by the 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment are 
being degraded or used unsustainably.10 While the full costs of 
the loss and degradation of these ecosystem services are difficult 
to measure, the available evidence demonstrates that the costs 
are substantial and growing.11 Many of the losses in ecosystem 
services are a consequence of actions taken to increase the sup-
ply of other services, especially food production.12 These trade-
offs often shift the costs of ecosystem degradation from one 
group of people to another; the greatest costs may be borne by 
future generations.13
Climate change caused by rising concentrations of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere can significantly affect all aspects 
of human life. The 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (“IPCC”) report makes clear that climate change is 
largely a result of human activity and that it is likely to have sig-
nificant social, economic, and security implications.14 Addition-
ally, a recent study, National Security and the Threat of Climate 
Change, discusses how climate change might act as a threat mul-
tiplier in already fragile regions, exacerbating conditions that 
lead to failed states—the breeding grounds for extremism and 
terrorism.15 Such potential threats are driving U.S. lawmakers to 
consider mandating a national intelligence analysis of security 
implications of climate change.16 
Today, the impact of social conditions and environmental 
pressures manifests in real time. As Internet access grows, so 
does the public’s ability to access data and respond to it. Public 
involvement shapes government policies and business practices, 
making the public one of the important decision makers shown 
in Figure 1. 
If the statistics in Table 1 are not enough of a wake-up call 
to business and government, then the combined impact of future 
population growth, urban development, and increased use of 
materials and energy should be. Over the next fifty years, the 
world’s population is expected to increase by fifty percent and 
global economic activity is projected to increase by five hun-
dred percent, while global energy consumption and manufactur-
ing activity are likely to increase at least threefold.17 All of us 
must learn how to deal with the consequences of this growth and 
development. 
riSk manaGerS anD inSurerS 
The insurance industry may have a significant impact in 
implementing sustainable development due to its size, the extent 
of its reach into the community, and the significant role it plays 
in the economy.18 Importantly, unsustainable development is 
costly and risk managers are paid for avoiding problems. Floods, 
droughts, earthquakes, hurricanes, and tornados are the expected 
sources of most insurance losses. Changes in the frequency of 
such events are critical in anticipating risk. As such, techniques 
to evaluate and understand future risk are essential. Aiming 
to describe the new risk landscape, insurers such as Swiss Re 
have an extensive research program on the early detection and 
assessment of environmental and health risks.19 Other insurers 
have also been leaders in the study of natural catastrophes. For 
example, Munich Re publishes an annual review of disasters and 
catastrophes,20 and has set up a foundation dedicated to sharing 
knowledge connected to the subject of risk.21
Munich Re, Swiss Re, and other major insurance and rein-
surance firms are bringing new attention to issues of environ-
mental sustainability. In reacting to expected pressures from 
climate change, these firms are adjusting their rate structures 
and calling for government action. Additionally, the insurance 
industry now offers businesses that are committed to sustain-
able business practices options to reduce their insurance costs.22 
Innovative green insurance programs could offer significantly 
reduced insurance premiums for qualifying companies based on 
factors such as risk profile, commitment to sustainability, and 
business needs.
However, while the insurance industry is an important con-
tributor, it cannot address the challenges of climate change on 
its own. The solution will require concerted effort by all stake-
holders. Current and future risk goes well beyond just climate 
change. In the following sections, I will discuss chemicals and 
human health. In this area, risk managers are getting help from 
advances in science and technology that improve our ability to 
detect risks from new chemicals.23 Businesses have learned that, 
if not handled properly, the combination of increased scientific 
understanding of the health effects of chemicals with public 
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access to information can seriously threaten any business.
reGulatorS
Environment regulators and business standards are affect-
ing how businesses and society think about sustainability. How 
are all these players interacting with and responding to social 
and environmental pressures, and advancing sustainability? 
EPA and State Regulations
In the 1960s, social unrest and environmental neglect com-
pelled the Nixon administration—acting more out of political 
defensiveness than environmental enlightenment—to create the 
EPA.24 From the 1970s to the 1990s, U.S. environmental leg-
islation grew rapidly, with strong enforcement measures aimed 
at limiting known pollutants. Today, social and environmental 
pressures require EPA to address more than just enforcement. 
EPA now confronts a suite of issues related to economic 
growth, demographics and aging, urban development and rede-
velopment, energy and materials use, non-point sources of 
pollution, ecosystem destruction, and new chemical and bio-
logical risks. In today’s world, while regulating dangerous pol-
lution and toxics certainly remains a necessary and vital task, 
eliminating the use of noxious 
materials altogether is a bet-
ter, more sustainable alterna-
tive. It is therefore unsurprising 
that as pressures grow and new 
risks arise, EPA programs have 
moved toward life cycle analy-
sis, green chemistry, green 
design, green engineering, smart 
growth, and industrial ecology. 
EPA’s changes parallel a new 
management approach by many 
businesses that is more system-
oriented and gives more atten-
tion to what goes into a product rather than simply what the 
production process emits.25 
In the area of waste management, there is a similar shift in 
thinking from managing waste to managing materials. This new 
attitude reflects the belief of many EPA programs “that devel-
oping new approaches for conserving resources, reducing the 
amount of toxic materials in society and the toxicity of materials 
that remain, and managing wastes properly can and should be 
an important part of responding to [the] challenge of making a 
more sustainable world.”26 
This kind of environmental management calls for the active 
participation of all stakeholders. In recognition of this need, EPA 
has begun to promulgate a vision of stewardship and sustain-
ability, recognizing that a sustainable future “cannot be accom-
plished by government [and regulations] alone; rather it requires 
the active engagement of all people. To this end, [EPA has] a 
vision of environmental stewardship—where all parts of society 
actively take responsibility to improve environmental quality 
and achieve sustainable results.”27
Sustainability has become a clear part of federal policy, 
at least in the management of government buildings and other 
facilities. In January 2007, President Bush signed Executive 
Order 13423, entitled “Strengthening Federal Environmental, 
Energy, and Transportation Management,” that sets goals in the 
areas of energy efficiency, acquisitions, renewable energy, toxics 
reductions, recycling, sustainable buildings, electronics steward-
ship, vehicle fleets, and water conservation.28 Executive Order 
13423 explicitly directs heads of federal agencies to implement 
sustainable practices in these areas, and specifies that “sustain-
able” means “creat[ing] and maintain[ing] conditions, under 
which humans and nature can exist in productive harmony, that 
permit fulfilling the social, economic, and other requirements of 
present and future generations of Americans.”29 A next step is to 
ensure that sustainability practices are part of agencies’ external 
programs and policies, so that this concept extends to all federal 
policies and programs.
Individual states have demonstrated leadership on many 
environmental and development issues, going well beyond fed-
eral policies. Acting through laws, policies, and voting initiatives, 
states are working with business communities to find sustain-
able solutions. State-EPA partnerships in this area are impor-
tant; EPA has worked closely 
with the Environmental Council 
of the States (“ECOS”), a non-
partisan association of state and 
territorial environmental agency 
leaders,30 to advance sustainable 
practices. With EPA support, 
ECOS has created a searchable 
database of regulatory and non-
regulatory programs, including 
projects on energy efficiency, 
smart growth, pollution preven-
tion, multimedia permitting and 
inspections, consolidated report-
ing, small business assistance, and eco-efficiency.31
In response to the social and environmental pressures shown 
in Figure 1, regulators experience both positive and negative 
feedback. Conflicts between state and federal policies can result 
from different reactions to given pressures. This kind of conflict 
led to the 2007 U.S. Supreme Court case concerning whether 
the Clean Air Act gives EPA the authority to regulate carbon 
dioxide gas as a pollutant.32 The several states that filed the law-
suit argued that EPA has such authority, while EPA opposed this 
interpretation. Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in favor of 
the states, EPA faces three options: (1) to make an affirmative 
judgment that GHGs do cause or contribute to climate change, 
and “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health 
or welfare;” (2) to make a judgment that GHGs do not have this 
effect; or (3) to provide “some reasonable explanation as to why 
it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to make that determi-
nation.”33
On this issue, states and cities are aggressively implement-
ing low-impact development and carbon-reduction policies. The 
U.S. Council of Mayors adopted a resolution on climate change 
Sustainable development 
fosters policies that  
integrate environmental, 
economic, and social  
values in decision-making.
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calling for “the federal government and state governments to 
enact policies and programs to meet or beat the target of reduc-
ing global warming pollution levels to 7 percent below 1990 
levels by 2012.”34 As of June 21, 2007, 504 mayors represent-
ing over sixty-two million Americans had endorsed this Climate 
Protection Agreement.35 
U.S. Accounting and Corporate Reporting 
Environmental regulators are not alone in responding to 
growing social pressures on business. Disclosure requirements 
for public corporations have been strengthened significantly in 
recent years. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley (“SOX”) Act of 
2002, enacted in response to the Enron and WorldCom finan-
cial scandals and administered by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, protects shareholders and the general public from 
accounting errors and certain fraudulent business practices.36 
Other pressure points promoting transparency in business 
operations come from the Financial Accounts Standards Board 
(“FASB”). In March 2005, FASB issued a new interpretation 
(known as “FIN 47”)37 of its Accounting for Asset Retirement 
Obligations (“ARO”) standards38 that has prodded firms that 
had been slow to record obligations for the anticipated expenses 
needed to retire physical assets in an environmentally safe and 
sound manner. 
These accounting procedures require firms to identify assets 
such as building sites, mines, chemical plants, and nuclear power 
facilities that may cause long-term environmental damage and 
that the firms may be legally required to restore to their original 
conditions. Firms are now clearly required to recognize those 
future obligations as they purchase, construct, and use their 
physical assets. The FASB accounting procedures also require 
that firms estimate the potential risk and liability of operating 
facilities that produce environmentally dangerous products. 
Such life cycle analysis reinforces the movement toward more 
sustainable management practices, and should help to prevent 
future contamination, brownfield development, and legal dis-
putes over toxic substances like asbestos.
International: Global Reporting Initiative  
and the European Union
Additionally, reporting initiatives are growing globally, the 
broadest of which is the Global Reporting Initiative (“GRI”).39 
Initially convened in 1997 by the Coalition for Environmen-
tally Responsible Economies (“CERES”), a non-profit coalition 
of investor, environmental, religious, labor, and social justice 
groups, the GRI aimed at extending sustainability reporting to 
the breadth and rigor of financial reporting.40 Today, more than 
one thousand organizations in sixty countries are using the GRI 
framework.41
Reporting similar to the reporting required under the SOX 
Act of 2002 is required under the EU Directive on Accounts 
Modernization, which requires companies to report on environ-
mental and social impacts of their operations.42 The 2004 EU 
Transparency Directive “requires companies seeking a stock 
market listing to disclose risks associated with their capital 
assets.”43 The 2004 Environmental Liability Directive estab-
lished “a framework for national-level statutes that impose . . . 
cleanup responsibilities for contaminated” sites.44
Responding to growing trends in waste management and 
toxic chemicals, the EU has enacted several directives with 
important global environmental implications—including direc-
tives for the Restriction of Hazardous Substances (“RoHS”),45 
Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (“WEEE”),46 and 
Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of Chemicals 
(“REACH”).47 These directives regulate products (input) rather 
than outputs, manage materials rather than waste, promote use of 
life cycle assessment and “cradle-to-grave” management, apply 
green engineering and green chemistry principles, shift the bur-
den of proof to industry, and measure and manage future finan-
cial risk and liabilities. Combined with pressures from insurers, 
risk managers, and ARO accounting, these directives advance 
the movement to sustainability. 
financial manaGerS anD inveStorS
Environmental and social pressures are pushing bankers, 
pension fund mangers, and individual investors toward more 
sustainable and socially responsible investing. The Equator 
Principles require banks to assess the social and environmen-
tal impacts of projects that they finance.48 Influenced by actions 
and pressures from groups like the activist Rainforest Action 
Network, Citigroup has gone beyond the Equator Principles by 
committing to refuse funding for projects that could result in 
illegal logging, other environmental damage, or harm to indig-
enous people.49 Such actions demonstrate the potential power of 
social pressures on business—a key element of the social license 
to operate. 
Research on how Wall Street investors and managers are 
incorporating environmental and social trends into their invest-
ment decisions is showing mixed results, with U.S. investors 
apparently lagging behind those in Europe and Asia. Senior 
environmental officials at leading U.S. companies have told 
EPA staff that they are not getting traction with the investment 
community. While some capital market transactions, particu-
larly those in which climate change is an issue, take the qual-
ity of corporate environmental management into account, such 
transactions do not constitute a widespread trend.
However, EPA’s assessment of links between environmen-
tal performance and fiscal incentives suggest that some progress 
is occurring: (1) “both investment firms and the companies they 
invest in are showing greater interest in environmental issues 
and performance;” and (2) “institutional investors are becoming 
more active in shaping the direction and practices of the compa-
nies they invest in.”50
Some of the resistance on Wall Street may reflect the old 
adage that “the business of business is business.” Change in this 
perspective is evident from the growth of socially responsible 
mutual funds and from the evolution of the definition of “fidu-
ciary responsibility” to include environmental risk and perfor-
mance.51
The 2007 publication of the Fiduciary Guide to Toxic 
Chemical Risk (co-sponsored by the Investor Environmental 
Health Network, which represents twenty investment organiza-
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tions managing $22 billion in assets) demonstrates the shift in 
defining corporate responsibilities.52 This guide responds to the 
growing number of reports about chemicals, foods, and other 
products that reflect a “growing . . . concern about the impact on 
human health of relatively small amounts of chemicals in every-
day products,”53 and notes that some of the largest law firms in 
the world have “definitively concluded that considering environ-
mental, social and governance issues is at the core of fiduciary 
Duty of Prudence”54 and that “fiduciaries have an affirmative 
duty to consider toxic chemical issues that impact corporate risk, 
return and shareholder values.”55 The guide provides “a compre-
hensive set of immediate action steps that can be taken to trans-
late the long-term threats and opportunities associated with toxic 
chemical issues into prudent portfolio stewardship.”56 
If Figure 1 captured all the positive and negative feedbacks 
in the system, this new interpretation of fiduciary responsibil-
ity would be seen as a positive feedback of the changing risk 
landscape.57
un anD Global socIeTy
Since 1972, the UN has been at the center of championing 
environmental and social issues by collecting data, encouraging 
national reporting, organizing 
world conferences and sum-
mits, and fostering international 
agreements. The Rio Earth Sum-
mit in 1992 launched Agenda 
21, an aggressive international 
agenda for sustainable develop-
ment.58 A series of UN confer-
ences followed, each focused on 
different development and social 
issues. The goal of sustain-
able development was further 
advanced in September 2000, when 189 countries adopted the 
Millennium Development Goals.59 Among these goals was the 
determination: to “[i]ntegrate the principles of sustainable devel-
opment into country policies and programmes and reverse the 
loss of environmental resources.”60 Two years later at the UN-
sponsored International Conference on Financing for Devel-
opment in Monterrey, Mexico, world leaders agreed on a new 
approach to development assistance based on shared responsi-
bilities.61 In September 2002, the World Summit for Sustainable 
Development (“WSSD”) in Johannesburg, South Africa adopted 
the “Johannesburg Plan of Action,”62 an implementation plan 
emphasizing basic human needs such as health and access to 
clean water, as well as agriculture, energy, and biodiversity.63
These UN-rooted activities have focused global attention on 
a suite of social and environmental issues that are increasingly 
affecting business strategies and government policies. Interac-
tion among the business sector, government, and civil society 
has led to the emergence of partnerships within the UN system. 
These partnerships break with traditional UN approaches by 
establishing agreements among a modest number of relevant 
stakeholders aiming to address a concrete problem with a spe-
cific timetable and targets.64 When the U.S. first proposed the 
concept of global partnerships at the WSSD, initial reaction was 
skeptical, but the number of partnerships has been growing. The 
UN’s database on partnerships lists over 325 projects,65 the larg-
est number being water-related.66 The Coca-Cola Company and 
many other businesses are collaborating with governments, non-
government organizations (“NGOs”), and stakeholders.67
While UN conferences may not lead to concrete and bind-
ing actions, they have elevated public debate on strategic issues 
and exerted significant pressure for member governments to take 
action. Concurrent with the growth of UN activities has been the 
increase in NGOs focusing on environmental and social issues. 
Today, these organizations are key partners with government 
and business in efforts to bring clean water, sanitation, clean 
energy, and medical care to billions of people around the world. 
NGOs also are exerting considerable pressure on business by 
using modern satellite and Internet technology. For example, the 
non-profit group Global Forest Watch uses satellite tracking to 
monitor logging activities around the world,68 often spotting ille-
gal logging in real time. Such capabilities can help governments 
struggling to control illegal logging, independent certifiers, such 
as the Forest Stewardship Council,69 and multinational wood and 
product manufacturers, like IKEA, who are committed to using 
only legally and sustainably 
harvested products.70
converGence oF busI-
ness anD GovernmenT  
polIcIes: nexT sTeps
Clear evidence demon-
strates a convergence toward 
sustainability taking place 
among major companies in 
the world today.71 After inter-
viewing dozens of business 
leaders for their influential book, Green to Gold: How Smart 
Companies Use Environmental Strategy to Innovate, Create 
Value, and Build Competitive Advantage, Daniel C. Esty and 
Andrew S. Winston concluded that smart companies—whom 
they call “WaveRiders”—were able to respond to the environ-
mental and social pressures shown in Figure 1 by developing a 
forward-looking and profitable business strategy.72 These inno-
vative companies consistently behave in recognizable patterns: 
(1) anticipating environmental issues and addressing them; (2) 
staying ahead of new regulatory requirements; (3) managing 
government mandates to gain advantage in the marketplace; (4) 
designing innovative or greener products; (5) pushing suppliers 
to be better environmental stewards; (6) setting metrics and col-
lecting data to track progress; and (7) partnering with NGOs and 
other stakeholders.73 
The business transition that Esty and Winston describe in 
Green to Gold heralds a new era of sustainable business prac-
tices. There is a comparable transition underway in U.S. govern-
ment policy, but at a much slower pace. The government still 
does not have a sustainability strategy. Nevertheless, several 
positive steps can be identified that build on current activities 
and form the basis for a longer-term strategy. Just as progres-
Today, social and environ-
mental pressures require 
EPA to address more than 
just enforcement.
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sive businesses are responding to external pressures, EPA can 
develop and promote a strategy for achieving the next level of 
environmental protection in the U.S. by taking specific actions: 
(1) anticipating and responding to future problems; (2) partner-
ing with business; (3) advancing sustainability science and tech-
nology; and (4) measuring results and affecting change. 
Anticipating and Responding to Future Problems 
 No one can predict the future, but considering social and 
environmental stressors clearly operating in today’s world and 
the trends recognizable in the business strategies described in 
this Article, the argument for an EPA role in advancing sus-
tainability is a strong one. However, if a “sustainability train” 
is indeed coming, then EPA, as a regulatory agency with his-
toric roots deep in controlling pollution, needs to reflect on 
and plan how it can foster sustainability. How does an agency 
organized by offices for specific media (air, water, toxics, and 
waste) develop an integrated systems approach to environmental 
protection? Moreover, how does a federal agency without a spe-
cific mandate for sustainability advance and achieve sustainable 
development?74
EPA’s first step must be a clear strategic plan that coher-
ently connects the dots among existing policies and programs 
that affect sustainability. For example, many EPA programs—
including building design and energy efficiency, urban devel-
opment and revitalization, green buildings and smart growth, 
sustainable management of urban systems, sustainable water 
infrastructure, and improving air quality—cut across EPA’s 
strategic goals and program offices to advance urban sustainabil-
ity and the built environment. 
All of these EPA programs emphasize the goal of sustain-
able development. Even if the term is not always explicitly used, 
the concept is clear. These programs and many others have con-
tributed significantly in their own areas of responsibility. Viewed 
in an integrated manner, these programs together constitute a 
strategy for urban sustainability. The environmental results of 
these programs would benefit by better integration among them 
and a clearer focus on achieving sustainable outcomes.75 
Partnering with Business 
Achieving sustainability has become a mainstream goal for 
private firms large and small that have responded to simple but 
forward-thinking questions: Why aim merely to reduce toxic 
waste when we can eliminate it with new chemicals and pro-
cesses? Why handle and dispose of growing amounts of waste 
when we can more efficiently manage materials that eliminate, 
reduce, or recycle waste? What will be EPA’s role in the new era 
of businesses managing for sustainability?
In working with the regulated community, EPA has followed 
the four broad approaches highlighted in a 2005 Government 
Accountability Office report on corporate social responsibil-
ity: (1) Endorsing, which encompasses policies that encourage 
or reward sustainable behavior, such as EPA’s Energy Star and 
Design for the Environment programs; (2) Facilitating, which 
involves providing information, funding, or other incentives to 
advance sustainable practices, such as EPA programs for con-
sumer information, energy and water use, Performance Track, 
and its new stewardship initiative; (3) Partnering, which relies 
on voluntary and collaborative programs like Climate Protection 
Partnerships; and (4) Mandating, which requires adherence to 
legislation and executive orders.76
Over the next decade, EPA needs to assess how it can best 
implement each of these approaches. The agency has already 
made cooperative problem solving and partnerships with busi-
ness a priority. It will need to explore how best to partner and 
collaborate with business on many emerging issues and new 
regulatory concerns: product design, materials use, new tech-
nologies, corporate social responsibility, and environmental eth-
ics. This has led EPA to focus on how to help decision makers 
(including businesses, citizens, and all levels of government and 
businesses) make more informed and sustainable decisions. 
One key barrier to EPA’s contribution to sustainable man-
agement—the mindset that federal action in the realm of the 
environment must be restricted to roles explicitly specified in 
existing regulations—must be recognized and overcome. This 
mentality reflects in part past history and outmoded business 
attitudes that burdensome federal regulations unnecessarily cur-
tail economic growth. Such views are changing in some busi-
ness quarters—such as among companies seeking federal action 
to limit carbon emissions77—but the current debate on climate 
change and nanotechnology shows that business resistance to 
controls by agencies like EPA is still deeply embedded. Cen-
tral to this debate over government’s role—and to long-term 
sustainability—is the growing recognition on nearly all sides 
that reliance on regulations alone is not the most effective route 
to advance sustainable outcomes. Regulatory agencies like EPA 
need to follow a broader mandate to undertake core research to 
achieve better understanding of interactions among the econ-
omy, society, and the environment and to develop tools, mod-
els, and approaches that inform public debate and help business 
make better decisions. Regulatory agencies and industry must 
work together with evolving mindsets that reflect current risks 
and challenges for environmental protection. 
 The successes of the many companies pursuing the goal of 
sustainability come from the realization that protecting the envi-
ronment makes good business sense. If the number of articles on 
green business and of actual changes by management in manu-
facturing design are reliable measures, then we are approaching 
the green “tipping point.” Many EPA programs have anticipated 
and contributed to advancing sustainability concepts, e.g., sev-
eral prominent EPA programs that relate to business in non-reg-
ulatory ways, emphasizing business practices ranging from raw 
materials and manufacturing to waste and recycling.78 
The key goal of these programs is to shape a new way of 
manufacturing and doing business that goes beyond controlling 
pollution to actually changing the strategic thinking of com-
panies. Collectively, these programs demonstrate that the next 
level of environmental protection will arise not only from disin-
centives to pollute, but also from the positive vision of sustain-
ability that is acceptable to business operation.
Partnerships between EPA and industry on sustainabil-
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ity objectives can provide benefits to both sides. While EPA 
advances its sustainability goals, access to EPA’s reputation and 
technical skills can be of considerable value to many companies. 
A prime example is Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. In response to social 
and environmental pressures, the giant retailer has established a 
set of “Sustainability 360” objectives, and is working with EPA 
to pursue those goals and to address issues of product design and 
energy and materials use.79 
Sustainability Science and Technology
Science and technology drive change and are critical ele-
ments of any sustainability strategy. The science of sustainabil-
ity aims to go beyond the science needed for setting regulatory 
policies. Sustainability science anticipates problems, promotes 
innovation, and aids decision-making. A National Academy of 
Engineering report has suggested that the path to sustainability 
“involves the smart design of products, processes, systems, and 
organizations, and the implementation of smart management 
strategies that effectively harness technology and ideas to avoid 
environmental problems before they arise.”80
Good science is not something anyone would argue against; 
but it is the science for decision-making part that goes the vital 
next step. EPA today has a strong scientific foundation in sys-
tems research, risk assessment, and life cycle and materials flow 
analysis, and is working at the frontiers of research in computa-
tional toxicology, genomics, ecoinformatics, and nanotechnol-
ogy. EPA clearly needs to expand these efforts in line with the 
priorities of a sustainability research strategy.81 
Measuring Results–Affecting Change 
EPA is currently measuring environmental quality through 
a set of environmental indicators, which EPA’s Draft Report on 
the Environment 2003 defines as measures that “help measure 
over time the state of air, water, and land resources, pressures 
on those resources, and resulting effects on ecological condition 
and human health.”82 Looking ahead, EPA needs to develop a 
set of sustainability indicators for policy and public use that will 
affect strategic planning and inform decision makers inside and 
outside of government. The proposed EPA budget highlights 
this challenge: “In FY 2008 EPA’s Sustainability research pro-
gram will embark on a new effort that is aimed at creating a suite 
of science-based sustainability metrics that are readily under-
1 See Joseph Fiksel, Sustainability and Resilience: Toward a Systems Approach, 
SuStainability: Sci., practice, & pol’y, Fall 2006, at 14-21, available at http://
ejournal.nbii.gov/progress/2006fall/0608-028.fiksel.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 
2007). 
2 uniteD nationS, the millennium Development GoalS report 2007, avail-
able at http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Data/2007%20Stat%20
Annex%20current%20indicators.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2007) [hereinafter 
MDG report 2007]. 
3 World Bank, A Midpoint Look at Progress on Millennium Development Goals 
(July 5, 2007), available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/N
EWS/0,,contentMDK:21398721~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSite 
PK:4607,00.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2007). 
stood by the public.”83 These measures must become not just a 
report on the environment but a step in active engagement with 
all stakeholders. EPA needs greater engagement with a variety 
of stakeholders to help everyone better understand why measur-
ing something like nitrate levels in surface water is important for 
everyday life and for sustainable practices. 
Developing sustainability indicators will fulfill several valu-
able roles. It will: (1) assist decision makers in understanding the 
practical meaning of achieving a sustainable way of life; (2) pro-
vide guidance for decision makers in designing and implement-
ing policies and practices to advance sustainability; (3) enable 
decision makers to see the interconnections among issues so they 
can understand systems and make better-informed decisions; (4) 
promote cross-media policies and strategies within EPA; (5) 
serve as a framework and focus for constructive dialogue and 
collaboration among business, government, and NGOs; and (6) 
provide ongoing access to the data and information that support 
decision making for sustainability.
conclusIon
Connecting the dots on the political, government, and busi-
ness landscapes reveals a convergence of business strategies and 
government policies toward a more sustainable management of 
natural resources. It is more obvious now than ever before that 
the well-being of those both at the top and at the bottom of the 
economic pyramid cannot continue without sustaining our natu-
ral resource base. The next level of environmental protection 
will be created not only by disincentives to pollute, but also by 
the positive vision of sustainability that achieves acceptance by 
and motivates business leaders. This convergence towards sus-
tainability is inevitable and its acceleration through concerted 
efforts by business, government, and the public will benefit all. 
History has shown that EPA’s air, water, and land programs 
have made significant contributions in the agency’s areas of 
responsibility. The environmental results from these programs 
could significantly improve with greater integration among them 
and with a clearer focus on achieving sustainable outcomes. So 
much more is possible to advance environmental sustainability 
with a strong research focus and a clearer political and policy 
roadmap. In this way, EPA cannot simply respond to change but 
can help to create the future.
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4 See, e.g., MDG report 2007, supra note 2; United Nations Population 
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In the absence of an effective national policy to combat cli-mate change, states have enacted renewable portfolio stan-dards (“RPS”) to require a percentage of supplied power 
with renewable resources which, among other things, reduces 
greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions.1 As Congress considers a 
national RPS, it must be aware of the role of energy efficiency. 
Renewable energy production may not be sufficient to meet new 
demand for electricity. However, if electricity demand stabilizes 
because of greater efficiency, renewables can replace conven-
tional sources and reduce U.S. GHG emissions.2 A standard 
that requires renewable resources alongside greater efficiency is 
more effective and economically efficient than a renewable stan-
dard alone.3 
Energy efficiency can 
reduce GHG emissions while 
renewable technologies become 
cost-effective. Renewable 
sources alone could result in a 
22 percent drop in conventional 
electricity generation and com-
bining renewables with effi-
ciency increases could result in 
a 44 percent reduction in con-
ventional generation by 20204 
and cut GHG emissions in half.5 
While a renewable energy stan-
dard initially increases energy costs, it reduces consumer costs 
when combined with an efficiency standard.6 Additionally, lower 
demand reduces conventional fuel costs, potentially offsetting a 
future tax on GHG emissions.7
Of states with renewable energy requirements, fifteen have 
created or are considering energy efficiency targets.8 Each state 
has different standards of renewable energy, and different tar-
gets.9 Among those states, Texas established a requirement that 
utilities offset ten percent of demand growth with increased 
energy efficiency. The state’s utilities are currently exceed-
ing that target.10 Connecticut, Nevada, and Pennsylvania have 
adopted legislation requiring the use of “white tags,” which rep-
resent one mega-watt-hour (MWh) of energy conserved, and can 
be traded on a market like GHG emissions or renewable energy 
credits.11 
GHG emissions are much more than a state problem and 
a national policy is necessary to bring about national reduc-
tions in emissions. A federal policy on renewable energy and 
efficiency would provide regulatory clarity and direct innova-
tion.12 However, a federal law should not adopt a weak national 
standard that would preempt stricter state standards.13 An effec-
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tive national energy policy needs to include elements such as 
improved appliance efficiency standards, building efficiency 
standards, decoupling utilities’ profits from electricity sales, 
promotion of combined heat and power systems, and a public 
benefits charge to fund efficiency programs. 
Appliance efficiency standards eliminate the least efficient 
portion of the market. In the United States, homes and commer-
cial buildings are responsible for over two-thirds of electric-
ity use14 and large savings are possible. Because builders and 
designers are not ultimately responsible for future energy costs, 
they have little incentive for more efficient designs.15 Regula-
tions mandating building efficiency standards will increase effi-
ciency and educate consumers in 
possible energy savings.16 
Decoupling utility prof-
its from sales eliminates the 
incentive to sell more energy.17 
Combined heat and power sys-
tems increase the efficiency of 
fossil fuels by converting waste 
heat produced by electricity 
generation into usable energy, 
increasing the efficiency from 
about thirty to ninety percent of 
the fuel’s potential energy.18 A 
public benefits charge provides 
funding for state or federal agencies to implement and monitor 
efficiency programs.19 
The next administration should assume global leadership by 
aggressively supporting innovative solutions to climate change. 
While renewable energy sources are a vital and effective tool 
in the effort to reduce GHG emissions, energy efficiency is a 
source of immediate and extensive benefits. The next national 
energy policy must require both renewable energy sources and 
greatly increased energy efficiency. 
Endnotes:
1 Marilyn A. Brown et al., Reduced Emissions and Lower Costs: Combining 
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency into a Sustainable Energy Portfolio 
Standard, the electricity Journal, May 2007, at 62, 63. 
2 Joel N. Swisher, Potential Carbon Emissions Reductions from Energy Effi-
ciency by 2030, in tacklinG climate chanGe in the u.S. 39, 48 (Charles F. 
Kutscher ed., 2007). 
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InTroDucTIon
At the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, toxic chemi-cals were recognized as a serious threat to sustainable development.1 Governments and civil society responded 
with an array of international treaties, regional agreements, and 
diverse national efforts to reduce the impacts on human health 
and the global environment from dangerous substances. For 
many years the United States played an important role in fur-
thering these international efforts. Yet in one important respect, 
the United States still lags behind. After three decades of experi-
ence with the federal Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”), 
the United States lacks effective national legislation to manage 
industrial chemicals within its own borders. This Article exam-
ines the unfortunate stagnation of U.S. chemical policy and the 
resulting response by many state 
governments that are acting to 
protect their citizens from the 
pervasive dangers of industrial 
chemicals.2 This bottom-up 
pressure, combined with accel-
erating international progress, 
sets the stage for a long overdue 
overhaul of U.S. federal policy 
on chemicals. 
The rise of state activism 
on toxic chemicals reflects the 
convergence of three powerful 
forces. First, scientific evidence 
is rapidly accumulating that hundreds to thousands of chemicals 
once deemed safe actually threaten public health. This includes 
new research examining the subtle biological and ecological 
consequences of chemicals at low concentrations, as well as 
a growing awareness of chemical exposures in industrialized 
countries and in regions far removed from polluting sources. 
Second, these state actions are a direct reaction to profound legal 
and political obstacles preventing an effective federal response. 
Third, these state actions are often inspired and bolstered by par-
allel international developments, including regulatory actions by 
other countries, multilateral treaties and other agreements, and 
corresponding shifts in global markets. Taken together, efforts 
by the states are driving the eventual reform of U.S. federal pol-
icy on chemicals and making an important contribution to sus-
tainable development. 
Before examining the nature of these state actions and their 
relationship to U.S. federal law, it is important to clarify the scope 
of chemicals policy. In contrast with environmental laws on air 
pollution, water pollution, and hazardous wastes that preceded 
TSCA has proven a slow 
and cumbersome tool for 
compelling chemical  
manufacturers to provide 
key information.
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or followed enactment of TSCA in 1976, chemical policy aims 
to influence the basic ingredients of our industrial economy. At 
least in intent, chemical policy shares a common outlook with 
laws governing the pre-market approval of new medicines. 
While pharmaceutical and agricultural chemicals are 
explicitly exempted from TSCA, so-called “industrial” chemi-
cals are not confined to industrial uses alone. Indeed, the tens of 
thousands of chemicals under the purview of TSCA are routine 
constituents of myriad commercial and consumer products from 
household cleaners to computers, from cosmetics to construc-
tion materials. The authority for implementing TSCA rests with 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and is not 
delegable to the states.3 Generally speaking, states are authorized 
under TSCA Section 18 to prohibit uses of chemicals that EPA 
has not regulated.4 
The FaIlInGs oF Tsca
TSCA was launched in 
1976 with great expectations. 
EPA Administrator Russell 
Train noted that the aim of the 
new law was “to give public 
health far more of the weight 
that it deserves in the decisions 
by which chemicals are com-
mercially made and marketed, 
by which they enter and spread 
throughout the human environ-
ment.”5 
Over the years, however, it has become clear the TSCA 
itself is incapable of meeting this goal.6 A 2005 report by the 
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) reiterated the long-
recognized defects of TSCA.7 Among its principal shortcomings 
is the high burden of proof placed on EPA to demonstrate that a 
chemical poses unreasonable risks as a precondition for taking 
regulatory action. This challenge is compounded by the fact that 
TSCA has proven a slow and cumbersome tool for compelling 
chemical manufacturers to provide key information. The federal 
toxics law fails to require even basic screening level data for 
most chemicals in the marketplace.8 EPA’s abilities are espe-
cially constrained for the tens of thousands of existing chemicals 
that were grandfathered when TSCA entered into force. This 
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statutory distinction has a significant impact on EPA’s ability to 
effectively regulate, because the vast majority of industrial chem-
icals in commerce today are the very same chemicals that U.S. 
industry produced in the 1970s. The crowning blow to TSCA’s 
effectiveness is a nearly impossible requirement that any pro-
posed EPA action be the least burdensome of all options. 
There is ample evidence that EPA has accomplished little 
under TSCA, especially with regard to assessing and assuring 
the safety of tens of thousands of existing chemicals. According 
to GAO, EPA has issued regulations compelling toxicity testing 
for less than 200 of the 62,000 substances that existed at the time 
of TSCA’s passage.9 Similarly, EPA has used the regulatory 
power of TSCA’s Section 6 to prohibit the manufacturing, pro-
cessing, or distribution of a mere five existing chemicals in thirty 
years.10 This crucial regulatory provision has not been used to 
control even a single chemical since 1991, when the U.S. Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals overturned EPA’s asbestos rule.11
Today, the law’s few enthusiasts tend to be those chemical 
manufacturers with an interest in minimal regulation.12 But the 
static state of current federal regulation has even some custom-
ers of the chemical industry worried. Ernie Rosenberg, Presi-
dent and CEO of the Soap and Detergent Association and former 
head of EPA’s new chemicals review in the 1970s, has said: 
“The toxics law needs to impart confidence and TSCA no longer 
does.”13
The rIse oF sTaTe laws on ToxIc chemIcals
Given EPA’s remarkable inability to regulate most indus-
trial chemicals under TSCA, it is unsurprising that state govern-
ments have felt pressured to fill the gap, stepping in to protect 
the health and well-being of their citizens. This trend is vividly 
illustrated by a series of state bills, executive orders, and legis-
lative enactments to control a class of commercial flame retar-
dants called polybrominated diphenyl ethers (“PBDEs”). These 
substances have been incorporated in a wide range of products, 
including electronic equipment, furniture and fabrics to inhibit 
fire. Unfortunately, PBDEs and other brominated flame retar-
dants persist in the environment and can accumulate in the food 
chain. PBDEs concentrations have risen sharply in human breast 
milk and have been detected in people and wildlife, even in the 
Arctic. Research indicates that PBDEs and closely related com-
pounds are associated with adverse effects on neurodevelopment, 
reproductive health, and endocrine function in mammals.14 
In 2003 California passed the first state law to restrict the use 
of two commercial PBDE mixtures, penta-BDE and octa-BDE. 
Use of these chemicals in electronic equipment was already 
the subject to the new Restriction on Hazardous Substances 
(“RoHS”) directive in Europe, a fact that helped bolster the case 
for controls in California.15 Over the next two years seven more 
states followed suit and a total of eleven states enacted compa-
rable laws by 2007.16 In addition to the speed and geographical 
expansion of PBDE bans, states have broadened the scope of 
restrictions. In 2007 Washington and Maine each passed legisla-
tion restricting future uses of deca-BDE, a related PBDE com-
pound that can degrade to more hazardous forms but which so 
far lacks the same clear evidence of harm. Legislation to restrict 
deca-BDE was proposed in eight other states.17 
The case of brominated flame retardants is the clearest 
example of how public demands, international precedents, and 
market forces have fueled a flurry of state action. But other 
chemicals have attracted attention as well. A class of plastic 
softeners called phthalates, bisphenol A used in the manufacture 
of hard plastic bottles and food can linings, pharmaceutical uses 
of the pesticide lindane, and perfluorinated chemicals used in 
nonstick and stain-resistant applications have all been the focus 
of proposed state regulation, along with more familiar pollut-
ants such as mercury, lead, and other heavy metals. The Safer 
Alternatives bill in Massachusetts, which builds on the state’s 
long experience under its pioneering Toxics Use Reduction Act, 
targets ten diverse chemicals including PBDEs, lead, formalde-
hyde, perchloroethylene, and dioxins.18
Some of these bills go beyond chemical-specific limitations 
to create new policy approaches and programs. Studies of toxic 
chemicals in people—including health experts, public officials, 
and ordinary Americans from newborns to grandmothers—pro-
vide a potent symbol of the failure to control industrial chemi-
cals.19 Furthermore, so-called biomonitoring is also a feature of 
some policy reforms. In 2006 California enacted the nation’s first 
statewide program for sampling chemical contamination in peo-
ple. Biomonitoring was also part of state bills introduced in New 
York, Washington, and Indiana.20 California has also launched 
one of the most ambitious efforts to explore the environmental 
and economic benefits of becoming a “world leader in develop-
ing, adopting and supplying green chemistry solutions for the 
21st century.”21 This builds on an important 2006 report com-
missioned by the state legislature that concludes that TSCA had 
directly contributed to gaps in data, safety, and technology—to 
the disadvantage of California businesses and citizens.22
U.S. chemical manufacturers might reasonably conclude 
that efforts to regulate chemicals at the state and local level will 
expand, subjecting them to a convoluted patchwork of regula-
tion. In the past session of the California legislature, some fifty 
bills were introduced relating to chemicals, pollutants, and 
environmental health.23 To be sure, lobbyists for the chemical 
industry and manufacturers of specific chemicals have poured 
resources into fighting these state bills. They have also launched 
some unsuccessful efforts in Congress to explicitly preempt 
states from establishing stricter standards on individual chemi-
cals, mandating tighter security at chemical plants or enacting 
other measures affecting environmental health and safety. 
But these state initiatives are not random attacks on the 
chemical of the moment. In fact, they only appear surprising 
in contrast with the status quo of U.S. federal inaction. When 
viewed in the context of developments taking place in other 
industrialized countries, the state actions can be viewed as paral-
lel actions guided by similar goals and founded on shared prin-
ciples. 
InTernaTIonal proGress on chemIcals
These state policy initiatives on chemicals are clearly neces-
sitated by the conspicuous absence of meaningful federal action. 
But international developments have also spurred state action. 
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The coordinated state focus on PBDEs restrictions benefited 
from the European RoHS Directive and its direct effects on 
the global electronics industry.24 Such international precedents 
provide state campaigners with relevant information on chemi-
cal hazards, uses, and potential alternatives. They also demon-
strate the political and commercial feasibility of taking action, a 
powerful counterweight to typical industry predictions of cata-
strophic impacts. 
The 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pol-
lutants (“POPs”), an international treaty to control certain chemi-
cals, offers another lever for state initiatives.25 Countries that are 
party to the treaty commit to reduce or eliminate releases persis-
tent, bioaccumulative, and toxic chemicals (“PBTs”) that pose a 
global threat to human health or the environment. The conven-
tion lists twelve POP chemicals and includes a mechanism for 
adding additional chemicals. As of late 2007, eleven chemicals 
are under review for possible addition to the Stockholm Conven-
tion, including penta-BDE and octa-BDE, lindane and a suite of 
perfluorinated compounds. Since its entry into force in 2004, the 
POPs treaty promises to provide a source of data, experience, 
and inspiration for future policy initiatives, including initiatives 
by states.26 While the United States signed the POPs treaty in 
2001, Congress has yet to pass the necessary amendments to 
TSCA and the federal pesticide statute to allow U.S. implemen-
tation. The 109th Congress considered but failed to adopt a pro-
posal that would have preempted state rules on new POPs that 
were stricter than future federal regulations.27 As a result, the 
United States remains an observer while 148 nations work to 
expand this important international environmental agreement. 
While the RoHS Directive and the Stockholm POPs Con-
vention target small numbers of chemicals, an expansive new 
European Union law is beginning to cause sweeping changes 
in the management of industrial chemicals. The regulation for 
Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals, better 
known by the acronym “REACH,” is the product of an unprec-
edented political debate to overhaul a series of existing rules on 
the manufacture, import, and use of chemicals.28 With the expan-
sion of the European Union to twenty-seven nations, the EU is 
the world’s largest producer and largest market for chemicals, 
with a major impact on practices worldwide.29
In brief, REACH will require basic safety information on 
chemicals made or imported in the EU above one metric ton 
per year, a scope that could eventually cover as many as 30,000 
industrial chemicals. Industry bears the burden of proof under 
REACH, with government authorities providing evaluation and 
enforcement. Chemicals deemed of “very high concern,” includ-
ing carcinogens, mutagens, and PBTs, are subject to authoriza-
tion, which may lead to use-specific restrictions or bans.30 As 
REACH is implemented over the next decade, U.S. states and 
the federal government can expect a steady influx of new data on 
chemical hazards, uses, and safer alternatives. U.S. advocates for 
policy reform are sure to make use of this important resource. 
prIncIples For reForm
These international initiatives bear a striking resemblance 
to many of the state actions regulating chemicals. This is no 
coincidence. These actions are driven by common concerns and 
shared objectives. An understanding of these underlying motiva-
tions helps to place recent state bills in perspective and suggest 
future directions. For example, at the World Summit on Sustain-
able Development in Johannesburg, South Africa in 2002—ten 
years after the Rio Earth Summit—world leaders reaffirmed the 
call to action of Agenda 21 and set a global goal for the sound 
management of chemicals by the year 2020.31 
This 2020 Goal figured in the timeline for the implementa-
tion of REACH. In the United States, environmental advocates 
have also adopted 2020 as an important milestone for eliminating 
dangerous chemicals. The Louisville Charter for Safer Chemi-
cals represents one important public statement about accomplish-
ing federal reform by 2020.32 The Louisville Charter has been 
endorsed by dozens of environmental health advocates working 
at the community, state and federal levels. More importantly, it 
articulates a set of principles that are informing state and federal 
thinking on chemical policy: (1) requiring safer substitutes and 
solutions; (2) phasing out persistent, bioaccumulative, or highly 
toxic chemicals; (3) giving the public and workers the full right-
to-know and participate; (4) acting on early warnings; (5) requir-
ing comprehensive safety data for all chemicals; and (6) taking 
immediate action to protect communities and workers. 
If these principles sound familiar, it may be because the 
drafters drew heavily on the Copenhagen Charter for Safer 
Chemicals, a public statement by European environmental and 
health advocates in the early days of the REACH debate.33 It is 
instructive to consider the state actions on chemicals in light of 
these principles. The state bills targeting PBDEs, lindane, and 
other PBTs fit squarely with the priority attention that this state-
ment gives to persistent, bioaccumulative toxics. The emphasis 
on developing safer substitutes and solutions is echoed in several 
state bills that call for a proactive examination of alternatives to 
avoid an inadvertent shift from bad to worse, and to facilitate a 
smooth transition for downstream users of banned substances. 
The calls for comprehensive safety data and greater right-to-
know speak to the serious legacy problems of inadequate infor-
mation. Despite many years of the voluntary EPA-industry High 
Production Volume Challenge program, there is still a dearth of 
information needed for assessing risk and prioritizing action on 
chemicals.34 This lack of information demonstrates the value of 
biomonitoring programs, which can be instrumental in identify-
ing substances to which humans are intimately exposed rather 
than relying on hypothetical predictions. 
It is also important to note that several of these principles 
address the process by which decisions about chemicals are 
made. The references to acting on early warnings and tak-
ing prompt measure to protect workers and communities are a 
reaction against a system that appears mired in a kind of risk 
analysis paralysis that frequently justifies business as usual. The 
statement conveys an urgency to provide environmental justice 
for communities disproportionately burdened by chemicals. In 
addition to the removing dangerous chemicals, the statement is 
framed in positive terms, including a stated desire to spur inno-
vation, invest in new technologies, and empower workers and 
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communities to have a voice in decisions that can affect their 
health.35 
conclusIon: TowarDs a new  
u.s. polIcy on chemIcals
One consequence of state success in enacting stricter con-
trols on chemicals is that it could lead to a patchwork quilt of 
disparate standards and requirements. But there are many rea-
sons why most advocates for reform of U.S. policy would not 
be satisfied with scattered state progress alone. For one, such 
an outcome would not guarantee the same basic protection to 
all Americans. It would create structural incentives for shifting 
operations involving hazardous chemical to states with weaker 
laws. Furthermore, a state-based approach to chemicals man-
agement would not be able to employ the legal, technical, and 
financial resources available to the federal government. States 
are historically the laboratories of democracy, but it does not fol-
low that the federal government should do nothing. 
Indeed, the current upsurge of state laws on chemicals aims 
not only to protect their own citizens, but also to create a politi-
cal environment for long overdue national reform. This politi-
cal tumult in the states will increase pressure on Congress and 
future presidents to adopt a new outlook on chemicals. The Sen-
ate and the House of Representatives has yet to begin a broad 
debate over the issue, and deep partisan divides make it diffi-
cult to begin the process. Given the Bush Administration’s lack 
of interest in TSCA reform—and its open animosity to the EU 
REACH legislation—the prospects for passing and enacting 
major chemical legislation is virtually nonexistent in the 110th 
Congress. 
Yet, taking a longer view, there is some cause for opti-
mism.36 Even in the dark, harshly anti-environmental climate of 
the 109th Congress, with both houses and the White House in 
Republican hands, some proposed legislation set out bold goals. 
The Child, Worker, and Consumer-Safe Chemicals Act (“Kid 
Safe Chemicals Act”), was introduced by Senator Frank Laut-
enberg (Dem-NJ) and Jim Jeffords (Ind-VT) and in the House 
by Representative Henry Waxman (Dem-CA).37 The Kid Safe 
Chemicals Act proposed major amendments to the core pro-
visions of TSCA borrowing heavily from policy elements of 
REACH and U.S. experience with pesticides. In addition, it 
would have included mandatory biomonitoring and provided 
dedicated funding for research and development into green 
chemistry. It also asserted the proper role for federal preemp-
tion as a floor, not a ceiling, for state action. Unfortunately, the 
majority never allowed for a hearing on the bill and it expired at 
the end of the term.
With the switch in political control in the 110th Congress, 
new committee chairs and new leadership created opportuni-
ties for debating a host of environmental, health, and economic 
issues that were not on the agenda for the past several years. 
This is particularly notable in connection with energy policy 
and climate change. In February 2007 Senator Lautenberg 
announced his intention to reintroduce the Kid-Safe Chemi-
cals Act, although this has yet to happen. In any case, Congress 
has begun to consider some narrowly targeted chemical issues 
including perchlorate, phthalates, asbestos, and a few broader 
initiatives to strengthen environmental justice protection and 
public right-to-know. 
If anything, this is further justification of the crucial impor-
tance of continued state action on chemicals. It could still take 
years to raise public and political awareness of the need for 
change, and even longer to undertake the hard work of nego-
tiating policy solutions. In the meantime, effective state action 
provides a means for addressing specific chemical threats and 
for broadening the constituency for reform. As workers, health 
professionals, faith communities, businesses, and others come to 
see the sense of comprehensive reform, Congress will have no 
choice to but to confront the challenge. By then, thanks to steady 
progress on the international and local levels, federal lawmakers 
will be able to fashion a policy framework that puts the United 
States on a more sustainable path for the sound management of 
chemicals.
1 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, June 13–14, 1992, Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26, ch. 
19, available at http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?Doc
umentID=78&ArticleID=1163 (last visited Nov. 17, 2007).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2007).
3 15 U.S.C. § 2602(1).
4 15 U.S.C. § 2617. 
5 Press Release, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Train Sees New Toxic 
Substances Law as “Preventative Medicine,” (Oct. 21, 1976), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/tsca/03.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2007).
6 Lynn Goldman, Preventing Pollution? U.S. Toxic Chemicals and Pesticides 
Policies and Sustainable Development, 32 envtl. l. rep. 11018 (2002), avail-
able at http://www.elr.info/articles/vol32/32.11018.cfm (last visited Nov. 17, 
2007).
7 GAO, chemical reGulation: optionS exiSt to improve epa’S ability to 
aSSeSS health riSkS anD manaGe itS chemical review proGram, GAO 05-458 
(June 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05458.pdf (last vis-
ited Nov. 17, 2007) [hereinafter GAO, chemical reGulation].
8 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (“It is the policy of the United States that—(1) adequate 
data should be developed with respect to the effect of chemical substances and 
mixtures on health and the environment and that the development of such data 
should be the responsibility of those who manufacture and those who process 
such chemical substances and mixtures.”)
9 GAO, chemical reGulation, supra note 7.
10 See GAO, chemical reGulation, supra note 7 (stating that the five chemical 
substances include polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), fully halogenated chloro-
fluoroalkanes (CFCs), dioxins, asbestos, and hexavalent chromium). 
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InTroDucTIon
Nanotechnology is now the subject of much excitement and attention, with applications proliferating quickly. Thus, engineered nanoscale materials’ (“ENM”) impli-
cations for human health and the environment, and the critical 
need for governments throughout the world to get the policy and 
regulatory framework right has garnered much attention. Most 
would agree that the ultimate goal for society is to enable nano-
technology to realize its potential while effectively addressing 
the pertinent environment, health, and safety (“EHS”) issues 
associated with ENM.
Domestically, the Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”) 
is the federal environmental law most often mentioned in con-
nection with regulating ENM. It provides the framework for 
the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (“EPA”) to man-
age new and existing chemical 
substances throughout their pro-
duction, use, and disposal.2 This 
Article considers several issues 
in connection with the applica-
tion of TSCA to ENM. It does 
not propose comprehensive res-
olutions, but rather seeks to raise 
awareness and promote further 
discussion of these issues.
backGrounD on nanoTechnoloGy
Nanotechnology, the “understanding and control of matter 
at dimensions of roughly 1 to 100 nanometers, where unique 
phenomena enable novel applications,”3 is expanding rapidly. 
It is viewed broadly as encompassing many technologies that 
over time will generate many new products and applications. 
Lux Research, a nanotechnology research and advocacy firm, 
predicts that by 2014, products incorporating nanotechnology 
will constitute fifteen percent of global manufacturing output 
and will total $2.6 trillion.4
One of the key reasons governments and inter-governmen-
tal organizations around the world are focusing on nanotechnol-
ogy is the lack of understanding in all cases regarding the EHS 
effects of exposure to ENM. Some believe that the information 
that exists warrants caution. The small size of certain nanopar-
ticles facilitates their biological uptake into cells and their move-
ment in the body more readily than is the case with their macro/
bulk counterparts.5 Other factors about nanoparticles contribute 
to a general sense of uncertainty regarding the health and envi-
ronmental effects of exposure to ENM. ENM can have proper-
ties that do not conform to conventional physics and chemistry, 
potentially increasing risk.6
tSca anD enGineereD nanoScale SubStanceS
by Lynn L. Bergeson & Ira Dassa*1
Set forth below is an overview of TSCA—the statute and 
EPA’s implementing regulations—followed by a discussion 
of the key issues that have arisen regarding the application of 
TSCA to ENM and a review of EPA’s TSCA-related nanotech-
nology initiatives to date.
Tsca overvIew
Congress enacted TSCA in 1976 to protect human health 
and the environment from potentially harmful chemical sub-
stances and mixtures. The statute authorizes EPA to regulate 
“chemical substances,”7 defined to mean “any organic or inor-
ganic substance of a particular molecular identity.”8 EPA has 
explained that ENM “which meet the TSCA definition of ‘chem-
ical substance[]’ are subject to TSCA.”9
TSCA Section 8(b)(1) directs EPA to “compile, keep current, 
and publish a list of each chemi-
cal substance which is manufac-
tured or processed in the United 
States.”10 This list is known as 
the TSCA Chemical Substance 
Inventory (“Inventory”). Chem-
ical substances included on the 
Inventory are considered exist-
ing chemical substances for pur-
poses of TSCA, while the statute 
expressly defines “any chemical 
substance which is not included 
[on the Inventory]” as a “new chemical substance.”11 Therefore, 
under TSCA, the government considers a chemical substance as 
an existing chemical substance or a new chemical substance. For 
ENM, this distinction is significant.
EPA published the initial Inventory in 1979 and continu-
ally updates it. EPA adds new chemical substances to the Inven-
tory after a Premanufacture Notice (“PMN”) and subsequent 
Notice of Commencement of Manufacture or Import (“NOC”) 
have been submitted pursuant to TSCA Section 5.12 As of early 
2007, the Inventory listed approximately 83,000 chemical sub-
stances.13
epa’S pmn authority
TSCA Section 5 governs the manufacture and import into 
the United States of new chemical substances, in addition to the 
* Lynn L. Bergeson is the Managing Director of, and Ira Dassa is an Associ-
ate with, Bergeson & Campbell, P.C., a Washington, D.C. law firm focusing on 
chemical, pesticide, and other specialty chemical product approval and regulation, 
environmental, health, and safety law, chemical product litigation, and associated 
business issues. Bergeson & Campbell, P.C. is counsel to the American Chemistry 
Counsel Nanotechnology Panel. The views expressed in this article are entirely 
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manufacture, import, and processing of existing chemical sub-
stances for a use that the EPA determines to be a “significant 
new use.”14 New, but not existing, chemical substances are sub-
ject to the PMN requirement set forth in TSCA Section 5(a)(1)
(A).15 Unless a PMN exemption applies, a company must submit 
a completed PMN form to the EPA at least ninety days before 
commencing the manufacture or import of any new chemical 
substance.16 Through the PMN review process, EPA assesses the 
new chemical and determines whether its manufacture, importa-
tion, processing, and/or distribution in commerce may present 
an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.17
Exemptions from the PMN process are either “self-exe-
cuting” or require prior EPA approval. Self-executing exemp-
tions are those that take effect once an entity determines that the 
exemption applies, and the company can manufacture the new 
chemical substance in the United States without the need for 
a PMN, provided that they comply with any recordkeeping or 
other applicable requirements for the particular exemption. Self-
executing PMN exemptions include the exemption for chemical 
substances with no separate commercial purpose,18 the poly-
mer exemption,19 and the research and development (“R&D”) 
exemption.20
Other exemptions from the PMN requirement require prior 
EPA approval. In those situations, entities must submit, and EPA 
must approve, an exemption application before the entity can 
commence manufacture of the new chemical, subject to compli-
ance with any recordkeeping or other applicable requirements. 
PMN exemptions that require prior EPA approval include the 
low volume exemption (“LVE”),21 the low release and low expo-
sure exemption (“LoREX”),22 and the test marketing exemption 
(“TME”).23
The PMN exemptions of greatest importance to the emerg-
ing nanotechnology industry include the LVE, the LoREX, 
and the R&D exemption,24 which appears to be uniquely well-
suited for nanotechnology R&D undertaken by start-up com-
panies, research laboratories, universities, and others. As noted 
above, the LVE and the LoREX require prior EPA review and 
approval.
The EPA bases eligibility for an LVE on the manufacture 
of a new chemical in quantities of 10,000 kilograms—approxi-
mately 22,000 pounds—or less per year, while it bases eligibility 
for a LoREX on meeting several regulatory criteria for release 
and exposure throughout the manufacture, processing, distribu-
tion, use, and disposal of the chemical.25 Once EPA notifies an 
applicant that it granted the LVE or LoREX application, or if the 
thirty-day review period expires without notice from EPA, man-
ufacture or import of the chemical substance may commence, 
consistent with the terms of the exemption.26
TSCA Section 5(e) authorizes EPA to issue administrative 
orders controlling new chemical substances when it finds, after 
review of a PMN, that insufficient information exists to permit 
a reasoned evaluation of the risk, and either the chemical may 
present an unreasonable risk to health or the environment, or 
it will be produced in substantial quantities that will enter the 
environment or to which there will be substantial or significant 
human exposure.27 In an order, the EPA may ban or limit the 
manufacture, processing, distribution, use, or disposal of the 
chemical.28 EPA must propose a Section 5(e) order prior to the 
expiration of the ninety-day PMN review period.29 As a mat-
ter of practice, rather than acting unilaterally under Section 5(e), 
EPA typically enters into a consent order with a PMN submitter, 
under which the latter agrees to restrict the manufacture, pro-
cessing, distribution, use, or disposal of the new chemical sub-
stance pending the development of data necessary to evaluate 
the potential hazards. 
epa’S “SiGnificant new uSe” authority
TSCA Section 5 authorizes EPA to review and assess the 
potential risks posed by significant new uses of existing chemi-
cal substances.30 A significant new use rule (“SNUR”) deter-
mines that a use is significant and new. 31 A Significant New Use 
Notice (“SNUN”) is the form an entity must submit to EPA at 
least ninety days prior to any manufacture, import, or processing 
for that use.32 Some have suggested that the co-location of EPA’s 
SNUR authority and PMN requirement in the same statutory 
section is a clear indication that Congress intended EPA to regu-
late new chemicals and significant new uses of existing chemi-
cals similarly.33 In fact, the TSCA legislative history reveals that 
EPA’s SNUR authority complements its PMN authority.34
A key distinction between EPA’s PMN authority and its 
SNUR authority is that under the latter, EPA first must issue a 
SNUR, whereas with the former, both the statute and a generic 
implementing rule already mandate the submission of a PMN.35 
Once EPA issues a SNUR, the two provisions operate in much 
the same way, and a SNUN is submitted on the same form and 
contains virtually the same information as a PMN.
In promulgating a SNUR, EPA must explain how it con-
sidered all relevant factors, including the following factors 
specifically mentioned in the statute: “the projected volume 
of manufacturing and processing . . . the extent to which a use 
changes the type or form of exposure to human beings or the 
environment . . . the extent to which a use increases the magni-
tude and duration of exposure of human beings or the environ-
ment . . . and . . . the reasonably anticipated manner and methods 
of manufacturing, processing, distribution in commerce, and dis-
posal.”36 EPA need not make a legal finding with respect to the 
potential harm that the existing chemical may pose, but rather, 
EPA need only consider the relevant factors.37
Importantly for present purposes, EPA is authorized to issue 
SNURs for categories of chemical substances.38 The term “cate-
gory of chemical substances” is defined as “a group of chemical 
substances the members of which are similar in molecular struc-
ture, in physical, chemical, or biological properties, in use, or in 
a mode of entrance into the human body or into the environment, 
or the members of which are in some other way suitable for clas-
sification as such for purposes of [TSCA].”39 Thus, the criteria 
for qualifying as a category are extremely broad.
epa’S authority unDer tSca Section 8
TSCA Section 8 gives EPA broad information-gathering 
powers. These powers include the ability to impose recordkeep-
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ing and reporting requirements for production, use, and expo-
sure-related information under Section 8(a),40 and requirements 
for the submission of “health and safety study” data under Sec-
tion 8(d).41 Pursuant to regulations issued by EPA under Section 
8(c), manufacturers, importers, and processors of chemical sub-
stances must create and maintain records of allegations—whether 
written or oral—that a particular chemical “caused a significant 
adverse reaction to health or the environment.”42 A company 
must make its Section 8(c) records available for inspection by 
EPA at any time and submit them to EPA upon request.43
Section 8(e), the self-executing “substantial risk” reporting 
provision of TSCA, obligates manufacturers, processors, and 
distributors as follows:
Any person who manufactures, processes, or distributes 
in commerce a chemical substance . . . and who obtains 
information which reasonably supports the conclusion 
that such substance . . . presents a substantial risk of 
injury to health or the environment shall immediately 
inform [EPA] of such information unless such person 
has actual knowledge that [EPA] has been adequately 
informed of such information.44
This reporting requirement is important and may have spe-
cial significance for companies working with ENM. Historically, 
penalties for non-compliance with the Section 8(e)’s substantial 
risk reporting obligation have been severe, and the EPA col-
lected its largest civil administrative penalty ever from alleged 
Section 8(e) reporting violations.45
applIcabIlITy oF Tsca To enm
Several of the key TSCA issues raised in connection with 
the application of TSCA to ENM include whether TSCA should 
regulate ENM consisting of Inventory-listed chemicals as “new 
chemical substances;” whether certain PMN exemptions are 
appropriate when applied to ENM; and whether TSCA’s infor-
mation-gathering and reporting provisions are sufficiently robust 
to address issues arising in connection with ENM.
enm conSiStinG of inventory-liSteD chemicalS
Several well-respected organizations, including Environ-
mental Defense (“ED”) and the Natural Resources Defense 
Council (“NRDC”), have questioned whether TSCA is well-
suited to manage potential EHS risks believed to be posed by 
ENM. These organizations have recommended that nanoscale 
versions of Inventory-listed chemicals be considered new chem-
ical substances for purposes of TSCA Section 5.46 As stated 
by ED, “engineered nanomaterials are ‘new’ substances under 
TSCA (and thus subject to PMN review), even where a material 
has a chemical structure that is identical to a substance already 
included on the Inventory, unless the nanomaterial’s chemical 
and physical properties are demonstrably identical to an existing 
conventional substance with the same chemical structure.”47 In 
short, the argument is that because nanoscale versions of exist-
ing macro-scaled chemicals are designed to have novel and 
enhanced properties and/or characteristics that differ from the 
macro-sized counterparts, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
nanoscale versions may pose risks not associated with their con-
ventional counterparts, such that the nanoscale versions should 
be considered new chemicals and thus subject to PMN review.
TSCA applies to ENM that meet the broad statutory defini-
tion of “chemical substance.” Conceding that ENM, which are 
chemical substances, are subject to TSCA, the issue really is 
which TSCA provisions apply. Proponents of the argument that 
nanoscale versions of existing chemicals should be regulated 
as new substances claim this interpretation of TSCA is good 
public policy and could prevent any unintended adverse human 
health and environmental consequences that may be associated 
with ENM. They also assert that ENM are of interest precisely 
because they are new and special. Because these materials are 
believed to offer new features and added value, they should be 
subject to TSCA’s new chemical review provisions.48 A third 
argument offered is that the TSCA definition of “chemical sub-
stance” encompasses more than just a substance’s molecular 
structure. ED, for example, claims nothing in TSCA expressly 
precludes the definition of “chemical substance” from including 
physical and chemical properties.49
The American Chemistry Council (“ACC”) Nanotechnol-
ogy Panel, on the other hand, claims that nanoscale versions of 
Inventory-listed substances are not new chemical substances for 
TSCA purposes and cannot be considered new based on the very 
definition of “chemical substance.”50 A “chemical substance” is 
defined by its “particular molecular identity,” and the definition 
makes no mention of a substance’s physical and chemical prop-
erties.51 In ascertaining whether a particular substance appears 
on the Inventory, all that matters legally, according to the ACC 
Nanotechnology Panel, is whether, based on the substance’s 
molecular identity, it is or is not listed on the Inventory.52
Additionally, the Panel claims that EPA’s historic course 
of conduct has been to consider only a chemical substance’s 
molecular identity, not its physical or chemical properties. This 
argument finds support in the ABA SEER Paper, which asserts 
“EPA’s emphasis on molecular structure is reflected in the PMN 
review process.”53 The ABA SEER Paper continues:
The initial steps of the PMN review process involve 
EPA establishing a complete and accurate chemical 
name for the substance and determining whether the 
chemical is already on the Inventory. If EPA deter-
mines, based on the chemical identity of the substance, 
that it is already on the Inventory, the PMN review 
ceases and the submitter is notified that the chemical 
can be manufactured in the U.S. This determination is 
made without any reference to the physical or chemical 
properties of the chemical.54
The ABA SEER Paper acknowledges that the statutory term 
“particular molecular identity” is “sufficiently flexible as to take 
into account physical properties or other defining characteristics 
in addition to molecular structure, at least to a limited degree,” 
but it concludes “molecular structure is the definitive character-
istic in most instances.”55
Even if EPA announced that nanoscale versions of Inven-
tory-listed chemicals are existing and not new chemicals for 
TSCA purposes (and as will be seen below, EPA is leaning 
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strongly in this direction), EPA nonetheless has broad authority 
under TSCA to consider any potential risks posed by nanoscale 
substances. The ABA SEER Paper emphasizes that, beyond the 
PMN requirement, EPA has broad authority under other provi-
sions of TSCA to address potential risks posed by ENM.56
Key among the other provisions is EPA’s SNUR authority. 
As indicated above, EPA can issue a SNUR, thereby trigger-
ing the need for companies to submit a SNUN.57 TSCA Sec-
tions 5(a)(1)(B) and 5(a)(2) thus enable EPA to perform the 
same risk assessment and implement the same risk management 
controls on existing chemical substances engineered at the nano-
scale that can be applied to new chemical substances through 
the PMN process.58 SNUNs and PMNs use the same submission 
form, EPA Form 7710-25,59 and both notices “undergo the same 
review process.”60 Notably, EPA is authorized to issue a Section 
5(e) (or Section 5(f)) order for any chemical substance “with 
respect to which notice is required by [Section 5(a)],” and that 
notice can be either a PMN under Section 5(a)(1)(A) or a SNUN 
under Section 5(a)(1)(B).61
In promulgating a SNUR, EPA must consider all relevant 
factors, including the four factors listed in the statute. Of the 
four statutory factors discussed 
above, the latter three appear to 
be especially relevant to ENM.62 
EPA, however, is not restricted 
to the four statutory factors, and 
in fact “construes the statute to 
allow consideration of any other 
relevant factors.”63
The ABA SEER Paper also 
points out that EPA is not limited 
to issuing SNURs for individual 
ENM. Given the great diversity 
that reportedly characterizes 
these materials, EPA’s authority 
to issue a SNUR for a category or categories of existing ENM is 
important, particularly as the criteria for qualifying as a category 
are broad and may mean merely being “in some . . . way suitable 
for classification as such for purposes of [TSCA].”64
appropriateneSS of certain pmn exemptionS
 The appropriateness of several of the PMN exemptions is 
also debated. ED, for example, has urged the EPA “not to apply 
mass-based, or other exemptions in the PMN program, unless 
the underlying scientific rationale is appropriate when applied to 
nanomaterials.”65 A key issue is the relevance of mass-based and 
volume-based criteria as applied to ENM, and whether these cri-
teria could ever apply to ENM, which are in many cases unlikely 
to be produced in substantial quantities.
The appropriateness of the LVE in particular has been ques-
tioned on the grounds that the threshold level of 10,000 kilo-
grams is too high, especially considering that few companies are 
expected in the near term to be producing ENM in amounts even 
approaching that level.66 At first glance, the suitability of this 
PMN exemption may seem questionable, but a closer review 
may suggest otherwise. Because the exemption requires prior 
EPA approval, EPA’s consideration of any potential risks posed 
by the ENM at issue can be expected to be comprehensive. In 
fact, EPA’s review of a PMN exemption for a carbon nanotube, 
originally submitted as a LVE, but later converted to a LoREX, 
took approximately one year and likely consumed considerable 
EPA resources and generated no small amount of deliberation 
and scrutiny.67
Although the LVE allows certain new chemicals, including 
those falling into the category of ENM, to avoid the full panoply 
of PMN review, this does not mean EPA does not consider care-
fully the EHS implications of the candidate substance. Indeed, 
the level of scrutiny the EPA reportedly devoted to the LVE/
LoREX application likely exceeded the degree of scrutiny typi-
cally reserved for conventional new chemicals reviewed under 
the PMN program.
appropriateneSS of reportinG  
obliGationS unDer tSca Section 8
Whether certain TSCA information-gathering and reporting 
obligations, particularly Section 8(e), apply to ENM is another 
debated issue. EPA, however, has made it clear that the Section 
8(e)’s substantial risk report-
ing obligation applies to all 
chemicals, including nanoscale 
materials consisting of chemical 
substances.68 Hence, if a person 
learns that a nanoscale-sized 
version of an existing chemical 
substance poses hazards differ-
ent from those associated with 
its bulk counterpart, and if that 
information reasonably sup-
ports the conclusion that the 
nanoscale-sized version presents 
a substantial risk of injury, then 
TSCA Section 8(e) requires reporting.69
Similarly, TSCA Section 8(c) reporting obligations apply 
to persons manufacturing, importing, processing, or distrib-
uting ENM in commerce. Such persons must maintain, and 
make available to the EPA for inspection, records of significant 
adverse reactions alleged to have been caused by the particular 
ENM. Under EPA’s implementing regulations, this means that if 
anyone, including a company’s employees, customers, or neigh-
bors, makes a written or oral statement to the effect that an ENM 
caused a significant adverse effect, the company must maintain a 
record of that allegation.
epa nanoTechnoloGy InITIaTIves To DaTe
EPA is to be commended for its leadership, vision, and 
energy in exploring early and creatively the application of TSCA 
to ENM. Two regulatory initiatives are worthy of discussion.
TSCA PMN Decision Logic—EPA’s Office of Pollution 
Prevention and Toxics (“OPPT”) developed a decision logic that 
its staff applies in assessing ENM submitted to EPA for PMN 
review under TSCA Section 5, or as part of PMN exemption 
applications. Use of the logic is resulting in EPA’s identifica-
EPA nonetheless has  
broad authority under 
TSCA to consider any 
potential risks posed by 
nanoscale substances.
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tion of specific areas of inquiry unique to ENM. Primary among 
these areas are potential routes of exposure to workers and 
potential environmental releases. EPA is assessing the adequacy 
of personal protective equipment to prevent potential exposures 
to ENM during the manufacturing, processing, and/or distribu-
tion and use of these materials. EPA’s decision logic is believed 
to distinguish between true ENM, meaning those materials that 
meet the criteria set out by the NNI, and those materials that 
fall within the size range of 1-100 nanometers, but are not spe-
cifically engineered with the intent to enable novel, size-depen-
dent properties. According to published sources, EPA has, as of 
August 2006, reviewed fifteen new chemicals that were deemed 
to fall within the nanoscale size range, one of which, a carbon 
nanotube, possessed properties deemed unique and resulted in 
EPA’s approval of a LoREX application in 2005.70
Now, the Inventory includes at least two new ENM. On 
June 9, 2006, and August 14, 2006, EPA issued Federal Reg-
ister notices acknowledging the receipt of NOCs of siloxane-
coated silica and siloxane-coated alumina nanoparticles.71
Nanoscale Materials Stewardship Program—In 2005, 
OPPT announced its interest in considering how best to obtain 
much-needed information on existing ENM, and convened a 
public meeting to discuss various options in June 2005.72 The 
discussion at the public meeting yielded a consensus that a vol-
untary program on existing ENM would have significant value. 
Shortly thereafter, EPA created an Interim Ad Hoc Work Group 
on Nanoscale Materials (“Work Group”) as part of the National 
Pollution Prevention and Toxics Advisory Committee (“NPP-
TAC”), a federal advisory group tasked with advising OPPT 
on TSCA and pollution prevention matters.73 On November 22, 
2005, after the Work Group had met several times, NPPTAC 
submitted to the EPA Administrator its Overview Document on 
Nanoscale Materials, which outlined a framework for an EPA 
approach to a voluntary program for ENM and a complementary 
approach to new chemical nanoscale requirements under TSCA, 
and addressed various other issues pertinent to ENM.74
On October 18, 2006, EPA Assistant Administrator James 
Gulliford sent a letter to stakeholders formally announcing the 
development of the Nanoscale Materials Stewardship Program 
(“NMSP”) and inviting stakeholder participation in it.75 Sev-
eral months later, EPA simultaneously published three Federal 
Register notices related to the NMSP.76 The first notice solic-
ited public comment on EPA’s proposed Information Collection 
Request under the Paperwork Reduction Act, including a draft 
form that NMSP participants could use to submit data to EPA;77 
the second announced a public meeting on the NMSP;78 and 
the third solicited public comment on two draft documents: the 
“Concept Paper for the Nanoscale Materials Stewardship Pro-
gram under TSCA” (“NMSP Concept Paper”) and the “TSCA 
Inventory Status of Nanoscale Substances—General Approach” 
(“TSCA Inventory Paper”).79
The draft NMSP Concept Paper outlined EPA’s “initial 
thinking on the design and development” of the NMSP and 
explained that the program, in keeping with the Work Group’s 
recommendations, would consist of two parts, a “Basic Pro-
gram” and an “In-Depth Program.”80 The draft TSCA Inven-
tory Paper “inform[ed] the public of the approach EPA has 
historically taken under TSCA in evaluating whether chemical 
substances are new, and further inform[ed] the public of EPA’s 
intention to follow [the same] approach for nanomaterials that 
are chemical substances.”81 In the draft TSCA Inventory Paper, 
EPA explained that if a particular ENM has the same molecular 
identity as a non-nanoscale (i.e., macro) substance that is listed 
on the TSCA Inventory, then the ENM is an existing chemical 
irrespective of its particle size and physical/chemical proper-
ties.82 Thus, the TSCA Inventory Paper runs counter to the view 
expressed by ED, NRDC, and others, that nanoscale versions of 
Inventory-listed chemicals should be deemed new for purposes 
of TSCA Section 5.
The comment period for the NMSP documents closed on 
September 10, 2007, and EPA is now reviewing the various com-
ments submitted.83 It is clear that EPA intends to proceed with 
the NMSP, and EPA hopes to launch the program by the end of 
2007. EPA has indicated that regulatory efforts under TSCA are 
unlikely to happen until after the NMSP is well underway, but 
a TSCA Section 8(a) information-gathering rule is possible, and 
perhaps even likely.
conclusIon
The debate over TSCA’s application to ENM will continue 
for some time. The discussion above demonstrates that EPA has 
broad authority under TSCA, and that new legislation intended 
to address any potential risks that ENM might pose is unneces-
sary. EPA can review ENM under TSCA Section 5(a), either as 
new chemicals or as significant new uses of existing chemicals. 
EPA can conduct a comprehensive review of the exemptions 
from the PMN requirement. EPA can also collect information 
on and compel and enforce reporting obligations with respect 
to ENM.
EPA’s stated commitment to issue final guidance on these 
issues will greatly assist the regulated community in understand-
ing EPA’s expectations regarding the submission of PMN and 
exemption applications for ENM and thus better prepare indus-
try to undertake its TSCA compliance obligations consistently. 
In the interim, chemical manufacturers would be wise to con-
sider carefully their TSCA compliance obligations, obtain legal 
advice when necessary, and seek EPA’s thoughts early and often 
regarding the regulatory status of ENM believed to consist of 
Inventory-listed substances.
Endnotes: TSCA and Engineered Nanoscale Substances 
continued on page 82
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The U.S. bipartisan trade compromise, concluded on May 10, 2007, was the first to create enforceable labor and environmental standards to be applied to the pending 
Free Trade Agreements (“FTAs”) with Peru, Panama, Colombia, 
and Korea.1 In 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(“NAFTA”), signed by the United States, Mexico, and Canada, 
broke new ground with the mention of sustainable development 
in its preamble.2 NAFTA was the first multilateral trade agree-
ment to include environmental protection.3 While breaking new 
ground NAFTA also included a problematic clause, Chapter 11, 
which provides a “right of action to a foreign investor against 
the government of the country in which it invested, for a broad 
range of actions taken” by the government.4 This right of action, 
included in the new FTAs, proved to be without a proper mecha-
nism to guard against claims brought against countries for pass-
ing legislation to protect the environment, which might affect 
the future profits of a company.
Many governments and environmentalists have found 
Chapter 11 actions problematic in relation to governments’ 
attempts to pass environmental laws and regulations. Indeed, the 
right of an investor claim can be important for the fair treatment 
of corporations doing business in a foreign country. However, 
merely allowing the actions to go forward without a mecha-
nism to evaluate the merits of the claim can strain governmental 
decision-making powers. In some cases, the threat of a claim 
may deter a government from establishing environmental pro-
tections. Methanex v. United States is one example of an action 
that may chill future government regulations. Methanex brought 
a claim against California for banning the import of a toxic fuel 
additive that leaked into groundwater and affected the health of 
the population.5 Another example is Sunbelt Water v. Canada. 
Sunbelt brought a claim against Canada for the loss of potential 
future earnings from bottled water exports, due to a change in 
Canadian government policy regarding water resource exports.6 
Claims of this kind could ultimately deter a country from pass-
ing legislation to protect natural resources. 
The latest wave of FTAs create new enforceable environ-
mental standards while inheriting many of the controversial 
clauses from NAFTA. There is a concern regarding the ability of 
developing countries to use or manage natural resources without 
fear of actions being filed against them under these clauses. The 
case of Bayview Irrigation District v. Mexico7 illustrates the dif-
ficult position a country may find itself in while attempting to 
manage natural resources. Sixteen U.S. irrigation districts along 
with twenty-eight individuals brought suit against the Mexican 
government for the diversion of water into Mexican farmlands, 
environmental StanDarDS in u.S. free  
traDe aGreementS: leSSonS from chapter 11
by Hena Schommer*
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claiming that this deprived claimants of their water rights.8 The 
arbitration tribunal in June of this year decided that it had no 
jurisdiction over these claims and thus the parties had no claim 
under NAFTA Chapter 11.9 The Mexican government had to 
cover the costs and expend resources for two years to defend 
itself in international arbitration for which there was no juris-
diction.10 The potential expenditure of resources in international 
arbitration could prove to be a burden to developing countries 
and deter them from passing further environmental protections.
The emergence of environmental standards in international 
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements is a decidedly posi-
tive evolution in the past fifteen years bringing environmental 
issues into spheres where it was historically precluded. How-
ever, the continued inclusion of clauses in the recent FTAs sim-
ilar to Chapter 11 could deter both developed and developing 
countries from passing necessary environmental regulation to 
protect their natural resources in the future. The discouragement 
of countries to act on behalf of protecting their land could have 
drastic environmental costs in developing countries, which often 
lack adequate environmental protections. 
Thus, a preliminary mechanism to determine the validity 
of a company’s claim under Chapter 11 before litigation would 
be a step to allay the concerns of countries that may hesitate to 
enact protections due to a threat of litigation under trade rules. 
This mechanism will potentially alleviate the excessive costs 
and other burdens a developing country faces while defending 
itself against a claim that is interfering with its right to protect 
the environment.
1 See U.S. Dep’t of State, International Information Programs, Free Trade Pacts 
Might Gain Congressional Support (June 28, 2007), available at http://usinfo.
state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2007&m=June&x=20
070628130953saikceinawz0.8419306 (last visited Nov. 17, 2007). 
2 See Stephen P. Mumme, NAF TA and Environment, foreiGn pol’y in focuS, 
Oct. 1999, available at http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol4/v4n26nafta.html (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2007).
3 Mumme, id.
4 Madeline Stone, NAFTA Article 1010: Environmental friend or foe?, 15 Geo. 
int’l envtl. l. rev. 763 (2003). 
5 U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of the Legal Advisor, Methanex Corp. v. United 
States, available at http ://www.state.gov/s/l/c5818.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 
2007).
Endnotes: Environmental Standards in U.S. Free Trade Agreements
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The August 3, 2007 bridge collapse in Minneapolis, Min-nesota focused the nation’s attention once more on the grave state of aging infrastructure in the United States. 
Built in 1967, the Interstate 35W (“I-35W”) bridge was ranked 
“deficient” as of 2006 by the National Bridge Inspection Pro-
gram.1 Nationwide nearly twenty-five percent of bridges are 
deficient; in fourteen states more than thirty percent of bridges 
are deficient.2 While a deficient rating does not necessarily imply 
impending collapse or breakdown, it does mean that elements of 
a bridge need to be monitored and/or repaired.3 Notwithstanding 
this definition, the disaster and the statistics beg the question: is 
the Minneapolis bridge collapse an ominous sign of problems to 
come for U.S. infrastructure, or a catalyst for a refreshed govern-
mental approach to transportation infrastructure? 
Investigation is still ongoing as to the precise cause of 
the summer bridge collapse in Minnesota. Whatever the final 
determination comes out to be, plans are moving forward for a 
replacement bridge to span the Mississippi River in downtown 
Minneapolis. The new I-35W bridge will be funded by the fed-
eral and Minnesota state governments. The stated goals of the 
City of Minneapolis, which is involved in planning for the new 
bridge, include “improved vehicle capacity and . . . transit capac-
ity,” that the new bridge design “incorporate options for future 
transit improvements” and that it “be built to meet all current 
environmental standards.”4
Within these goals, there is the potential for Minnesota 
to lead by example and take infrastructure construction in a 
more sustainable direction. In the same vein as the U.S. Build-
ing Council’s Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design 
(“LEED”) green building criteria, sustainable bridge building 
practices would incorporate heightened environmental concerns 
into the usual considerations of cost and aesthetics. Although 
currently no equivalent to the LEED criteria exists for sustain-
able bridge design, there are various elements that bridge plan-
ners in Minnesota and elsewhere could consider with an eye 
towards sustainability.5
A bridge that lasts longer without needing extensive repair 
or a complete overhaul is by definition more sustainable. High 
performance construction materials would help to create a 
bridge that remains solid and useable for generations. Alumi-
num and high performance concrete are two examples. Alumi-
num is substantially lighter than concrete, requiring fewer welds 
be made during construction and less overall weight-bearing 
supports. High performance concrete provides better long-term 
performance and reduced life-cycle costs than traditional con-
crete.6 The technology exists to allow construction of transpor-
minneapoliS briDGe collapSe:  
motivation to be Smarter on infraStructure or lateSt in a trenD?
by Mary Bortscheller*
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Endnotes: Minneapolis Bridge Collapse continued on page 84
tation infrastructure that 
is durable and ultimately 
safer for everyone. 
Prior to the col-
lapse, the I-35W bridge 
had eight lanes for motor 
vehicle use only. A new 
bridge constructed with 
an eye towards sustain-
ability would incorporate 
a mixed use approach, 
creating a transit corridor 
for motor vehicles, high 
occupancy vehicles, and 
light rail. Carrying higher 
volumes of people over a 
single structure increases 
the general efficiency of 
infrastructure, minimizing the need for future resource and time 
expenditures in future expansion. 
Sustainable design practices in transportation systems are 
not yet widely used. Bridges are expensive, and the design that 
serves the purpose at the lowest cost is the one usually chosen 
in a transportation plan.7 Incorporating innovative materials and 
special lanes inevitably adds to the upfront economic cost of 
a conventional bridge. But if long-term usability, safety, and 
environmental impact of a bridge are considered, then the 
greater initial cost becomes an investment in the future. Federal 
and state funds together pay for the bridges, tunnels, roads, and 
transit arteries that keep people and goods moving throughout 
the United States.8 The government must place a greater prior-
ity, through increased funding targeted at sustainability, on 
the planning, construction, and maintenance of transportation 
infrastructure. 
The passage of the 1956 Highway Revenue Act provided 
for the interstate highway system of which the I-35W bridge was 
a part. In 2006 that Act marked its fiftieth year.9 In the wake of 
the Minneapolis bridge collapse and other infrastructure failures 
around the country, it is vital for the federal and state govern-
ments to take a new look at the way the United States plans and 
constructs its transportation network.
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InTroDucTIon
Over thirty-five years have passed since the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), the “basic national charter for protection of the environ-
ment,” and one of the most important environmental laws passed 
by the U.S. Congress.1 The provisions of NEPA were intended 
to help public officials make decisions with an “understanding 
of environmental consequences, and take actions that protect, 
restore, and enhance the environment.”2 NEPA also provides 
the basis for Environmental Impact Statements (“EISs”), the 
environmental review process 
that requires agencies to take a 
“hard look” at the potential envi-
ronmental consequences of pro-
posed federal actions.3
As early as the 1970s, how-
ever, NEPA began to weather 
considerable criticism from 
some in the scientific com-
munity. Instead of producing 
environmental analyses of high 
technical quality, scientists con-
cluded that NEPA assessments 
contained “massive amounts 
of incomplete, descriptive, and 
often, uninterpreted data.”4 The 
Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) more recently 
found that even when there was more than enough data to make 
a responsible decision, the EIS lacked analysis.5
Our first thesis is that problems with inadequate data and 
science intensify when dealing with NEPA assessments of 
complex federal actions: large-scale programs, policies, or 
projects. We maintain that in the face of scientific uncertainty 
and data limitations, the risk of harm to ecological systems 
increases as the scale of proposed development increases. For 
example, during the Bush Administration, the speed and scale 
of oil and gas leasing and drilling on public lands throughout 
the West has increased dramatically.6 Between 2001 and 2006, 
more than 17,000 gas and oil wells were drilled on public land 
in the Rockies. In contrast, fewer than 9,500 wells were drilled 
between 1995 and 2000 during the Clinton Administration.7 A 
recent analysis conducted by The Wilderness Society found that 
the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) is in the process of 
approving more than 126,000 wells to be drilled in the Rocky 
a roaD map to a better nepa: 
why environmental riSk aSSeSSmentS ShoulD be uSeD to analyze  
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Mountain West over the next fifteen to twenty years, despite the 
more than 77,000 wells already producing on the public lands.8 
Studying the effects of this trend, the Government Account-
ability Office (“GAO”) issued a report in June of 2005 entitled 
“Oil and Gas Development—Increased Drilling Permit Activity 
Has Lessened BLM’s Ability to Meet Its Environmental Pro-
tection Responsibilities.”9 As the title indicates, the GAO found 
that the increased volume of permits to drill, and the mandates 
to focus on processing them, has resulted in more BLM staff 
resources devoted to issuing permits—with less attention being 
paid to monitoring and enforcing compliance with environmen-
tal standards that apply to the 
activities conducted under the 
permits. 
In the Rocky Mountain 
West, the scale of oil and gas 
development is larger and the 
pace of decisions is faster than 
in the past, but there is less 
attention paid to considering or 
addressing the cumulative envi-
ronmental risks. The Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 included five 
new categorical exclusions from 
NEPA analysis for oil and gas 
development activities, and both 
the BLM and the U.S. Forest 
Service have implemented additional categorical exclusions in 
the past year.10 A recent study concluded that the rapid pace and 
large scale of oil and gas drilling and leasing that has occurred 
greatly increases the risk to the environment as well as the uncer-
tainty regarding the ultimate effects of this large-scale policy.11 
Our second thesis is that the potential cumulative ecologi-
cal impacts associated with federal efforts of large scale, such 
as the Bush Administration’s national energy policy, would be 
better analyzed through the use of Ecological Risk Assessments 
The Energy Policy Act of 
2005 included five new 
categorical exclusions 
from NEPA analysis for 
oil and gas development 
activities.
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(“ERAs”), often within a Programmatic EIS. ERAs provide a 
conceptual and methodological framework to improve EISs, 
and they are designed to explicitly address uncertainty and risk 
when analyzing environmental impacts.12 This scientific frame-
work could rectify some of the continuing weaknesses of EISs, 
as well as better analyze the cumulative impacts and natural 
increases in risk and uncertainty stemming from these large, 
programmatic projects. 
This Article will argue that, in order to adequately fulfill 
NEPA’s requirement of taking a hard look at potential environ-
mental impacts of national policy initiatives and large-scale proj-
ects, ERAs should be an essential component of NEPA analysis. 
We begin by defining ERAs and providing background infor-
mation on their use. The next section details the many common 
elements of ERAs and EISs, including the similar purposes and 
structures of the two processes, which make them so compatible. 
The Article will next discuss how ERAs can improve the NEPA 
process by improving analysis, assessing cumulative impacts, 
dealing more effectively with uncertainty, and separating assess-
ment from management decisions. We end with discussion and 
recommendations, based on the information presented in the 
Article, that ERAs should be 
conducted for Programmatic 
or large-scale EISs—such as 
the Administration’s policy of 
increases in oil and gas drilling, 
or tar sands and oil shale devel-
opment—in order to adequately 
fulfill NEPA’s requirements.
backGrounD on  
ecoloGIcal rIsk 
assessmenTs  
Risk can be simply defined 
as circumstances that pose danger 
to people or what they value.13 Risk is more formally expressed 
as the relationship between the magnitude of an undesired effect 
and the probability of the undesired effect occurring.14 Risk 
results from the existence of a hazard and uncertainty about its 
expression.15 Ecological risk assessments attempt to transform 
scientific data into meaningful information about the undesired 
effects of human activities on the environment and combine it 
with an evaluation of the consequences.16 Risk assessment iden-
tifies hazards such as the release of drilling fluids into surface 
waters that support fisheries and communities, and it uses mea-
surement, testing, and statistical methods to quantify the rela-
tionship between initiating events and the effects.17 
Development of ecoloGical riSk aSSeSSmentS
ERAs have been performed for more than twenty years and 
have a long history that began with pollution investigation.18 The 
EPA published its Framework for Ecological Risk Assessment in 
1992, therein establishing the basic process that is widely used 
today. It then added further detail in the 1998 Guidelines for 
Ecological Risk Assessment. In addition, the EPA continues to 
develop a “bookshelf” of documents for guidance on conducting 
ERAs on more specific topics.19 Public lands agencies, such as 
the U.S. Forest Service, have begun to develop new models for 
ERAs for use in making land management decisions.20
epa GuiDelineS for ecoloGical riSk aSSeSSmentS
According to the EPA, ERA is “a process that evaluates 
the likelihood that adverse ecological effects may occur or are 
occurring as a result of exposure to one or more stressors.”21 
ERAs “systematically evaluate and organize data, information, 
assumptions, and uncertainties in order to help understand and 
predict the relationships . . . in a way that is useful for environ-
mental decision making.”22 Put more simply, ERAs try to answer 
three basic questions: “What can go wrong? How likely is it to 
happen? And, so what if it does?”23
The EPA 1998 Guidelines provide a clear framework that 
includes three distinct steps for conducting ERAs. The first step 
is the problem formulation phase where the scope and scale of 
the ERA is decided upon and a full analysis plan is developed. 
The second phase is the actual analysis where exposure to stres-
sors and the relationship between stressor levels and ecologi-
cal effects is determined. For instance, if the risk assessor were 
trying to determine the effect 
of road building on a water-
shed, one stressor could be the 
increased sediment in the stream 
caused by the road construction, 
while the corresponding eco-
logical effect could be reduced 
salmon spawning numbers in 
the river. The analysis would 
include a determination of how 
much sediment increases and 
what effect that increase would 
have on the numbers of spawn-
ing salmon. The third and final 
part of the process is where assessors estimate and describe the 
risk and prepare a report, which includes their overall degree of 
confidence in their conclusions.24
common elemenTs oF eras anD eIss
There are many common elements of ERAs and EISs, 
including similar purposes and structures, which make ERAs a 
useful tool for informing the NEPA process. The basic goal of 
both ERAs and EISs is to provide a structure for collecting and 
analyzing information without requiring a specific result, based 
on the premise that better information leads to less uncertainty 
in decision making. Through the NEPA process, an agency must 
prepare a “coherent and comprehensive up-front environmental 
analysis to ensure informed decision making to the end that ‘the 
agency will not act on incomplete information, only to regret 
its decision after it is too late to correct.’”25 A NEPA document 
is legally sufficient only if its “form, content and preparation . 
. . foster both informed decision-making and informed public 
participation.”26 
common purpoSeS of eraS anD eiSS
One of the most important common elements of EISs and 
NEPA specifically encour-
ages adapting and chang-
ing methods of analysis 
as science and knowledge 
about ecosystems improve.
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ERAs are their purpose. The purpose of NEPA, according to 
the Council for Environmental Quality’s NEPA regulations, 
is to “facilitate the evaluation of management decisions and 
the environmental effects of proposed federal agency actions.” 
ERAs have a similar purpose: “[e]cological risk assessments are 
designed and conducted to provide information to risk manag-
ers about the potential adverse effects of different management 
decisions.”27 These two processes not only have the same goals, 
but also complement each other. ERAs provide information to 
risk managers about different management decisions and EIS’s 
evaluate the environmental effects of different management 
decisions. 
common StructureS of eraS anD eiSS
These similarities continue with the general structures of the 
EIS and ERA. The NEPA process begins with the scoping phase 
where the agency formally announces its intention to prepare an 
EIS. The agency requests comments from interested parties and 
the public in order to help focus its environmental review on 
potentially significant environmental issues. Likewise, the first 
step in conducting an ERA is problem formulation, when risk 
assessors, risk managers, and any other interested parties help 
focus the assessment and identify the important issues. At this 
time, risk assessors should also evaluate goals, select assessment 
endpoints, prepare a conceptual model, and develop an analy-
sis plan. Although the initial phases of the ERA and EIS have 
different labels—and ERAs require more specific planning—
both processes include the input of interested parties in order to 
determine the scope of the analysis. In this context, the scope of 
the environmental analysis to be performed under NEPA must 
be commensurate with the scope of the proposed action and its 
potential impacts.28 Similarly, in order to determine the scope of 
an ERA,
[r]isk managers and risk assessors consider the nature 
of the decision (e.g., national policy, local impact), 
available resources, opportunities for increasing the 
resource base (e.g., partnering, new data collection, 
alternative analytical tools), potential characteristics of 
the risk assessment team, and the output that will pro-
vide the best information for the required decisions.29 
The NEPA process continues with the development and 
writing of the EIS, where the agency staff conducts an objec-
tive analysis of the environmental impacts that could occur as a 
result of the proposed action, whether it is a policy, program, or 
project. The EIS also includes analysis of possible alternatives to 
the proposed project and recommendations on how to lessen or 
avoid environmental consequences. The second step of the ERA 
process is risk characterization, when assessors estimate the risk 
through integration of exposure and stressor-response profiles.30 
At the end of this phase there should be summary profiles that 
describe the exposure and the stressor-response relationships.31 
According to the EPA, these results should be written “clearly, 
articulate major assumptions and uncertainties, identify reason-
able alternative interpretations, and separate scientific conclu-
sions from policy judgments.”32 The risk manager can then use 
the risk assessment results, along with other factors such as pub-
lic opinion, economic, or legal concerns in making management 
decisions.33
common requirementS for public DiScloSure
Both processes make the information contained in the EIS 
or ERA public. The EIS is published and mailed to federal, state, 
and local government agencies and elected officials, as well as 
environmental and public interest groups, other interested par-
ties, affected landowners, Native American tribes, newspapers, 
and local libraries. The purpose is to inform the public of the 
proposed actions, show how decisions were made, make the 
decision-making process clear and open to further scrutiny, and 
keep the agency accountable for its actions and decisions.
The EPA recommends a number of additional public disclo-
sures, including explicitly defined endpoints, being open about 
the strengths and limitations of the conceptual model, identifying 
and describing the rationale for key assumptions, and describ-
ing data limitations. The purpose of disclosing these details is 
to keep the ERA process clear and open to further scrutiny and 
peer review. Instead of relying on conclusory statements, these 
required details allow those who were not involved in the pro-
cess to independently evaluate the validity of the assessment. 
Similarly, NEPA’s hard look at environmental conse-
quences must be based on “accurate scientific information” of 
“high quality.”34 Essentially, NEPA “ensures that the agency, in 
reaching its decision, will have available and will carefully con-
sider detailed information concerning significant environmental 
impacts.”35 The Data Quality Act and BLM’s interpreting guid-
ance expand on this obligation, requiring that influential scien-
tific information use the “best available science and supporting 
studies conducted in accordance with sound and objective scien-
tific practices.”36 NEPA also requires agencies to disclose where 
information is incomplete or unavailable.37 
Once again the purposes of EISs and ERAs mirror each 
other. However, because ERAs generally require disclosure of 
specific information regarding the analysis, uncertainty, and data 
limitations, the ERA reporting process can make the EIS more 
informative and useful to a broader number of people.
how eras wIll Improve The nepa process
Although ERAs cannot fulfill all NEPA requirements 
by themselves, they can help agencies effectively analyze the 
potential environmental impacts resulting from proposed federal 
actions and their possible alternatives.38 Because the ERA pro-
cess has a more defined scientific framework than the EIS and 
has historically incorporated more scientific data, merging the 
two processes actually facilitates better analyses when an ERA 
is used as part of an EIS. ERAs can also help focus taxpayer 
resources, both on what data needs to be collected and on where, 
when, and to what extent federal projects should occur.
fulfillinG nepa requirementS anD  
improvinG analySiS
As discussed above, there have been continuing prob-
lems with inadequate NEPA documents including incomplete, 
descriptive and uninterpreted data, and a lack of clear analy-
sis. In 1997, the CEQ conducted a study of the effectiveness 
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of NEPA twenty-five years after its implementation. Among a 
number of conclusions, the CEQ found that “NEPA practitio-
ners need to analyze existing information more effectively. . . ” 
and “[w]hat is often lacking in EISs is. . . a comparison of the 
potential impacts of choosing particular alternatives at particular 
locations expressed in clear, concise language. . . ”39
The purpose of an EIS is to take a hard look at environ-
mental effects, analyzing a number of different options in order 
to better protect the environment. NEPA specifically encour-
ages adapting and changing methods of analysis as science and 
knowledge about ecosystems improve. NEPA states that, “. . . 
it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government. . . to use 
all practicable means and measures. . . to create and maintain 
conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive 
harmony.”40 ERAs provide available means and measures to 
incorporate an accepted, consistent, science-based framework 
that public land agencies already frequently use to focus and 
improve their decisions. Completing ERAs as part of an EIS and 
following the EPA’s Guidelines will address long-term weak-
nesses and enable federal agencies to fulfill more completely the 
purposes of NEPA. 
aSSeSSinG cumulative impactS
ERAs can help to address the difficulties in adequately 
assessing cumulative impacts that can plague EIS’s. NEPA 
requires that agencies assess the “direct, indirect, or cumula-
tive” environmental impacts of a proposed action.41 Cumulative 
impacts are defined as:
the impact on the environment which results from the 
incremental impact of the action when added to other 
past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions 
regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) 
or person undertakes such other actions. Cumulative 
impacts can result from individually minor but collec-
tively significant actions taking place over a period of 
time.42
As the scale and pace of these large-scale developments 
increases, the need to examine the potential cumulative impacts 
increases as well. Agencies are required by NEPA and the 
courts to provide “some quantified or detailed information; 
. . . [g]eneral statements about possible effects and some risk do 
not constitute a hard look. . . absent a justification regarding why 
more definitive information could not be provided.”43 Agencies 
can fail to properly analyze these cumulative impacts, especially 
when dealing with large-scale projects; the Ninth Circuit com-
plained in Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
that the agency’s “findings about cumulative impacts were per-
functory and conclusory and d[id] not provide a helpful analysis 
of past, present, and future projects.”  44 Similar concerns have 
motivated courts to require programmatic EISs to ensure that 
the likely environmental consequences of policy initiatives are 
adequately assessed.45
The conceptual and methodological framework for ERAs 
outlined by the EPA allows for a consistent and comprehen-
sive approach for land managers to follow when making deci-
sions. Each ERA should include—as well as document for the 
public—the stages of problem formulation, exposure analysis, 
effects assessment, and risk characterization.46 Requiring each of 
these components should, in turn, improve methods of sampling 
and analysis, interpretations of data, and quality assurances.47 In 
this way, cumulative impacts can be dealt with consistently and 
comprehensively, avoiding the lack of analysis and conclusory 
findings that often occur in EIS.48 
DealinG effectively with uncertainty
Uncertainty is a constant when dealing with the effect of 
land management actions upon the environment, but using 
ERAs can help to consistently recognize where uncertainty lies, 
how uncertainty can be reduced, and where more data may be 
needed to make an effective evaluation. Unfortunately, in the 
history of EIS, uncertainty has been largely “ignored, omitted, 
described in qualitative terms, or merely [made] implicit in the 
assessment.”49
Where there is incomplete or unavailable scientific infor-
mation concerning significant adverse environmental impacts, 
NEPA requires the disclosure and analysis of the costs of uncer-
tainty and the costs of proceeding without more and better 
information.50 However, agencies may not address, explain, or 
satisfactorily reduce uncertainty in their decisionmaking process, 
even when it is brought to their attention. For example, the Ninth 
Circuit found an EIS inadequate because it “did not address in 
any meaningful way the various uncertainties surrounding the 
scientific evidence.”51 Courts have also concluded that agencies 
“need not undertake further scientific study, [to reduce uncer-
tainty. . . but the agency] must explain in the EIS why such an 
undertaking is not necessary or feasible.”52 
The ERA process helps to address this problem by calling 
for an explicit determination of the impacts of uncertainty on 
the overall quality and utility of the ERA. First, the EPA Guide-
lines prescribe better planning to eliminate as many sources of 
uncertainty as possible. When uncertainty is thus reduced, the 
EPA recommends that the ERA openly and explicitly describe 
the strengths and limitations of the model as well as identify 
and describe rationales for any assumptions made. Finally, risk 
assessors should describe data limitations. In this way, if there is 
missing data or uncertain results, these problems are not simply 
ignored or swept aside, but they become an intricate part of the 
analysis. 
SeparatinG aSSeSSment anD manaGement
Agencies and land managers are subject to substantial pres-
sure from various interested parties and groups when it comes 
to making land management decisions. There is pressure to 
develop, pressure to keep pristine, and pressures for all different 
kinds of access. In addition, there are economic and legal impli-
cations that must be taken into account. There is no question that 
these pressures, as well as personal biases, can and do have an 
impact on land management decisions.53 However, these reasons 
and pressures are often not clearly separated from the scientific 
analysis in NEPA documents, making it unclear where the sci-
ence ends and where the policy-based planning begins.
The EPA framework clearly defines these different roles 
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and encourages their separation in order to prevent personal or 
institutional bias that typically “color” the scientific evaluation. 
Therefore, ERAs begin with the risk assessment, a scientific pro-
cess, which involves the evaluation of the likelihood of adverse 
effects. When this process is finished, the risk characteriza-
tion process involves the selection of a course of action based 
on other factors including social, legal, political, economic, as 
well as the risk assessment results.54 Following this framework 
should help to separate the scientific conclusions from policy 
decisions, leading to more clearly defined discussions with the 
public about the effects of different courses of action as well as 
better management decisions.
DIscussIon anD recommenDaTIons
NEPA requires federal agencies to consider the direct, indi-
rect, and cumulative impacts of “major federal actions signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”55 Major 
federal actions include: “new and continuing activities, includ-
ing projects and programs entirely or partly financed, assisted, 
conducted, regulated, or approved by federal agencies; new or 
revised agency rules, regulations, plans, policies, or procedures; 
and legislative proposals.”56 In addition to oil and gas drilling, 
we have identified a number of major federal actions related to 
energy of sufficient scale, scope, 
and uncertainty to merit the use 
of ERAs. 
The BLM assessed the 
development of wind energy 
on Western public lands man-
aged by the agency, utilizing a 
programmatic EIS in order to 
evaluate the cumulative impacts 
of this program.57 The final pro-
grammatic EIS identifies places 
that wind energy development would be appropriate on public 
lands, establishes policies and best management practices con-
cerning right-of-way authorizations, and amends fifty-two sepa-
rate BLM land use plans.58 
The BLM is currently conducting programmatic NEPA 
analysis of the effects of oil shale and tar sands development on 
public lands in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming.59 The uncertainty 
of this project is significant because the scale of development 
is very large (and encompasses three states) and both oil shale 
and tar sands energy development involve new, commercially 
unproven processes with unknown risks to the environment.60
The BLM and the U.S. Forest Service are preparing a 
joint programmatic EIS to analyze and expedite the leasing of 
lands with high potential for renewable geothermal resources in 
eleven Western states and Alaska.61 Neither agency has a robust 
geothermal leasing program, as a result there is a substantial 
amount of uncertainty about the effects on public lands, while at 
the same time there is a desire to begin leasing at a greater speed 
and scope. 
The oil and gas energy policy established by the Bush 
Administration is also a major federal action significantly affect-
ing the quality of the human environment. This policy has 
required federal agencies to prioritize and accelerate approval of 
energy development projects while reducing the amount of envi-
ronmental analysis that will be conducted.62 Unlike wind and 
geothermal energy development, where a programmatic EIS is 
involved, no NEPA analysis of the Bush Administration oil and 
gas energy policy has been conducted despite requests to do so.63 
The direct, indirect, and cumulative effects of the energy policy 
must be considered through a comprehensive, programmatic 
EIS, much as the agencies have proceeded with other large-scale 
energy development initiatives.64 By completing a programmatic 
EIS of the Bush Administration’s energy policy, the BLM would 
be able to examine “an entire policy initiative rather than per-
forming a piecemeal analysis.”65 Because the Bush Administra-
tion has made unmistakable and public efforts to increase oil and 
gas development throughout the West, the cumulative impacts 
of this regional increase are more than reasonably foreseeable 
and must be taken into account in a thorough NEPA analyses.
The effects of broad program or policy initiatives include 
large-scale habitat fragmentation, cumulative air quality, water 
quantity and quality, human health impacts, wildlife, loss of 
recreation opportunities, and damage to the habitat of sensi-
tive, threatened and endangered species. In order to effectively 
consider such impacts, the structured and scientific approach of 
ERAs will be invaluable. The 
environmental consequences 
of these truly major federal 
actions need to be analyzed at 
an equally broad scale through a 
programmatic EIS that includes 
an ERA. For the Bush Admin-
istration’s energy policy, which 
has not yet been subjected to a 
programmatic NEPA analysis, a 
programmatic EIS and ERA should be prepared immediately.
conclusIon
Both EISs and ERAs are premised on the principle that 
thorough consideration of accurate, relevant data will yield the 
most responsible decisions. Both EISs and ERAs set out pro-
cesses that are intended to ensure that decisions are made based 
on the most complete and accurate information available and 
take uncertainty into account. Both EISs and ERAs are tools 
that are being used by federal agencies, but they can be used 
more effectively and consistently, especially if they are used in 
concert.
ERAs have already been used in public land management 
decisions that range from estimating risks from wildfire and other 
natural disasters, to implementation of vegetation projects. The 
use of ERAs should be expanded, however, to broad land man-
agement decisions where the large scale and scope of the analy-
ses to be completed in an EIS makes a complete analysis more 
difficult. The EPA framework for ERAs outlines a consistent, 
science-based framework to improve the analysis of cumulative 
impacts and deal with uncertainty. ERAs can be an essential ele-
ment of large, programmatic EISs and should be used in order to 
more effectively fulfill NEPA’s purpose and requirements.    
The purpose of an EIS is  
to take a hard look at  
environmental effects.
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Federal agencies have recognized the importance of con-
ducting NEPA analysis on a programmatic scale when the scope 
of a federal action is a policy or program that can have wide-
ranging impacts on resources and values. Programmatic EISs 
have been or are in the process of being used to assess the devel-
opment of wind energy, geothermal energy, tar sands, and oil 
shale resources on public lands. NEPA’s mandate to analyze 
direct, indirect, and cumulative environmental consequences, 
consider measures to avoid or mitigate those impacts, and evalu-
ate management alternatives at this scale can be effectively 
fulfilled via ERAs, which provide a rigorous scientific frame-
work. Moreover, ERAs will ensure that the analysis of risks is 
completed separate from and prior to the ultimate management 
decisions, which often involve different, non-scientific consid-
erations, facilitating informed and science-based decision-mak-
ing—which we believe to be better decision-making.
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Battle lines were drawn this fall when Defenders of Wild-life posted a video online about Alaska’s use of aircraft to kill wolves. The ten-minute film features state-
ments by biologists, hunters, and a former Lieutenant Governor 
along with archival footage depicting aerial assaults on fleeing 
wolves.1 The video’s release coincided with a proposal by Cali-
fornia Congressman George Miller to prohibit such aerial hunt-
ing. Alaska Governor Sarah Palin defended her state’s practice, 
insisting that Alaska’s “science-driven and abundance-based 
predator management system” serves an entirely different pur-
pose than hunting and that the Congressman’s bill “threatened 
the very foundations of federalism.”2 
Wildlife conservation groups contend that the real threat lies 
in Alaska’s exploitation of a loophole in the federal Airborne 
Hunting Act (“AHA”), which outlawed shooting or harassing 
wildlife from aircraft over thirty years ago.3 The law grants an 
exception to any person operating under state or federal author-
ity in the administration or protection of natural resources.4 The 
video argues that Alaska has issued permits to private individu-
als seeking trophies under the guise of wildlife management and 
that killing predators to increase game animal populations vio-
lates Congress’ intent when it created the management exception 
in the AHA. Defenders of Wildlife contends that Congressman 
Miller’s Protect America’s Wild-
life Act (“PAW”)5 is needed to 
explicitly proscribe the use of 
aerial hunting for the manipula-
tion of predator and prey popula-
tions and restrict the use of other 
variations of aerial hunting such 
as the “land-and-shoot” method 
to government officials only.6 
The debate over lethal pred-
ator control methods is an old 
one in Alaska but its effects will grow increasingly significant 
as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) inches closer to 
removing federal protection of the gray wolves in the Northern 
Rocky Mountain Region. Wolves were eradicated from Idaho, 
Montana, and Wyoming in the 1930s and their reintroduction to 
Central Idaho and the Greater Yellowstone Area in 1995 ignited 
a rancorous debate that stirs passions about conservation, state 
sovereignty, and the heritage of the Old West.7 In February of 
2007, the Department of Interior released its proposal to remove 
the Rocky Mountain wolf population from the Endangered Spe-
cies Act’s list of endangered wildlife.8 The proposal indicated 
that, by 2006, the federal government’s recovery goals for the 
weStern politicS anD wilDlife policy: 
the caSe of the Gray wolf
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“nonessential experimental” wolf population had been achieved 
and surpassed for seven consecutive years and that it had already 
approved Idaho and Montana’s management plans. According to 
FWS, the long-awaited de-listing has been delayed only because 
Wyoming’s management plan is scientifically inadequate and 
legally inconsistent, and it poses a threat to the survival of the 
species in that state.9 
Wyoming’s reluctance to 
adopt an adequate wolf manage-
ment program may seem incon-
gruent with its neighbors’ desire 
to exercise sovereignty over their 
natural resources, but it demon-
strates the difficulty in drafting 
sound wildlife policy when tra-
ditions—ranching and hunting 
in this case—seem threatened. 
Idaho Governor Otter personi-
fied this political climate when he proclaimed from the steps of 
the State Capitol in front of a gathering of pro-hunting demon-
strators that he supported a plan to reduce the Idaho wolf popu-
lation to the federal minimum and that he would be the first to 
bid for a $26.50 wolf-hunting permit.10 
It is this kind of political bravado that preserved some form 
of aerial hunting in Alaska after the passage of the AHA11 and 
reinstated it as a predator control method four years ago.12 Alas-
The debate over lethal 
predator control methods 
is an old one in Alaska.
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kan voters passed a ballot initiative that banned “same-day-
airborne” hunting13—the most conservative way to hunt with 
a plane—but the State Legislature overturned the initiative and 
overruled the Governor’s subsequent veto just three years later.14 
After the legislature opened aer-
ial wolf hunting to private indi-
viduals, voters responded with 
Proposition 6, which restricted 
its use to Department of Fish 
and Game officials.15 Although 
the initiative was again over-
turned by the legislature, the 
issue has garnered enough oppo-
sition among Alaskans to make 
its way onto next year’s ballot.16
Despite Governor Palin’s claims that predator control is 
only necessary for “Alaskans to put healthy food on their fami-
lies’ dinner tables,” many conservation advocates fear that 
Alaska’s pro-ungulate program will filter down to the lower 
forty-eight where wolves have only recently reestablished them-
selves.17 The de-listing of the gray wolf in Idaho, Montana, and 
Wyoming will allow for the reduction of wolf numbers within 
each state to a hundred, providing that there are at least ten 
breeding pairs within each group.18 Considering that there was 
a combined total of over 1,243 wolves and eighty-nine breed-
ing pairs in 2006, it comes as little surprise that Defenders of 
Wildlife President Rodger Schlickeisen described the Idaho and 
Wyoming’s management plans, 
which skirt the federal minimum 
as “geared toward wolf eradica-
tion, not wolf conservation.”19 
The debate over the aer-
ial hunting of wolves and the 
legal acrobatics that have kept 
it alive present a challenge to 
environmental policy-making. 
Passionate opposing viewpoints 
can swing the conservation pendulum wildly on the state and 
local levels, and it seems likely that federal authorities are better 
positioned to draft more objective, science-based policy. When 
moral, cultural, and environmental concerns are at odds, it may 
be difficult not to hand over responsibility to the people who 
feel their lifestyles are being threatened. If maintaining healthy 
ecosystems is the underlying goal, however, then science, not 
politics, needs to determine U.S. policy toward wildlife.
Science, not politics, needs 
to determine U.S. policy 
toward wildlife.
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Satellite imagery revealed that the Arctic sea ice cover fell to its lowest level in recorded history during the 2007 melting season, opening up the Northwest Passage.1 As 
the ice cover diminishes, the long sought wish of trade is becom-
ing a reality—a shortened global shipping route through the 
northern waters. Polar bears depend on this same ice for their 
habitat, access to food, and breeding sites.2 Experts predict that 
two-thirds of the world’s polar bears will disappear by 2050.3
In an effort to protect the species, Greenpeace, the National 
Resources Defense Council, and the Center for Biologi-
cal Diversity filed a lawsuit in December 2006 after the Bush 
Administration ignored a petition to list the polar bear as a 
threatened species.4 In January 
2007, in response to the lawsuit, 
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice (“FWS”) proposed listing 
the polar bear as a threatened 
species under the protection of 
the Endangered Species Act 
(“ESA”).5 Consequently, the 
U.S. Geological Survey 
(“USGS”) generated new sci-
entific data and models on polar 
bears and their sea ice habitats. 
The USGS issued a final report 
on the status of the polar bear on 
September 7, 2007.6
There are an estimated 20,000–25,000 polar bears world-
wide.7 The polar bears facing the greatest risk of extirpation, or 
local extinction, are the bears located in the Seasonal Ice and 
Polar Basin Divergent ecoregions.8 The USGS models predict a 
forty two percent loss of optimal polar bear habitat by the middle 
of the century.9 Scientists characterize their findings as conser-
vative because even they believe that the best available models 
underestimate the actual decline in Arctic ice.
Scientist predict that even if stringent greenhouse gas 
(“GHG”) emissions reductions are globally put into place, the 
sea ice in the Arctic will continue to rapidly decrease for the next 
fifty years.10 As the ice cover thins, more open ocean patches 
become exposed to sunlight, which in turn melts more ice in a 
process referred to as sea ice-albedo feedback.”11 This feedback 
cycle is a critical threat12 to the sea ice habitat of polar bears and 
GHG emissions must be reduced to slow this cycle.
The increasing possibility of a seasonally ice-free Arctic 
also opens the question of territorial jurisdictional claims for its 
resources and control over its use as a shipping route. Reports 
the future of the polar bear reStS on 
thin ice: liStinG unDer the eSa anD itS impactS
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indicate the world’s militaries are lining up to protect their eco-
nomic “rights” in the Arctic and sovereignty over the land is 
being asserted by a number of countries.13 The influx of military 
and possibly commercial activity into the Arctic region further 
threatens the polar bear and its habitat. Even in a best-case sce-
nario without an oil spill, increased traffic in the region presents 
a danger to the polar bear.
The FWS decision of whether to list the polar bear as threat-
ened is expected by the end of January 2008. Listing a species 
entitles it to a host of protections. Specifically, the consultation 
clause of the ESA places a procedural obligation on federal 
government to evaluate its actions and policies on the species 
and consult with the FWS so 
that its actions avoid jeopardiz-
ing a threatened species.14 Most 
importantly, listing the species 
would prevent private and state 
takings.15 “Taking” has been 
interpreted to bar habitat modifi-
cation of the species where there 
is a showing of actual injury to 
wildlife.16 Additionally, listing 
the species would require per-
mits for activities that result in 
incidental takings, the designa-
tion of a critical habitat zone, 
and the preparation of a recovery plan.17 
Listing the polar bear may be an effective tool to require 
the federal government to require a reduction in GHG emissions 
that threaten the polar bear’s habitat. If GHG emissions are con-
sidered a “taking” of the species, it raises a legal question of 
whether the government can compel U.S. companies to reduce 
their emissions to prevent such takings. It is also uncertain how 
such a listing would interact with international Arctic conserva-
tion treaties, such as the Polar Bear Treaty. 
U.S. courts may soon face the question of whether the ESA 
can be used as a mechanism to enact change in U.S. climate pol-
icy. Listing the polar bear as threatened under the ESA is only 
the first of many necessary steps to slow and eventually reverse 
the impacts of climate change. 
Endnotes: The Future of the Polar Bear Rests on Thin Ice 
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InTroDucTIon
On October 10, 2007, the European Commission (“Com-mission”) announced that they had adopted a new Inte-grated Maritime Policy for the European Union.1 The 
announcement completes a one-year period of extensive public 
consultation on a proposed policy called the Green Paper.2 The 
Integrated Maritime Policy is accompanied by a detailed action 
plan setting out implementation mechanisms over the next few 
years. This Article reviews the key elements of the action plan 
and compares it, briefly, to the present state of U.S. policy and 
law on the oceans and coasts. 
purpose oF The InTeGraTeD marITIme polIcy 
anD european conTexT
In adopting a new integrated maritime policy, the Com-
mission noted that “Europe is intimately linked to the seas and 
oceans that surround it. It is not just the shipping or fisheries 
industries and their related activities. It is also shipbuilding and 
ports, marine equipment and offshore energy, maritime and 
coastal tourism, aquaculture, submarine telecommunications, 
blue biotech and the protection of the marine environment.” 
The Commission not only intends to pursue the development of 
sea-related industries, but it recognizes that the use “needs to be 
sustainable as the marine environment is the base resource for 
all maritime economic activities.” In sum, the EU policy calls 
for “good governance and an integrated approach…that joins 
up sectoral policies for maritime activities and environmental 
policy relating to Europe’s seas.” 
A review and comparison of European maritime policy 
and American policy should also start with a comparison of the 
underlying legal regimes. For instance, the treaty that created 
the EU gives explicit competence to the EU only in the policy 
areas of transportation, fisheries, and the environment.3 All 
other aspects of maritime policy remain within the jurisdiction 
of Member States. In the case of the United States, we have a 
history of over 200 years of sorting out the division of author-
ity between the federal and state governments. This starts, of 
course, with the early decision by the Supreme Court in Gibbons 
v. Ogden (state regulation of steamboat licenses is preempted)4 
to the more recent decision in U.S. v. Locke (state regulation of 
tankering preempted by federal regulations).5 The EU will need 
many more years to sort out this division of responsibility. 
summary oF The key elemenTs oF The  
eu marITIme polIcy
With these objectives in mind, the Commission is proposing 
the following actions, described further below: 
the eu aDoptS an inteGrateD maritime 
policy anD action plan: iS the u.S. far behinD or aheaD?
by Joan M. Bondareff*
* Joan M. Bondareff, WCL ’75, is the former Chief Counsel of the U.S. Maritime 
Administration, Senior Counsel to the House Committee on Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries, and Assistant General Counsel for Coastal Zone Management of the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Ms. Bondareff is currently Of 
Counsel to Blank Rome LLP in Washington, DC. She may be reached at Bondar-
eff@BlankRome.com. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the 
author.
	 •	 A	European	Maritime	Transport	Space	without	barriers;
	 •	 A	European	Strategy	for	Marine	Research;
	 •	 National	 integrated	maritime	policies	 to	be	developed	by	
EU Member States;
	 •	 An	integrated	network	for	maritime	surveillance;
	 •	 A	 roadmap	 towards	marine	 spatial	 planning	 by	Member	
States;
	 •	 Elimination	of	pirate	fishing	and	destructive	high	seas	bot-
tom trawling;
	 •	 Promotion	of	a	European	network	of	maritime	clusters;
	 •	 A	review	of	EU	labor	law	exemptions	for	the	shipping	and	
fishing sectors;
	 •	 A	European	Marine	Observation	and	Data	Network;	and	
	 •	 A	 strategy	 to	mitigate	 the	 effects	 of	 climate	 change	 on	
coastal regions.
european maritime tranSport Space anD  
SuStainable ShippinG anD port policieS
The Commission noted that maritime transportation is vital 
for Europe’s trade because almost ninety percent of its external 
trade and over forty percent of its internal trade goes by sea. 
Internally, there are barriers to marine transport because voy-
ages by ship from a port of one EU Member State to another are 
always considered international even when the cargo transported 
is comprised of internal market-cleared goods. Consequently, 
the Commission will launch a consultation of stakeholders on 
the concept of a European Space for Maritime Transport without 
barriers and offer options for its implementation. The aim of the 
consultation is to adopt a proposal before the end of 2008. The 
Commission also referenced its draft guidelines on the applica-
tion of EC competition rules to liner and tramp shipping confer-
ences that had been published for comment in September 2007, 
and stated that its final guidelines will be adopted before Octo-
ber 2008.6
Ship DiSmantlinG
The Commission is developing a new EU strategy to be pre-
sented as a Communication for ship dismantling in mid-2008. 
The Communication will possibly contain technical assistance 
to developing countries to improve their ship dismantling facili-
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EU proposes to build on  
an existing system of  
maritime clusters to  
promote a European  
network of such clusters.
ties, promoting voluntary industry action on clean ship disman-
tling, e.g., by distribution of information on green facilities, and 
promoting research on ship dismantling. The Commission will 
continue, in a parallel manner, to work with the International 
Maritime Organization (“IMO”) on a Ship Recycling Conven-
tion scheduled for adoption in 2009, and in the work of the Basel 
Convention on the same subject.7 
air pollution
The Commission is closely following the IMO discussions 
on the revision of MARPOL Annex VI (setting limits on air 
emissions from ships)8 and, if it concludes that the results are 
insufficient, it will consider alternative proposals for action.9 
The Commission also plans to take action to further promote the 
use of shore-side electricity by ships at berth in EU ports, includ-
ing the possible revision of a directive to allow total or partial 
exemptions from electricity taxes to ships using shore electricity 
from the harbor so that it is competitive with untaxed bunker 
fuel. Further, the Commission will evaluate various options for 
EU legislation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from mar-
itime transport and will consult with stakeholders on the pro-
posed legislation. 
portS 
In October 2007, the Com-
mission also adopted a new 
Communication on Ports con-
taining a set of guidelines to 
bring more transparency and 
maintain a level playing field in 
the ports sector.10
european StrateGy for 
marine reSearch 
To provide the basis to 
underpin the EU Maritime 
Policy, the Commission announced that it would take action 
to develop a Maritime Research Strategy in consultation with 
Member States and with stakeholders in a European Marine Sci-
ence Partnership. The Strategy itself will be proposed in a Com-
munication in 2008. 
inteGrateD maritime policieS
The Commission has proposed that maritime functions be 
integrated across EU Member States and recommends that Mem-
ber States integrate their own maritime policies. As noted above, 
the EU can only make recommendations in these areas which 
are left essentially to the purview of Member States. The Com-
mission realizes that there are regulatory barriers to achieving 
an integrated EU maritime function, and therefore will issue in 
2008 a set of guidelines on common principles and stakeholder 
involvement for maritime policies and report on the actions of 
Member States by 2009. To assist Member States to unify their 
maritime policies, the Commission will develop a more inte-
grated network of surveillance systems for European waters, a 
program of marine spatial planning, and an EU Marine Observa-
tion and Data Network, described below. 
inteGrateD network of maritime Surveillance
Building on earlier proposals, in February 2008, the Com-
mission will adopt a Communication on a European Border Sur-
veillance System (“EUROSUR”). This system will link existing 
surveillance systems at the Member State level and provide for 
a common information sharing environment for the maritime 
domain, covering initially the Mediterranean Sea and the Black 
Sea. This so-called “system of systems” is intended to increase 
EU security by preventing illegal immigration and trafficking of 
human beings, and also reduce the death toll at sea. The Euro-
pean GALILEO system will provide an advanced technologi-
cal platform for the development of satellite-based surveillance 
applications.11 
In the second half of 2008, the Commission will announce 
in a Communication a detailed work plan for further steps 
towards the integration of all European maritime surveillance 
systems. Part of the creation of a European network for maritime 
surveillance will include improved cooperation between the 
coast guards of Member States. The EU may have preferred to 
establish a unified coast guard, as the United States has, but this 
certainly would infringe upon 
the jurisdiction and sovereignty 
of Member States. 
marine Spatial  
planninG anD  
inteGrateD coaStal  
zone manaGement 
An earlier Green Paper pro-
duced by the EU on Maritime 
Policy identified the increase in 
competing activities on coasts 
and seas as a source of potential 
conflict to be managed. There-
fore, in 2008, the Commission 
will propose a road map to facilitate and encourage the further 
development of marine spatial planning in Member States, and 
examine different options, including zoning, to make different 
maritime activities compatible, including the maintenance and 
strengthening of biodiversity. In 2009, the Commission will set 
up a system for the exchange of best practices in marine spatial 
planning and integrated coastal zone management. 
As EU Commissioner Joe Borg stated in a February 22, 
2007 speech in Sopot, Poland, “spatial planning,” or the coor-
dination of maritime activities in European coastal regions and 
waters, can “help ensure the economically and environmentally 
sustainable development of coastal regions.”12 At the same time, 
the Commissioner applauded the development by some Member 
States of pilot projects for implementing such spatial planning, 
notably Germany, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and the Neth-
erlands.13
increaSeD fiShery reGulationS anD  
review of labor law excluSionS
The Commission observed that “the current situation of 
European fisheries cannot be deemed as satisfactory,” and 
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“efforts to achieve capacity reduction, and the conservation and 
restoration of fish stocks must go hand-in-hand with improving 
the social well-being of those active in the sector.”14 Conse-
quently, the Commission announced that, in 2008, it will adopt 
a Communication on the overall application of the ecosystem 
approach to the Common Fisheries Policy. One of the top pri-
orities for a Common Fisheries Policy will be the elimination of 
the dumping overboard of dead, unwanted fish as by-catch. The 
Commission is also preparing a draft regulation on combating 
illegal, unregulated, and unreported (“IUU”) fishing. Finally, 
the Commission will come forward with a legislative proposal 
to regulate destructive fishing practices on the high seas by EU 
fishing vessels, e.g., bottom trawling. 
The Commission has agreed to undertake an assessment of 
the situation concerning the exclusion of maritime professions 
from EU social legislation and working conditions in a Com-
munication to be launched later this month. Further, the Com-
mission will work towards establishing a Certificate of Maritime 
Excellence to be endorsed on a voluntary basis with the aim 
of supplying highly knowledgeable personnel to the shipping 
industry. 
promotion of a european network  
of maritime cluSterS
The EU proposes to build on an existing system of mari-
time clusters to promote a European network of such clusters. 
A maritime cluster is a region within which maritime industries 
and related activities may be co-located.15 
a european marine obServation  
anD Data network
A new European Maritime Observation and Data Network 
(“Network”) will be proposed in 2009, on the basis of a road map 
to be published in 2008. According to Commissioner Borg, in an 
October 19, 2007 presentation to the Conference of Peripheral 
Maritime Regions of Europe, the Network will serve as a “genu-
ine driver for the integrated governance of maritime affairs.”16 
The Network also will provide opportunities for high-technol-
ogy commercial companies in the maritime sector and improve 
the efficiency of marine observation and the management of 
marine resources and marine research. It will be integrated with 
the global initiative for a Group of Earth Observation System of 
Systems, called GEOSS, and the European contribution called 
Global Monitoring for Environment and Security, or GMES. On 
a related note, the Commission, in the second half of 2008, will 
propose a program for the development of mutually compat-
ible and multi-dimensional mapping of seas in Member States’ 
waters. 
a StrateGy to mitiGate the effectS of  
climate chanGe on coaStal reGionS 
In 2008, the Commission will propose a Community strat-
egy for disaster prevention and the development of a Strategy for 
Adaptation to Climate Change, with a focus on coastal regions. 
In particular, the Commission is examining the potential of new 
off-shore technologies such as carbon capture and geological 
storage to meet the EU’s climate change objectives. By the end 
of this year, the Commission will propose a legal framework for 
carbon capture and storage, including the removal of obstacles 
to storage in sub-sea formations.17 The Commission recognizes 
that seabed storage will also require an international legal frame-
work and cooperation. The transport of CO
2
 to sub-sea sites also 
should be included, according to the Commission, in new marine 
spatial planning. Finally, “the technology used must ensure that 
the environmental gain from carbon storage is [not] offset by 
deterioration of the local marine environment.”18  
promotinG europe’S leaDerShip in  
international maritime affairS
The Commission plans to take a higher profile in interna-
tional maritime organizations and to encourage Member States 
to ratify international maritime conventions. On the international 
front, the Commission will produce, in 2008, a report on strate-
gic issues for the EU relating to the Arctic Ocean. Further, the 
Commission, before the end of 2009, will put forward a strategy 
for the protection of high seas biodiversity through the desig-
nation of marine protected areas. Finally, the Commission will 
celebrate a European Maritime Day and create a European Atlas 
of the Seas. 
a comparIson oF The eu marITIme polIcy To 
u.s. oceans polIcy: revIew oF The reporTs  
oF Two ocean commIssIons
A starting point for comparing the work of the EU with that 
of the United States is to review the recommendations of two 
recent ocean policy commissions in the United States, the U.S. 
Commission on Ocean Policy and the Pew Oceans Commission. 
Both Commissions called for major reforms and restructuring of 
U.S. ocean law and policy. 
In the first place, the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, 
established by the Oceans Act of 2000, consisted of Presiden-
tial appointees.19 The U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy issued 
its report, entitled An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century, on 
September 20, 2004.20 In recognition of the fact that it has been 
thirty-five years since anyone had undertaken a comprehensive 
review of U.S. ocean policy, the Ocean Blueprint called for sig-
nificant changes in the management of U.S. oceans, coasts and 
Great Lakes, and recommended the creation of an “effective 
national ocean policy that ensures sustainable use and protection 
of our oceans, coasts and Great Lakes for today and far into the 
future.”21 
The Ocean Blueprint called for the reform of the manage-
ment structure for ocean policy decision-making in the United 
States and strengthening of many ocean and coastal resource 
management policies. In brief, the Ocean Blueprint called for:
	 •	 A	new	National	Ocean	Policy	Framework,	 including	 the	
establishment of a National Ocean Council within the Exec-
utive Office of the President;
	 •	 The	establishment	of	regional	ocean	councils	to	coordinate	
ocean policy across state lines;
	 •	 Coordinated	governance	of	offshore	waters;
	 •	 An	organic	act	for	the	National	Oceanic	and	Atmospheric	
Administration (“NOAA”); 
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	 •	 Increased	investment	in	science	and	exploration;
	 •	 The	launch	of	an	integrated	ocean	observing	system;
	 •	 Reauthorization	 and	 strengthening	 of	 the	 Coastal	 Zone	
Management Act to enable states to incorporate a watershed 
focus;
	 •	 Guarding	people	and	property	against	natural	hazards;
	 •	 Conserving	and	restoring	coastal	habitat;
	 •	 Supporting	marine	 commerce	 and	 transportation	 through	
the development of an integrated national freight transpor-
tation strategy; 
	 •	 Addressing	coastal	water	pollution	and	limiting	pollution	
from vessels;
	 •	 Preventing	the	spread	of	invasive	species;
	 •	 Achieving	sustainable	fisheries	and	setting	a	new	course	for	
sustainable marine aquaculture; 
	 •	 Managing	 offshore	 energy	 and	 other	mineral	 resources;	
and 
	 •	 Establishing	a	dedicated	Ocean	Policy	Trust	Fund	to	carry	
out the Commission’s recommendations.
A set of similar recommendations was adopted by the Pew 
Oceans Commission, a privately-funded commission which 
issued its report, entitled America’s Living Oceans: Charting a 
Course for Sea Change, in 2003.22
reaction of the u.S. 
aDminiStration anD con-
GreSS to the commiSSion 
reportS 
The Bush Administration 
reacted to the report of the U.S. 
Ocean Commission by issuing 
an Executive Order on December 
17, 2004, establishing an inter-
agency Committee on Ocean 
Policy.23 The Committee would 
be part of the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”), and 
be chaired by the Chairman of CEQ. In addition, representatives 
of the Departments of State, Defense, the Interior, Agriculture, 
Health and Human Services, Commerce, Labor, Transportation, 
Energy, and Homeland Security, among others, would serve on 
the Committee.24 The purpose of the Committee would be to 
coordinate the activities of departments and agencies regarding 
ocean-related matters in an integrated and effective manner to 
advance the environmental, economic, and security interests of 
present and future generations of Americans.25 
At the same time, the Bush Administration submitted to 
Congress its own Ocean Action Plan, responding to the recom-
mendations of the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy.26 The 
Action Plan committed the Bush Administration to undertake 
the following priority tasks: (1) establish a new Cabinet-level 
Committee on Ocean Policy (completed, see above); (2) work 
with Regional Fisheries Councils to promote greater use of mar-
ket-based systems for fisheries management; (3) build a Global 
Earth Observation Network, including a mechanism for inte-
grated ocean observation; (4) develop an ocean research priori-
ties plan and implementation strategy; (5) support accession to 
the UN Convention on Law of the Sea; (6) implement coral reef 
local action strategies; (6) support a regional partnership in the 
Gulf of Mexico; (7) seek passage of an organic act for NOAA 
within the Department of Commerce; and (8) implement the 
Administration’s National Freight Action Agenda.27
The U.S. Congress conducted hearings on the Commis-
sions’ recommendations and has begun to implement some of 
the key recommendations.28 How the Congress and Adminis-
tration are doing in implementing these recommendations has 
become the focus of a new Joint Ocean Commission Initiative.29 
Admiral James D. Watkins and Mr. Leon Panetta, chairs of the 
U.S. Commission and Pew Commission, respectively, co-chair 
the Initiative. The Initiative has also issued a series of report 
cards on how Congress and the Administration are doing.30 For 
example, in its 2006 report card, the Initiative noted that “prog-
ress on ocean policy reform has been uneven, and the modest 
progress that has been made is jeopardized by a lack of funding 
to support the implementation of promising initiatives and plans 
at all levels of government.”31 
Most of the grades issued by the Joint Task Force were 
below average. However, it widely credited the work of Con-
gress and the Administration in passing the Magnuson-Stevens 
Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 
2006.32 This Act strengthened 
the role of science in CEQ 
decision-making and required 
an end to over-fishing.33 It also 
contained new tools to eliminate 
IUU fishing. 
It is beyond the scope of 
this Article to examine the report 
cards in greater detail except 
as they relate to an overall com-
parison of U.S. and European 
maritime policies, below. 
The eu’s call For an InTeGraTeD  
marITIme polIcy compareD To The polIcy  
recommenDaTIons oF The u.s. ocean 
commIssIon(s) anD ImplemenTaTIon
In a remarkably similar manner and within somewhat simi-
lar time frames, the EU and the United States have undertaken 
comprehensive reviews of their maritime policies and developed 
very similar recommendations. Both the EU and the U.S. Ocean 
Commissions call for increased attention to maritime and coastal 
issues in recognition that they have in many instances been 
neglected for years and there is a need for increased attention, 
resources, and new governance mechanisms. 
On first examination, it appears that the EU’s call for an 
Integrated Maritime Policy is far ahead of the U.S. Ocean Com-
mission’s call for an Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century 
because the latter has not been implemented to any great degree 
in legislation or funding mechanisms. However, the United 
States in many respects is ahead of the EU in paying attention 
to coastal regions and has the advantage of a well-established 
system of federal environmental legislation to work with. 
The United States has  
yet to ratify the UN  
Convention on the Law  
of the Sea.
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The EU is a relatively new legal body and the European Com-
mission’s call for integrated action requires the cooperation of 
its Member States especially in the critical areas of marine spa-
tial planning, the development of maritime clusters, and the cre-
ation of a unified coast guard.
In the area of marine spatial planning, the United States 
already has two important laws that call for such planning, one in 
coastal regions and one in offshore waters. The first is the Coastal 
Zone Management Act of 1972,34 which calls for a nationwide 
program of integrated state coastal management programs for 
state-defined coastal regions with federal oversight, policy guid-
ance and grants for their development and implementation.35 In 
exchange for federal funds, states develop what would be the 
equivalent of spatial plans for their coastal regions.36 Within 
these regions, the states must develop systems of conflict reso-
lution and ensure that development will be sustainable.37 The 
states also have the authority to extend their policies to offshore 
development through the use of the so-called federal consistency 
process.38 If a state objects to an offshore development permit 
by the federal government, the project can not proceed unless 
the Secretary of Commerce overrides the state’s objection.39 To 
date, thirty-four coastal states have developed approved coastal 
management plans.40
The United States also has an extensive system of marine 
spatial planning for special marine areas within the 200-mile 
Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”), established by title III of 
the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act.41 To date, 
the United States has established fourteen marine sanctuaries, 
including the Hawaiian Humpback Whale Sanctuary, the Chan-
nel Islands (California) Marine Sanctuary, and the Farallon 
Islands (California) Marine Sanctuary.42 This is a major piece of 
federal legislation that establishes a plan for conflict resolution 
and protection of unique resources, such as coral reefs, fisher-
ies habitats, and whale calving areas, within extensive offshore 
marine areas.43 
Given the extensive legislative framework for marine spa-
tial plans both within coastal zones and offshore marine areas 
in the EEZ, it can be said that the United States is substantially 
ahead of the EU in this particular area of promoting sustainable 
coastal development. 
In other areas, the United States is lagging seriously behind 
the EU. For example, as of this writing, the United States has 
yet to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea although 
it was negotiated and approved by the UN some twenty-five 
years ago. As the New York Times editorialized on October 31, 
2007, the debate over the Law of the Sea Treaty pits the Bush 
Administration, the environmental community, the military, the 
oil, shipping, and fishing industries, and the top Democratic and 
Republican members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
against a “handful of cranky right-wingers.”44 The Senate held 
an important hearing on the subject, and recently, the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee voted out a resolution on acces-
sion. The full Senate expects to take up the question of ratifica-
tion in 2008. It is possible that before the end of 2008 the United 
States could become a party to this international agreement 
which the United States itself took the lead in negotiating.45 
The United States is making progress in ending destructive 
fishing practices as the EU has begun to do as well. As noted 
above, in the last Congress, the United States enacted significant 
amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act which called for an end to over-fish-
ing, enhanced the role of science in fishery management, and 
strengthened the controls on IUU fishing.46 The work of Con-
gress in passing this law was lauded by the Joint Ocean Com-
mission Initiative, as well. 
The EU Maritime Policy calls for increased cooperation 
between the coast guards of Member States. The United States 
already has a unified federal Coast Guard which provides secu-
rity for all waters within the EEZ, as well as further offshore as 
needed, to protect U.S. port state interests.47 Moreover, if the 
U.S. Coast Guard promulgates regulations in an area of mari-
time safety, the federal regulations will preempt conflicting state 
laws and regulations.48 
With respect to sustainable shipping practices, the two pro-
posals are close to a draw. For example, the United States is 
helping the IMO to negotiate a new convention on ship recy-
cling.49 The United States, however, has yet to ratify the Basel 
Convention, and it is unclear weather the United States agrees 
that ship scrapping is regulated under that Convention as a mat-
ter of law. A number of EU Member States are parties to the 
Basel Convention, but the practice of many States is to continue 
to send their old ships to third-world countries for disposal.50 
The EU has called for the development of a new integrated 
maritime surveillance system. The United States has taken sig-
nificant steps to create and fund a new border surveillance initia-
tive, called the Secure Border Initiative, or SBI-Net.51 The U.S. 
Coast Guard has undertaken new programs to monitor the mari-
time borders of the United States, too, called Maritime Domain 
Awareness.52 Recently, the U.S. Department of Homeland Secu-
rity contracted with a team led by Boeing to establish SBI-Net. 
SBI-Net is a comprehensive plan by the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security to gain operational control of the U.S. bor-
ders through the integration of increased staffing, international 
enforcement, detection, technology, and infrastructure.53 
The United States already has a unified marine transport 
space that allows all transportation between the fifty states to 
exist without any barriers. The EU is just beginning to create 
a European Transport Space without barriers. A similar system 
extends to transportation between the United States and Canada, 
on the one hand, and United States and Mexico, on the other, 
through the North American Free Trade Agreement.54 
The United States, however, like the EU, is just beginning 
to examine the question of establishing a new system of marine 
highways to divert trucks off highways and alleviate conges-
tion and air pollution. The U.S. Maritime Administration has 
undertaken to support this initiative, called Short Sea Shipping.55 
Authority for a new Short Sea Shipping Program, to transport 
goods by waterways, was passed by the U.S. House of Represen-
tatives this year and included in a larger energy bill.56 However, 
it remains to be seen if Congress will enact this bill this year. 
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Both the EU and the U.S. Ocean Commission called for an 
integrated program of maritime research. The Joint Commission 
Task Force gave the Congress and White House a failing grade 
of “F” in their last report card for failing to develop an integrated 
budget for federal ocean and coastal programs and a near-failing 
grade of “D+” for failing to address chronic under-funding of 
ocean science and education.57 At the same time, the Task Force 
credited the Administration with developing an Ocean Research 
Priorities Plan and Implementation Strategy.58 The EU has just 
begun its work on an integrated marine research program so it is 
too soon to evaluate the EU on this element of its work. 
A final element of comparison is in the area of climate 
change. The EU Maritime Policy calls for the development of 
new sustainable strategies to protect coastal regions from the 
effects of global climate change and also specifically calls for 
the development of an innovative system of sub-sea disposal 
of carbon. The Joint Commission Initiative gave the Bush 
Administration and Congress the grade of “D+” last year for 
failing to recognize the ocean’s role in climate change, but has 
not endorsed sub-sea disposal of carbon as an option. While 
most European nations are signatories to the Kyoto Protocol, 
the United States is not. Therefore, the author concludes that 
the United States is lagging behind the EU in the areas of 
recognizing the serious effects of global climate change and call-
ing for specific actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.59 
conclusIon
The good news is that both the EU and the United States 
have finally come to recognize the importance of the sea and 
coasts to their future not only as economic zones of interest 
but also as zones that contain significant resources that must be 
protected, restored, and maintained if we are not to lose them 
and our way of living in the twenty-first century. If only it were 
a race to the finish to see who could protect these regions and 
resources the most, the EU or the United States, the marine 
regions of both continents and the populations living therein 
would all benefit. For now, I call it a draw, and as an interested 
bystander, I encourage both governments to do more to live up 
to their promises and commitments to create improved maritime 
policies and governance structures. 
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A new report from the National Research Council (“NRC”) indicates that ethanol from corn production may have a substantial negative impact on the U.S. water supply.1 
The U.S. ethanol subsidy program, $0.51 per gallon, is designed 
to help wean domestic dependence on foreign oil. However, 
subsidies for corn-derived ethanol may accelerate a domestic 
and global water crisis2 without establishing national energy 
independence. Congress should eliminate inefficient subsidies 
for corn-derived ethanol in the upcoming Energy Bill because 
the over-production of corn for corn-derived ethanol will likely 
accelerate the depletion of U.S. water quality and quantity.
According to NASA and the World Health Organization, 
severe water shortages will affect 
four billion people by 2050 and 
southwestern states in the U.S. 
will face severe freshwater 
shortages by 2025.3 U.S. corn 
production has several externali-
ties that contribute to freshwater 
scarcity and environmental deg-
radation. For instance, it creates 
more soil erosion and uses more 
herbicides and insecticides than 
any other U.S. crop.4  These 
inputs become residues in well 
water.5 These pesticides are 
arguably the cause of the Gulf of Mexico “dead zone,” an ever-
increasing seasonal phenomenon where nutrient runoff causes 
oxygen depletion in an area the size of Massachusetts, caus-
ing harmful impacts on marine and coastal fish populations.6 
Moreover, ethanol itself is likely to leak into ground water and 
cause harm to our drinking supply because ethanol will mainly 
be stored underground and there have been over 400,000 reports 
of leaks in the last few decades.7 The NRC has taken alarm to 
statistics like these and undertook an extensive study to find 
answers to potential water concerns related to corn-derived 
ethanol. The NRC suggests alternative subsidies to reduce 
impacts of biofuels production on water use and quality, policies 
to encourage best agricultural practices and policies to encourage 
biofuels produced from some cellulosic alternatives rather than 
from corn.8
The perfect storm of high oil prices and record-breaking 
U.S. corn yields has allowed the powerful corn lobby to dictate 
many policies in the renewable energy debate. The Energy Policy 
Act of 2005 established the Renewable Fuel Standard (“RFS”) 
that requires the use of 7.5 billion gallons of renewable fuels by 
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2012, with most of the renewable fuel originating from subsi-
dized corn ethanol.9 President Bush suggested a thirty-five bil-
lion gallon domestic ethanol target during his 2007 State of the 
Union Address.10 Last June, the Senate voted 65-27 to expand 
the production of renewable fuels to thirty-six billion gallons by 
2022, with fifteen billion to come from corn-derived ethanol.11 
The U.S. House of Representatives is in the process of negotiat-
ing an Energy Bill but House and Senate Democratic leaders 
intend to avoid the conference committee process and instead 
plan to bounce versions of their bills back and forth.12 Therefore, 
critical debate over the impact of corn-derived ethanol subsidies 
on water supplies must occur immediately.
The ethanol debate is 
complex and it is perpetually 
evolving because new environ-
mental externalities periodically 
emerge and prices of energy and 
food commodities perpetually 
change. Congress has the duty 
to include all future costs associ-
ated with ethanol in their energy 
and environmental impact 
analysis when developing fed-
eral policy related to subsidies 
that promote corn ethanol pro-
duction. Over-farming to pro-
duce ethanol from corn will significantly erode drinkable water 
quantity and overused pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers will 
eventually ruin the general quality of our water. Only a diligent 
analysis of all environmental factors and wise policy choices in 
the Energy Bill can supply the United States with its greatest 
needs while reflecting the country’s highest values.
Endnotes:
1 Water Implications of Biofuels Production in the United States (Prepublica-
tion Copy), Nation Resources Defense Council, Oct. 10, 2007 (explaining how 
corn ethanol production can harm the U.S. water supply), available at http://
books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12039&page=R1 (last visited Nov. 
20, 2007).
2 See generally Sara Hughes et al., The Development of Biofuels Within the 
Context of the Global Water Crisis, SuStainable Dev. l. & pol’y. Spring 2007, 
at 58.
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InTroDucTIon
The 2002 decision in State of California v. Norton
1 pro-
vides a unique insight into the history and evolution of 
the Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”),2 a pow-
erful and as yet underutilized federal environmental law. This 
case also reveals the respective roles of the legislative, judicial, 
and executive branches in coastal protection and governance. 
As this Article will discuss, the debate centers on the respective 
roles of the federal government and coastal states in addressing 
coastal resources and activities. In State of California v. Norton, 
the Ninth Circuit upheld the broad role of states in reviewing 
activities that may affect their coastal zones, even though such 
activities are under the direct 
authority of the federal govern-
ment.3
hIsTory anD back-
GrounD oF The cZma
The CZMA came about 
as the federal government and 
coastal states were engaged in 
a decades-long struggle over 
offshore regulatory authority, 
including matters regarding off-
shore oil and gas development. 
Both the federal government and 
the states sought exclusive con-
trol over offshore areas, in order 
to regulate and protect these areas, but also to ensure ownership 
of (and thus economic interest in) mineral and other resources. 
Beginning in the 1930s, both Congress and California 
attempted to assert jurisdiction over offshore energy resources.4 
In 1945, President Truman concurred with Congress and 
claimed federal authority over all offshore resources.5 In 1947, 
the Supreme Court confirmed the validity of federal jurisdiction 
over all offshore resources.6 Thus, all three branches of the fed-
eral government agreed that areas offshore were to be regulated 
at a national level. However, coastal states continued to assert 
tremendous pressure in favor of shared offshore jurisdiction and, 
in 1952, Congress voted to move federal jurisdiction to three 
miles offshore. President Truman vetoed the bill, but his oppo-
nent in the presidential race, Dwight Eisenhower, promised to 
support the bill and the expanded role of coastal states. Eisen-
hower was elected President and supported new legislation 
in 1953 that established state jurisdiction out to three nautical 
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miles offshore. This law is known as the Submerged Lands Act.7 
Federal oversight of oil and gas development activities beyond 
three nautical miles from shore was ensured later that same year 
when Congress passed the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
(“OCSLA”).8
Despite Congress’s attempt to resolve these disputes, 
coastal states remained dissatisfied with the compromise and 
the federal assertion of jurisdiction off their borders. Activi-
ties beyond three miles from shore could still have a substantial 
effect on a state’s coastline, as so prominently demonstrated by 
the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill.9 This spill—“the spill heard 
around the world”—occurred after a blowout at Platform A, a 
Union Oil Company (“Union”) 
drilling platform located in fed-
eral waters approximately six 
miles from the California coast. 
10 The U.S. Geological Sur-
vey (“USGS”) had waived the 
requirement for casing in the 
wells drilled from the platform,11 
even though casing helps to pre-
vent oil and gas from escaping 
the well.12 The USGS agreed to 
allow Union to install casing to 
a depth of 239 feet instead of 
the federal and state standard of 
880 feet.13 As a result of the lack 
of casing throughout the depth 
of the drilling wells, a blowout occurred and over three million 
gallons of oil released into coastal waters, blackening over 35 
miles of pristine beaches.14 This spill heightened the concerns 
of not only Californians, but other coastal states as well, which 
were vulnerable to the environmental consequences of decisions 
made by the federal government.15
The coasTal Zone manaGemenT acT
The CZMA represented Congress’s next attempt to address 
the ongoing concerns of coastal states. Although the CZMA did 
not change the jurisdictional boundaries already set forth in the 
Submerged Lands Act and OCSLA, it offered states an enhanced 
role in federal planning and permitting decisions that affect their 
The intent of the CZMA 
was to ensure proper  
“coordination and  
cooperation” between the 
federal government and 
coastal states.
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coasts.16 The intent of the CZMA was to ensure proper “coor-
dination and cooperation” between the federal government and 
coastal states.17 The key to ensuring this coordination and coop-
eration was the requirement for consistency review. Pursuant to 
this provision, activities carried out or approved by the federal 
government that affect a state’s coastal zone must comply with 
the state’s coastal laws and policies.18
The CZMA provides a two-step process towards secur-
ing federal-state coordination and cooperation. First, states are 
encouraged to prepare coastal management programs that will 
manage, protect, and conserve coastal resources.19 The CZMA 
sets forth several areas of national concern that must be addressed 
in a state’s coastal program. These include, for example, protec-
tion of natural resources and water quality.20 The state’s program 
must be approved by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (“NOAA”), a branch of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce.21
Once NOAA certifies a state’s program, the CZMA requires 
that activities carried out or approved by the federal government 
must be consistent with the state’s approval program.22 There are 
three types of activities subject to state consistency review: (1) 
activities proposed by federal agencies; (2) private activities that 
require federal approval; and (3) 
offshore oil exploration, devel-
opment, and production plans 
that are submitted for federal 
approval under OCSLA.23
Federal agency activities 
include those activities pro-
posed and carried out by the 
federal government. The CZMA 
requires that such activities 
“shall be carried out in a man-
ner which is consistent to the 
maximum extent practicable with the enforceable policies of 
approved State management programs.”24 Under this provision 
of the CZMA, the federal agency makes a “consistency determi-
nation” and submits it to the state for review.25 
Private applicants seeking a license or permit from a fed-
eral agency are also subject to the consistency requirement of 
the CZMA.26 The Act provides that an application for a federal 
license or permit must include “a certification that the proposed 
activity complies with the enforceable policies of the state’s 
approved program and that such activity will be conducted in 
a manner consistent with the program.”27 The state then has the 
ability to review the application for consistency with its coastal 
management program. A state may concur with, or object to, the 
consistency certification.28
Similarly, an application for approval of an offshore oil and 
gas exploration or development and production plan must also 
include a certification that the activity will be carried out in a 
manner consistent with the state’s approved coastal management 
program.29 As with private licenses and permits, the state may 
concur with, or object to, a consistency certification.30
There are two key differences between consistency review 
of federal agency activities (i.e., those activities carried out by a 
federal agency) and private activities that must be approved by 
federal agencies. First, unlike privately proposed actions, which 
must be conducted in a manner consistent with a state’s coastal 
program, a federal agency activity need only be “carried out in a 
manner which is consistent to the maximum extent practicable” 
with a state’s program.31 The difference in language allows the 
federal government some relief from the consistency require-
ment; private activities, by contrast, must be found strictly consis-
tent with a state’s coastal program. Second, the CZMA provides 
that federal agencies may proceed with a proposed activity even 
if a state finds the activity to be inconsistent with its approved 
coastal program, whereas a state’s objection to a private applica-
tion precludes the federal government from issuing a license or 
permit.32 These distinctions demonstrate that although Congress 
was willing to encourage federal-state coordination and coop-
eration, it was not willing to give states veto authority over the 
actions or proposals of federal agencies.33
InTerpreTInG cZma
SeCretary of the interior v. California: a narrow 
reaDinG of the czma
In 1981, the State of Cali-
fornia and several environmen-
tal groups sought consistency 
review of a federal oil and gas 
lease sale located in the Santa 
Maria Basin offshore Santa Bar-
bara County (Lease Sale 53).34 
The sale was proposed by the 
U.S. Minerals Management 
Service (“MMS”), the federal 
agency responsible for admin-
istering oil and gas leasing and 
development under OCSLA.35 California and the other plaintiffs 
were concerned that the lease sale could result in an oil spill 
that would threaten the southern sea otter.36 They asserted that 
this threat was inconsistent with the State’s coastal manage-
ment program. The MMS, however, refused to allow the State 
to review the proposed lease sale for consistency review under 
the CZMA.37
The district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
ruled in favor of the State of California, finding that the lease 
sale would affect the State’s coastal zone and therefore required 
consistency review by the State.38 However, the U.S. Supreme 
Court reversed.39 The Court placed great reliance on the fact that 
the CZMA required a “direct” effect on a state’s coastal zone 
in order to trigger the consistency requirement.40 The Supreme 
Court found that because the sale of an oil lease only allows 
“very limited, ‘preliminary activities,’” and does not grant the 
right to “full-scale exploration, development or production,” 
it therefore could not result in a “direct” effect on the State’s 
coastal zone.41 Instead, the Court pointed out that under OCSLA, 
only the subsequent approval of a specific exploration plan 
(“EP”) or development and production plan (“DPP”) could result 
In 1947, the Supreme 
Court confirmed the valid-
ity of federal jurisdiction 
over all offshore resources.
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in a direct effect on a state’s coastal resources. Accordingly, the 
Court noted that consistency review would be appropriate later, 
when specific exploration, development or production plans are 
submitted for federal approval.42
This decision reinvigorated the controversy over offshore 
jurisdiction, and fractured the state-federal compromise that 
had been crafted in 1972. The coastal states turned to Congress 
again, and when the CZMA was reauthorized in 1990, Congress 
responded to Secretary of the Interior v. California by amend-
ing the Act to delete the requirement for a “direct” effect and by 
clarifying the legislature’s intent for coastal states to be able to 
review any activities would affect their coastal zones, whether 
directly or indirectly. Congress specifically stated its intent that 
states should be allowed to review offshore oil and gas leases.43 
State of California v. norton: a broaD application 
of conSiStency review unDer the czma
There have been no further lease sales offshore California 
since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Secretary of the Interior v. 
California. However, in 1999, 40 undeveloped leases located 
off the coast of Central California were set to expire unless 
“suspended” by MMS. Under OCSLA, an oil and gas lease is 
initially granted for five to ten years. If production does not 
commence within that time period, the oil lessee must request 
a “suspension,” otherwise the lease will expire.44 None of the 
leases in question had been produced; therefore they required 
suspensions to remain in existence. Because these leases were 
sold between 1968 and 1984, their initial sales escaped state 
consistency review.45
The forty leases had been suspended previously for a variety 
of reasons, including a directed suspension from 1992 to 1999, 
during which time MMS conducted a study regarding the poten-
tial environmental and socioeconomic effects of development 
of the leases on the adjacent coastal communities of Santa Bar-
bara, Ventura and San Luis Obispo Counties.46 When the study 
was completed in 1999, MMS notified the lessees that the leases 
must be suspended or they would expire. 
In response to MMS’s notice, California Governor Gray 
Davis asked for a report from the California Coastal Commission 
(“Coastal Commission”), the agency responsible for consistency 
review under the CZMA, regarding the State’s ability to respond 
to the proposed lease suspensions. The Coastal Commission 
staff scheduled a public hearing on the matter. In its report, the 
Commission staff explained that under Secretary of the Interior 
v. California, the state would have to wait for submittal of new 
proposed seismic surveys, EPs and DPPs before being allowed 
to review the leases for consistency with the State’s coastal man-
agement plan.47
In anticipation of the Coastal Commission hearing, a coali-
tion of environmental groups hired the Environmental Defense 
Center (“EDC”) to evaluate the State’s role in responding to the 
proposed lease suspensions.48 The EDC argued that the 1990 
amendments to the CZMA should apply to the lease suspen-
sions, and that the Coastal Commission should be allowed to 
review the suspensions for consistency with the State’s coastal 
management program.
At the hearing in June 1999, the Coastal Commission agreed 
with the EDC and voted to send a letter to MMS, demanding the 
right to review the suspensions. The Commission noted a num-
ber of concerns with the leases, including the close proximity 
of the leases to the Monterey Bay and Channel Islands National 
Marine Sanctuaries, and changed environmental circumstances, 
including the expanded range of the southern sea otter, as well as 
more stringent air and water quality standards.49 
MMS rejected the Coastal Commission’s request, and 
instead suspended the leases on November 12, 1999.50 EDC urged 
the Commission to challenge the suspensions in court, under the 
CZMA. On November 18, 1999, the State of California, through 
the Governor, Attorney General and Coastal Commission, filed 
a lawsuit challenging not only the failure of MMS to allow the 
State to review the lease suspensions under the CZMA, but also 
the failure of MMS to conduct environmental review prior to 
suspending the leases.51 The oil lessees intervened on behalf of 
the federal government, and the three adjacent counties and ten 
environmental groups intervened on behalf of the State.52
In their briefs, the state, environmentalists and counties 
argued that the lease suspensions should be reviewed by the 
state either under section 1456(c)(1) of the CZMA as a federal 
agency action, or under section 1456(c)(3)(A) as private licenses 
or permits requiring federal agency approval. The plaintiffs also 
argued that section 1456(c)(3)(B) of the CZMA, which pertained 
to EPs and DPPs, clearly did not apply to the lease suspensions. 
MMS claimed that CZMA and National Environmental Policy 
Act (“NEPA”) review would happen later, when the oil compa-
nies submitted EPs and DPPs. MMS even made the “post hoc” 
argument that lease suspensions are categorically excluded from 
NEPA review. 
The district court rejected MMS’s arguments, ruling that 
(1) MMS had failed to explain during the environmental review 
process why lease suspensions are excluded from environmental 
review, and (2) the 1990 CZMA amendments gave the State the 
right to review the lease suspensions as a federal agency action 
under section 1456(c)(1) of the CZMA.53 The decision placed 
significant reliance on the 1990 amendments to the CZMA, 
pointing out that the purpose of the 1990 amendments was to 
“to overrule Secretary of the Interior.”54 Judge Wilken noted 
that “Section 1456(c)(1)(A) was amended to delete the word 
‘directly’ modifying ‘affects,’” and that “Congress indicated in 
the legislative history that ‘the term “affects” is to be construed 
broadly, including direct effects which are caused by the activ-
ity and occur at the same time and place, and indirect effects 
which may be caused by the activity and are later in time or far-
ther removed in distance but are still reasonably foreseeable.’”55 
Finally, the decision cited Congress’ statement that the 1990 
amendments were intended “‘to make clear’ that the sale of oil 
and gas leases is subject to the CZMA;” and noted that all of the 
parties agreed that the 1990 amendment of the CZMA stated oil 
and gas lease sales constitute federal agency activities subject to 
state consistency review.56 Therefore, the only question left was 
whether lease suspensions were also subject to state review. 
Judge Wilken answered this question in the affirmative, 
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explaining that “MMS’s grant of the suspensions is a fed-
eral activity which it carries out in the exercise of its statutory 
duties.”57 She concluded: 
Therefore, because of Congress’s intent to require a fed-
eral agency to give the State consistency determinations 
at the time of the sale of the leases, which did not occur 
in this case, and because the MMS’s grant of these sus-
pensions requires activities that affect the coastal zone, 
the Court finds that the MMS must provide the State 
with a determination that the lease suspensions are con-
sistent with the State’s coastal management program, 
pursuant to CZMA § 1456(c)(1).58
MMS and the oil companies appealed. In December 2002, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Wilken’s rul-
ing.59 In an unusually descriptive opinion, the court reviewed 
the background of oil and gas development offshore California, 
including a discussion of the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill. The 
court recognized that “[s]ome would trace the current framework 
of environmental protections in substantial measure directly to 
the Santa Barbara spill.”60 Moreover, the court noted that “[o]f 
particular relevance here, the federal Coastal Zone Management 
Act and California’s Coastal Act 
followed in the wake of the spill 
and both provided California 
substantial oversight authority 
for offshore oil drilling in feder-
ally controlled areas.”61
The court followed with an 
overview of the CZMA, OCSLA, 
and NEPA. The Court reiter-
ated that Congress amended the 
CZMA in 1990 with the specific 
intent of overturning Secretary 
of the Interior v. California.62 
The court then concluded that 
the CZMA required full review 
at the lease suspension stage.63 
As the court noted, the lease suspensions “represent a significant 
decision to extend the life of oil exploration and production off 
of California’s coast, with all of the far reaching effect and perils 
that go along with offshore oil production.”64 The court rejected 
MMS’s argument that the State could wait until submittal of EPs 
and DPPs, pointing out that “[a]lthough a lease suspension is 
not identical to a lease sale, the very broad and long term effects 
of these suspensions more closely resemble the effects of a sale 
than they do the highly specific activities reviewed under sec-
tion (c)(3).”65 Therefore, “section (c)(1) review is available now 
for the broader effects implicated in suspending the leases. This 
phasing of review fits closely the expressed intent of Congress 
in subjecting the analogously broad implications of lease sales to 
(c)(1) review and specific plans to (c)(3) review.”66
aftermath of State of California v. norton
As a result of these rulings, the leases were placed under a 
“directed suspension,” meaning that all activities on the leases 
were halted. In February 2005, MMS issued final Environmen-
tal Assessments and “Findings of No Significant Impact” under 
NEPA, again deferring review of future exploration and devel-
opment activities until submittal of EPs and DPPs.67 In March 
2005, EDC and the Natural Resources Defense Council filed a 
lawsuit under NEPA on behalf of several environmental orga-
nizations.68 In April 2005, MMS submitted proposed “consis-
tency determinations” to the Coastal Commission pursuant to 
the CZMA. Although MMS claimed to address future activities 
that may occur on the leases, when the Coastal Commission 
requested more specific information and analysis of the effects 
of such activities, MMS again stated its refusal to conduct such 
an evaluation at this stage in the process.
The court hearing on the NEPA claim and the Coastal Com-
mission hearing on the CZMA issue were scheduled one day 
apart in August 2005. In each case, the environmental groups 
argued that MMS should not be allowed to defer review of future 
activities that may occur on the leases. EDC pointed out that 
NEPA requires federal agencies to consider not just the “direct 
effects” of an action, but also the “indirect effects, which are 
caused by the action and are later in time or farther removed in 
distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable.”69 Similarly, the 
legislative history of the 1990 
CZMA amendments supported 
the same standard for assuring 
timely review of activities that 
may affect the State’s coastal 
resources. The environmental 
groups noted that without the 
suspensions, the leases would 
expire. Therefore, they argued, 
the State should be allowed 
to consider the full range of 
impacts that may flow from such 
a decision. 
On August 11, 2005, the 
Coastal Commission agreed that 
the scope of its review encom-
passed all future activities on the leases.70 Accordingly, the Com-
mission unanimously objected to the consistency determinations 
submitted by MMS. The next day Judge Wilken ruled from the 
bench that MMS “violated NEPA by failing to prepare environ-
mental analyses of future exploration and development activi-
ties sunder the leases.”71 The Judge found not only that future 
development activities on the leases are reasonably foreseeable, 
but that the very purpose of the lease suspensions is to allow 
such activities. Accordingly, the Judge remanded the matter to 
MMS, ruling that the agency must complete adequate NEPA 
analyses of the lease suspensions. MMS appealed this decision 
and the case is currently pending before the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals. 
These decisions reflect the shared opinions of the legisla-
tive and judicial branches of the federal government that coastal 
states should be granted the right to review any federal agency 
activities that may have a direct or indirect effect on the State’s 
coastal zone. This perspective—so integral to Congress’s amend-
States should be granted 
the right to review any 
federal agency activities 
that may have a direct 
or indirect effect on the 
state’s coastal zone.
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ments of the CZMA in 1990, and confirmed by the court’s deci-
sion in State of California v. Norton—was further endorsed by 
the executive branch, under the Clinton Administration, when it 
published final revisions to the CZMA regulations.72 Although 
the purpose of the update was to allow a comprehensive review 
of the CZMA regulations, a critical component of the new 
regulations was focused on the need to comply with the 1990 
amendments to the Act.
Thus, the three branches of government subscribed to the 
broad right of coastal states to review activities that may affect 
their coastal resources. Despite this unanimity, a change in the 
executive branch muddied the waters in 2002. Under the Bush 
Administration, the federal government proposed to revise the 
CZMA regulations again, less than two years after the com-
prehensive revisions were made in December 2000. The new 
regulations, which were finalized on January 5, 2006, appear to 
undermine both the Congressional intent in 1990 as well as the 
Ninth Circuit’s ruling in 2002.73 For example, the Federal Reg-
ister notice announcing the new regulations characterizes OCS 
lease suspensions as “interim or preliminary” and states that “in 
all foreseeable instances, lease suspensions would not be sub-
ject to federal consistency review since (1) in general, they do 
not authorize activities with coastal effects; and (2) if they did 
contain activities with coastal effects, the activities and coastal 
effects would be covered in a State’s review of a previous lease 
sale, an EP or a DPP.”74 This language appears to conflict with 
the 1990 CZMA amendments, which provide for early review, 
similar to NEPA, so that even future, indirect effects shall be 
considered in the context of a proposed federal activity.
conclusIon
As the courts have stated, the CZMA must be applied on a 
case-by-case basis. There are no exclusions from state consis-
tency review; if the facts of a particular case indicate that the pro-
posed activity may result in a direct or indirect effect on a state’s 
coastal zone, a consistency determination or certification must 
be submitted to the state for review. Any limitations set forth in 
the CZMA regulations must be implemented consistent with the 
intent of the Act itself. Thus, if the current or any future admin-
istration attempts to rely on the 2006 regulations to limit state 
review, the judicial branch may be brought into the fray again to 
determine whether Congress’s intent is being undermined. In the 
meantime, California and other coastal states should follow the 
1990 amendments to the CZMA and the court’s interpretation of 
such amendments, as set forth in State of California v. Norton.
Endnotes: Defending State’s Rights
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Louisiana is losing its coastal wetlands and barrier islands at the fastest rate of any U.S. state: the Gulf of Mexico has claimed an area roughly the size of Delaware since 
the 1930s.1 The main cause of wetland loss is human activity, 
specifically isolating the Mississippi River from the Mississippi 
Deltaic Plain (“MDP”) by building levees to control natural 
flooding and canals.2 Congress and the Louisiana legislature 
have increased efforts to restore the MDP in the wake of the 
destruction caused to the Gulf Coast by Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita.3
MDP restoration can have both indirect and direct positive 
effects in dampening flooding caused by future storms. Indi-
rectly, the main cause of sediment loss to the MDP and flooding 
after Hurricane Katrina was the 
15,000 km of canals dredged in 
the MDP.4 The canals, built since 
the 1950s, have “sliced the wet-
lands into a giant jigsaw puzzle, 
increasing erosion and allow-
ing lethal doses of salt water to 
infiltrate brackish and freshwa-
ter marshes.”5 Computer models 
suggest that these same canals, 
mostly the Mississippi River 
Gulf Outlet canal (“MRGO”), 
helped channel the storm surge 
from Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita into the sub-sea level par-
ishes in the New Orleans area.6 
Thus, it would seem that proposed efforts to reconstruct the 
MDP wetlands by reconnecting the Mississippi River to the 
MDP through backfilling canals and the MRGO would cut off 
the very channels that brought flood waters into New Orleans 
during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.7
Restoration of the MDP can also have a more direct effect 
on decreasing the volume of flood waters that threaten the Loui-
siana coast during hurricanes and other tropical storms. There 
is no exact measurement of the amount of protection that wet-
lands provide against a hurricane’s storm surge.8 Data collected 
after Hurricane Andrew demonstrates that a kilometer of coastal 
wetland decreases storm surge by 5 cm.9 Computer models sim-
ulating a Category 3 hurricane hitting south-central Louisiana 
estimate that the past 40 years of wetlands decline results in a 
2.5 to 3 meter increase in the height of storm surge.10 Although 
wetland restoration alone will not provide much protection from 
Gulf Coast hurricanes,11 the buffer effect of wetlands combined 
cateGory 3 wake-up call: 
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with restoration efforts that close sediment robbing canals might 
provide an environmentally sustainable complement to levees 
that can protect New Orleans and the surrounding parishes from 
flood damage on the level seen after Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita.12
Perhaps the most important reason for Louisiana’s wetlands 
restoration is the abundance of natural resources provided by 
the MDP wetlands. Louisiana’s wetlands provide a third of the 
nation’s oil and a quarter of its natural gas,13 and the MDP pro-
vides habitats for $3 billion worth of oysters, shrimp, and fish.14 
This same area is also a priceless wildlife habitat.15 Congressio-
nal and state spending on wetlands restoration after Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita also furthers other national priorities.
Congress first recognized 
the need to restore the MDP in 
1990 with the Coastal Wetlands, 
Planning, Protection, and Res-
toration Act (“CWPPRA”). The 
CWPPRA provided $50 million 
per year to the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers to implement 
projects to restore the MDP.16 
In 1998 Congress recognized 
that restoration efforts must be 
increased and commissioned the 
Coast 2050—Toward a Sustain-
able Coastal Louisiana Plan and 
the associated U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers Louisiana Coastal 
Area Ecosystem Restoration Study (“LCA Study”).17 The LCA 
Study stated that various restoration efforts to achieve ecosys-
tem benefits would cost from $5 billion to $17 billion.18 The 
Office of Management and Budget instructed the Army Corps of 
Engineers to scale back this plan. However, the Army requested 
only $1.12 billion from Congress in the Water Resources Devel-
opment Act (“WRDA”) in 2005.19 The WRDA has recently been 
the subject of the first override of a President G.W. Bush veto. 
On November 6, 2007 Congress overrode President Bush’s veto 
of the WRDA, appropriating $23 billion for over 900 water sup-
ply, flood control, navigation, and environmental restoration 
projects. 20 The WRDA includes billions of dollars to restore the 
Louisiana coast.21
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State level efforts to prepare the Louisiana Gulf Coast after 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita will have a mixed effect on MDP 
restoration. The Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration 
Project (“LCPRP”), directed by 
both Congress and the state of 
Louisiana, has thus far only dealt 
with manmade hurricane protec-
tion barriers, such as levees and 
floodgates, which could pose a 
threat to the sustainability of the 
MDP.22 At the same time, how-
ever, Louisiana has dedicated its 
share of newly opened oil and 
gas tracts provided by the federal Gulf of Mexico Energy Secu-
rity Act (“GMESA”) to coastal restoration and protection.23 It 
therefore remains to be seen how the money appropriated under 
the GMESA will coexist with the hurricane protection efforts 
proposed under the LCPRP. 
Science, not politics, needs 
to determine U.S. policy 
toward wildlife.
There are several factors that justify restoration of the MDP, 
including storm protection, natural resource extraction, and nat-
ural habitat. Whatever motivation exists for MDP restoration, 
the monetary cost will be one so 
large that it will require a reso-
lute federal government to pro-
vide funding. One can only hope 
that Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
brought enough awareness to the 
issue of MDP restoration that 
politics will subside to sound 
scientific analysis and action. 
The recent efforts by Congress 
to override a presidential veto and pass the WRDA is only a first 
step to a more comprehensive and sustainable approach to MDP 
restoration and development.
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InTroDucTIon
To date, the international community has dealt with cli-mate change, the quintessential sustainability issue of our time, principally by promoting the mitigation of 
greenhouse gases (“GHGs”). The rationale for such mitigation 
efforts, simply stated, is that if GHG concentrations are stabi-
lized or reduced, ultimately the severity of climate change can be 
alleviated. While there is no doubt that mitigation activities are 
necessary to the long-term well-being and stability of the global 
environment, the level of attention paid to mitigation-oriented 
science, technology, methodology, and policy serves to obscure 
the pressing need to seriously address the inevitable question of 
adaptation to climate change.
The overwhelming focus on GHG mitigation overshadows 
the adaptation half of the climate change equation. The reality 
is that, even if the most optimistic mitigation plans are adopted 
and all GHGs are stabilized immediately, residual GHG concen-
trations within the atmosphere will continue to create adverse 
consequences well into the future. The challenge is not success-
fully “managing a transition from one equilibrium to another,” 
as mitigation does, “but rather, adapting to a far more uncertain 
climatic future.”1 At best, mitigation of anthropogenic sources 
of GHGs can attempt to minimize long-term climate change 
impacts, but cannot halt or avoid all impacts. Therefore, adapt-
ing to the adverse impacts of climate change is a reality, and in 
some instances the need is immediate. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) 
defines climate change adaptation as “an adjustment in eco-
logical, social, or economic systems in response to actual or 
expected climatic stimuli and their effects or impacts.”2 Adap-
tive measures are needed because adverse consequences are 
expected to occur globally on unprecedented levels. The IPCC 
states with high confidence3 that many natural systems are being 
affected by regional climate changes, particularly temperature 
increases. Global data assessments show that it is likely4 that 
anthropogenic warming impacts many physical and biological 
systems, and other effects of regional climate change on natural 
and human environments are emerging.5 The current knowledge 
of climate change associated impacts has led the global com-
munity to the conclusion that “adaptation will be necessary to 
address impacts from the warming which is already unavoidable 
due to past emissions.”6
Because climate change is an immediate threat it is impera-
tive to develop and implement strategies for climate change 
adaptation. This Article explores the concepts behind climate 
change adaptation, discusses accomplishments to date and 
preparinG for the Day after tomorrow:  
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addresses the next step of how to implement adaptation strate-
gies in an effective and sustainable manner. This Article outlines 
the international commitment to address climate change adapta-
tion, introduces the concepts central to an adaptation framework, 
and details recent domestic developments in adaptation policy 
and planning.
clImaTe chanGe aDapTaTIon In Ipcc  
anD kyoTo processes
unfccc/ kyoto proceSSeS 
Although the Kyoto Protocol is largely directed towards 
mitigation, adaptation is recognized as part of the Kyoto frame-
work. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (“UNFCCC”)7 makes direct reference to adaptation 
measures in a number of key Articles.8 In all, ten provisions dis-
cuss climate change adaptation, “with particular attention having 
been given to issues relating to Article 4.89 and Article 4.910, and 
to scientific and technical aspects under the relevant Subsidiary 
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice agenda item on 
adaptation.”11
The Kyoto process recognizes that adaptation is integral 
through the Adaptation Fund. While this fund is not currently 
operational, it “will fund concrete adaptation measures, to be 
financed from a share of proceeds from the clean development 
mechanism and other voluntary sources.”12 The Adaptation 
Fund will support and promote measures such as vulnerability 
and adaptation assessment, capacity building, technical training 
and technology transfer, pilot programs, and strengthening and 
developing early warning systems for extreme weather events.13
At the UNFCCC Third Conference of the Parties held in 
Kyoto, Japan, it was requested that the Convention Secretariat 
“continue its work on the synthesis and dissemination of infor-
mation on environmentally sound technologies and know-how 
conducive to mitigating, and adapting to, climate change.”14 In 
response, the UNFCCC Secretariat in 1999 released a report 
organizing the technical and theoretical knowledge on adapta-
tion based on the sector model approach to vulnerability and 
discussing the options and tools available to evaluate and imple-
62Fall 2007
ment adaptation schemes.15 In 2005, the UNFCCC released the 
revised final draft report retaining the primary goal of convey-
ing available adaptation tools and methods without the use of 
a sector-based approach for data organization.16 The data was 
reorganized in a more efficient manner without recommending 
any specific tools or methods. 
ipcc anD aDaptation
The IPCC also is active in basic adaptation research and dis-
cussions. The IPCC published a series of reports that includes 
discussions on adaptation.17 The most recent IPCC report, Cli-
mate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability re-
emphasizes that climate change and adverse impacts are likely, 
and discusses the urgency and need to enhance the consideration 
of adaptive measures. The report notes that adaptation will be 
necessary to address impacts resulting from warming unavoid-
able from banked GHG concentrations and that a portfolio of 
adaptation and mitigation measures can diminish the risks asso-
ciated with climate change.18 The IPCC details a wide array of 
adaptation options (see Table 1), however, the IPCC noted that 
more adaptation is necessary to reduce vulnerability of future 
climate change. 
Table 1
poTenTIal aDapTaTIon responses anD examples19
 Utilizing known technologies i.e. Sea defenses
 Behavioral modifications i.e. Altered food and  
  recreational choices
 Managerial modifications i.e. Altered farm practices
 Policy development i.e. Planning regulations
basIc aDapTaTIon concepTs:  
vulnerabIlITy anD susTaInabIlITy
vulnerability analySiS
Vulnerability is a central concept for climate change adap-
tation policy and planning, and can be seen as the connecting 
thread that links all the adaptation modalities. Climate change 
vulnerability can be defined as “the degree to which a system is 
susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate 
change, including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerabil-
ity is a function of the character, magnitude, and rate of climate 
variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and adap-
tive capacity.”20 Vulnerability is multi-disciplinary in nature, 
because social, economic, and environmental systems can all be 
vulnerable to climate change. 
Vulnerability is associated both with the state of a system 
prior to a hazardous event, and the system’s ability to effectively 
handle the hazardous event.21 Vulnerability analysis is defined 
in terms of impact, with a focus on physical hazard, exposure, 
and a system’s sensitivity to hazard.22 Climate change vulner-
ability is distinguished through hazard exposure, represented in 
biophysical vulnerability, and coping with a hazard, represented 
in social vulnerability.23 Climate change vulnerability occurs at 
the intersection of social and biophysical vulnerability, where 
one is a function of the other. 
Although vulnerability is site-specific, there are certain char-
acteristics that can generally influence vulnerability, regardless 
of geographical and socio-political contexts. Such characteris-
tics are called “generic determinants of vulnerability” and are 
primarily developmental focused, including: poverty, health sta-
tus, economic inequality and elements of governance, technol-
ogy, education, infrastructure, and dependence on agriculture.24 
Generic determinants of vulnerability are associated with adap-
tive capacity, which refers to “the ability or capacity of a system 
to modify or change its characteristics or behavior so as to cope 
better with existing or anticipated external stresses.”25 Adaptive 
capacity is a determining factor of vulnerability because, given 
the generic determinants of vulnerability in addition to site-spe-
cific vulnerabilities, adaptive capacity is represented in terms of 
a system’s ability and/or capacity to potentially adapt. 
Generic determinants of vulnerability can be found glob-
ally in both developed and developing nations, however, due 
to developing nations’ circumstances of transition, all develop-
ing nations possess some form of generic vulnerabilities.26 The 
acknowledgment that developing nations are substantially more 
vulnerable raises issues of equity and fairness on a number of 
levels.27 While issues and questions continue to accumulate and 
answers are slow to surface due to a recent sense of urgency, 
interest, and concern, the relationship of vulnerability, adapta-
tion, and developing nations generates considerable attention. 
The global community has begun to recognize how vulnerability 
and adaptation are closely linked, and vulnerability is becoming 
the focus of research, analysis, and discussion for future adapta-
tion considerations.
aliGninG aDaptation anD SuStainability
Due to the varying scope and scale at which adaptive mea-
sures will be required, effective policy implementation pres-
ents the challenge of “linking climate change policy to policy 
normally seen as outside the scope of climate change, includ-
ing livelihood enhancement, poverty alleviation, education, and 
improved institutional arrangements.”28 Fortunately, integrating 
the goals of sustainability and climate change adaptation pres-
ents an effective avenue of integrating diverse policy goals. 
Adaptation and sustainability are complementary and “can yield 
synergistic efficiencies and benefits that advance the goals of 
both agendas . . . for a society that is made more climate resilient 
through proactive adaptation to climate variations, extremes and 
changes is one in which development achievements and pros-
pects are less threatened by climate hazards and therefore more 
sustainable.”29 For the integration to occur, adaptation must be 
included and considered in the process of “policy formulation, 
planning, program management, project design, and project 
implementation.”30 Aligning adaptation with sustainability is a 
policy option that could be used in both developed and develop-
ing nations to create win-win scenarios that foster sustainable 
development and strengthen climate resilience. 
Policy decision-makers at varying scales face the challenge 
of pursuing and achieving multiple goals with limited resources 
requiring tradeoffs to achieve priority goals. However, by inte-
grating sustainable development and adaptation, a tradeoff does 
not have to occur, for development will achieve its policy goals 
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while reinforcing the adaptation infrastructure. More so, several 
goals of sustainable development are complementary to adap-
tation, including: development that targets highly vulnerable 
populations, diversifies economic activities, provides for liveli-
hoods that are less climate sensitive, improves natural resource 
management, directs development away from highly hazardous 
locations towards less hazardous ones, and invests in expanding 
knowledge and creating technology that is relevant to reducing 
climate risks.31 
The integrated process can foster a top-down and a bottom-
up strategy. A top-down strategy implies action taken at larger 
scales, such as national and regional levels, to foster sustainable 
development and adaptation at the smaller scales, such as the 
community and local levels. For instance, national, regional, and 
state governments can “create incentives, enforce regulations, 
assist with capital financing and implement large projects that 
go beyond the means of the local authorities to create a climate 
proof society.”32 National, regional, and state level support would 
create a number of beneficial outcomes, such as fostering devel-
opment away from at-risk locations, constructing homes that can 
withstand climate variabilities, provide insurance, encourage and 
implement better land use, and 
construct infrastructure to help 
adapt to climate variability.33 
DevelopmentS in  
aDaptation
Because GHG mitigation 
has been the focal point of most 
climate change research and 
discussions, early adaptation 
research was geared towards 
informing mitigation policy.34 
Such considerations are viewed 
as first generation adaptation 
assessments and attempted “to 
understand how climate might change and what would be the 
likely impacts based on models and climate scenario methods.”35 
In contrast, second generation assessments examine the rela-
tionship of vulnerability, adaptive capacity, and climate change 
to identify where and what adaptive measures are needed, and 
ultimately integrate such considerations into associated decision 
making processes and policy goals. 
The first generation assessments typically followed a seven 
step approach: (1) define the problem; (2) select the method of 
assessments most appropriate to the problems; (3) test methods/
conduct sensitivity analysis; (4) select and apply climate change 
scenarios; (5) assess biophysical and socioeconomic impacts; 
(6) assess autonomous adjustments; and (7) evaluate adaptation 
strategies.36 This approach proved largely ineffective because it 
analyzed climate change from a big picture perspective. How-
ever adaptation is site specific and each location has different 
needs and situations. First generation assessments assume adap-
tation can be implemented with a broad stroke and paid little 
attention to implementation challenges, including social, behav-
ioral, or cultural obstacles.37 Moreover, stakeholders were typi-
cally not involved and a top-down approach was used. Since 
adaptation needs are site specific, local knowledge and customs 
are invaluable tools in developing effective and sustainable 
adaptation projects.38 The shortfalls of first generation adapta-
tion assessments prompted the global community to re-evaluate 
the adaptation approach. 
While the second generation adaptation assessments are 
works in progress, certain parameters can already be discerned. 
New assessment methods present a restructured approach that 
is solely focused on adaptation, places vulnerability and adap-
tation in the center of the assessment, engages stakeholders in 
the process, and attempts to strengthen country-level informa-
tion and data to promote informed policy decisions. Such assess-
ments attempt to determine the relationship of vulnerability 
and climate change by posing certain research questions: “how 
and why vulnerabilities differ for different populations within a 
region, and how vulnerabilities may change over time as a result 
of climate changes and other factors.”39
clImaTe chanGe aDapTaTIon InITIaTIves aT The 
InTernaTIonal level
aDaptation in the  
uScSp proGram 
Prior to the Earth Summit 
in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the 
United States announced the 
formation of the U.S. Country 
Studies Program (“USCSP”). 
This program, no longer in exis-
tence, was coordinated with the 
Global Environment Facility 
(“GEF”), IPCC, the Subsidiary 
Bodies to the FCCC, and other 
international organizations, 
to expand upon initial IPCC 
reports published in the early 1990’s.40 The goal of the program 
was to assist developing countries and economies in transition in 
assessing their climate change sensitive sector vulnerability and 
explore opportunities for adaptation.41 Participating nations were 
required to develop and list adaptation needs and vulnerabilities, 
take inventories of greenhouse gas emissions, formulate climate 
change action plans, and assess technological capabilities. The 
USCSP was intended to support the goals of the UNFCCC by 
compiling general baseline data to initiate discussion and poten-
tial action within the international community. 
 The USCSP’s primary contribution was capacity build-
ing in developing countries to assess potential climate impacts.42 
However, there is a need for caution in drawing sweeping con-
clusions about the vulnerability of developing and transition 
countries to climate change.43 Consistent with first generation 
projects, the USCSP studies tended to focus on identifying sys-
tem sensitivities and adaptability was assessed mainly for coastal 
resources.44 However, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions 
without also thoroughly considering underlying socioeconomic 
changes, integrated impacts, and adaptability in all sensitive 
sectors.45
Vulnerability is  
becoming the focus of  
research, analysis, and 
discussion for future  
adaptation considerations.
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national aDaptation proGramS of action 
The guidelines for National Adaptation Programs of Action 
(“NAPA”) strategies were set forth by the UNFCCC at the sev-
enth Conference of the Parties held in Marrakech, Morocco in 
2001. The principal goal of the program is to assist the least 
developed countries (“LDCs”) in identifying activities to 
respond to urgent climate change adaptation needs and fund 
them through the LDC Fund, in the order of priority while con-
sidering urgency and cost-effectiveness. The program is not a 
structured framework of assessment or implementation. Instead, 
the NAPA process creates a document that identifies priority 
adaptation actions.46 
For instance, Tuvalu, a small island nation confronting 
rising sea levels, submitted a NAPA in May 2007 identifying 
key adaptation areas. These areas include inter alia, coastal 
zones, which are vulnerable to sea level rise and sea tempera-
ture change; soils, which are vulnerable to saltwater intrusion 
and salinization; water resources, which are impacted by sea 
level rise and salinization; agriculture, which is impacted by sea 
level rise and intrusion; and public health.47 The report identi-
fies seven priority projects, with desired outcomes and activi-
ties within each key adaptation area. One project will seek to 
increase the resilience of coastal areas and settlement to climate 
change through activities such as training local Kaupule people 
and government personnel on constructing coastal defenses such 
as channel breakers, planting a green belt, and increasing pub-
lic awareness.48 Another project in Tuvalu would introduce a 
salt-tolerant pulaka species, thus increasing the production of a 
native locally-grown nutritious root that has been damaged by 
salinity intrusion into local soil.49 
Generally, the NAPA strategies prepared to date utilize a 
bottom-up approach relying on grassroots, local knowledge to 
lay the groundwork for site-specific adaptation priorities and 
solutions.50 Such a process is fostered through community-level 
support, recognizing that grassroots communities are the main 
stakeholders. A majority of the data used and analyzed is extrap-
olated from established local social and environmental systems 
to ultimately identify gaps in adaptive capacity. This approach 
represents a change in methodology utilizing local knowledge, 
moving away from a reliance on scenario based modeling51 to 
assess future vulnerability and long term policy at the state level. 
For instance, the Sudanese NAPA utilized stakeholder consulta-
tions to reveal a number of actions and decisions that should 
be undertaken by relevant authorities, along with some policy 
reform suggestions.52
The overall effectiveness of NAPAs has yet to be deter-
mined, however a new report discusses the lessons learned in 
preparing NAPAs in Eastern and Southern Africa and concludes 
that there is a need for increased funding sources.53 The same 
study suggested that the momentum generated from the NAPA 
process must be used to make the transition to implementing 
substantive adaptation projects.54
aSSeSSmentS of impactS anD  
aDaptationS to climate chanGe 
The Assessments of Impacts and Adaptations to Climate 
Change (“AIACC”) program was developed in collabora-
tion with the IPCC as an assessment tool designed to build an 
information base for developing countries adapting to climate 
change. The program had three specific mandates: (1)advancing 
scientific understanding of climate change impacts, adaptations 
and vulnerabilities in developing country regions; (2) building 
and enhancing scientific and technical capacity in developing 
countries; and (3) generating and communicating information 
useful for adaptation planning and action.55
The AIACC approach was largely research driven and pro-
duced numerous country and regional reports. AIACC took the 
stakeholder engagement process a step further by encouraging 
scientists, academics, and students within the host countries to 
participate in, and continue, the research and conclusions gen-
erated by the country reports. In total, 235 developing country 
scientists and more than 60 graduate and undergraduate students 
participated in the studies.56 
unDpS aDaptation policy framework 
The Adaptation Policy Framework (“APF”) is intended 
to integrate climate change adaptation into developing coun-
tries policies. The United Nations Development Programme 
(“UNDP”) and the Global Environment Facility (“GEF”) devel-
oped the APF with support from the Swiss, Canadian, and Dutch 
governments.
APF is a structured approach to creating strategies, policies, 
and measures for climate change adaptation.57 The APF frame-
work is considered a roadmap to assess, plan, and implement cli-
mate change adaptation supporting sustainable development.58 
This framework is consistent with other second generation proj-
ects and assessments, in that APF places adaptation in the center 
of the framework, strengthens local knowledge, and promotes 
a local, bottom-up information gathering and use. Importantly, 
APF focuses on practice rather than theory to more effectively 
inform the policy making process. This framework makes use 
of the vulnerability information that countries have to initiate 
a shift in the way risk, vulnerability and climate change are 
viewed. By utilizing synergies and intersecting themes, the APF 
approach can ultimately lead to a more informed policy-making 
process.59 
linkinG climate aDaptation proJect
The Linking Climate Adaptation (“LCA”) project was 
intended to “ensure that poor people benefit from adaptation 
processes, rather than bearing burdens by, for example, having 
the risks caused by climate change shift in their direction.”60 
The research focused on policy and institutional frameworks 
that could help support community-led adaptation, in addition 
to laying out the long-term research agenda and questions for 
community-led adaptation. The research drew upon a variety of 
sources including the Fourth Assessment of the IPCC and the 
UNFCCC Conference of Parties meetings and ‘side events,’ 
in addition to the views of the stakeholders from various sec-
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tors. Thus far, the project has resulted in “the establishment of 
the LCA Network which aims to link geographically dispersed 
communities undertaking adaptation at the local level with each 
other as well as with those engaged in formal scientific and pol-
icy responses to climate change.”61
The project has generated useful research questions, includ-
ing: (1) Who is vulnerable and how do sources of vulnerability 
change over time in response to multiple stressors? (2) What 
are the costs and benefits of adaptation to climate change? (3) 
How can climate change adaptation be integrated into develop-
ment/disaster risk reduction at multiple levels of governance?62 
Nonetheless, the LCA laments the lack of a “coherent body 
of policy-relevant knowledge about the changing dimensions 
and sources of vulnerability and the effectiveness of systemic 
approaches to vulnerability reduction.63 
uniteD kinGDom climate impactS proGramme
The United Kingdom Climate Impacts Program (“UKCIP”) 
was established in 1997 and published the report titled Climate 
adaptation: Risk, uncertainty and decision-making64 in con-
junction with the UK Climate Impacts Program, Department 
for Environment Food and Rural Affairs, and the Environment 
Agency. The report focuses on 
guiding, managing, and improv-
ing the decision-makers ability to 
judge associated climate change 
risks, when compared to other 
risks, to make informed adaptive 
choices. However, the UKCIP 
differs from previously discussed 
assessment tools in that it is not 
solely intended for developing 
countries. It is a framework that 
can be utilized by any governing 
body facing a myriad of choices and uncertainty, regardless of 
scale or focus. 
clImaTe chanGe aDapTaTIon acTIon  
In The unITeD sTaTes
aDaptation at the State level
Until recently GHG mitigation has dominated climate 
change discussions and planning considerations at the state level 
in the United States mirroring national and international devel-
opments. However, several U.S. state governments are express-
ing an awareness of adaptation and are in the early phases of 
identifying vulnerabilities. Specifically, states are creating adap-
tation commissions or committees with the intent to complement 
mitigation efforts and integrating adaptation into state climate 
action plans, which largely address the reducing and eliminating 
GHG emissions.65 Presently, thirty five states have or are in the 
process of creating climate action plans and fourteen additional 
plans are anticipated in late-2007 or 2008.66 Of those thirty five 
states, a number incorporate adaptation considerations into the 
scope of their climate action plan including Alaska, Arkansas, 
Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Min-
nesota, North Carolina, New Hampshire, Oregon, Vermont, and 
Washington. Only a handful of states have developed plans, 
commissions, and/or reports to specifically address adaptation 
considerations, including Alaska, Arizona, California, Mary-
land, Oregon, and Washington.67 
u.S. local initiativeS
At the U.S. local level, climate change adaptation activities 
have received a boost from recent initiatives by International 
Council on Local Environmental Initiatives -Local Governments 
for Sustainability (“ICLEI”). In 2005, ICLEI initiated the adap-
tation-focused Climate Resilient Communities Program, with 
funding from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration (“NOAA”), to assist local governments throughout the 
United States in identifying and assessing vulnerabilities, while 
improving their resiliency to associated climate change impacts. 
Early partners in this program included localities as diverse as 
Keene, New Hampshire; Fort Collins, Colorado; Anchorage, 
Alaska; and Miami-Dade County, Florida.
In 2007, ICLEI in conjunction with King County, Washing-
ton, published Preparing for Climate Change: A Guidebook for 
Local, Regional, and State Governments, a guidebook offering 
a detailed description of the methods and concepts needed to 
assist localities in implement-
ing, updating, and evaluating 
climate change preparedness 
measures.68 The guidebook 
offers a useful five-part check-
list for governments to better 
prepare for climate change. The 
checklist is divided into mile-
stones involving: (1) conduct-
ing a climate resiliency study 
and securing political and insti-
tutional support to prepare for 
climate change and building a climate preparedness team; (2) 
identifying and prioritizing planning areas for action through 
conducting and interpreting a climate resiliency study, climate 
change vulnerability assessment, and climate change risk assess-
ment; (3) setting preparedness goals and plan, establishing a 
vision and guiding principles for a climate resilient community, 
and developing, selecting and prioritizing preparedness actions; 
(4) implementing the preparedness plan, and ensuring the right 
implementation tools; and (5) measuring progress and updating 
the plan.69 
Regional adaptation activities —with concomitant trans-
boundary legal, regulatory, and economic implications—will 
likely grow in importance since ecosystems rather than politi-
cal boundaries will define the scope of such initiatives. Early 
evidence of this regional orientation is emerging. For instance, a 
conference entitled Climate Change in the Great Lakes Region: 
Decision Making Under Uncertainty was convened by Michi-
gan State University in March 2007 to explore the relationship 
of climate change, the Great Lakes region, decision making 
under uncertainty, and adaptation. The conference recognized 
that dealing with climate change presents complex challenges 
and instills a sense of uncertainty when dealing with the vari-
Historically, policy choices 
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ous effects of climate change on vital elements of ecosystems, 
infrastructure and economy in the Great Lakes region. In 
response, Michigan State’s Environmental Science and Policy 
Program and the National Science Foundation (“NSF”) will ini-
tiate “a process that will help identify the kinds of research that 
needs to be done and the best ways to provide the results so they 
are as useful as possible to decision makers.”70 
u.s. FeDeral GovernmenT aDapTaTIon acTIon
While the states have led the way in climate change adapta-
tion considerations, adaptation has begun to appear on the U.S. 
federal government’s radar in a substantive manner. Federal-
level discussions and considerations are preliminary, however, 
collectively they do represent a much needed first step in imple-
menting adaptation on the national scale. For instance, in May 
2007, the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior, 
Environment, and Related Agencies approved increasing EPA’s 
fiscal year budget to $8.1 billion for a temporary commission 
on adaptation and mitigation to review scientific questions on 
how to best adapt to a “warming planet” and identify the sci-
entific investment needed to address this reality.71 The commis-
sion would include officials from EPA, NOAA, the NSF, the 
Department of Energy, and the 
Forest Service, and would be 
responsible for the allocation of 
funds to governmental agencies 
to conduct adaptation research. 
Depending on the temporary 
commission’s findings, the EPA 
would allocate $45 million to 
itself and other agencies over 
the next two years.72 
The commission has yet to 
be officially created however 
the bill’s framework has two potential far reaching implications: 
(1) “the call for significant funding on adaptation could rep-
resent a new direction for EPA and other agencies to address 
the impacts of climate change, by going beyond the science of 
global warming or studies on policies to control [GHGs];”73 
and (2) The commission’s ability to “direct specific amounts of 
money toward a problem, rather than only making general rec-
ommendations” enables research “to begin immediately without 
having to wait for another appropriations cycle.”74
While the formation of the commission and its potential 
implications on adaptation research is promising, more con-
sistent and widespread action is required. A 2007 Government 
Accountability Office (“GAO”) report confirms this: the report 
concludes that 
federal agencies that manage the nation’s parks, forests, 
oceans, and monuments are unprepared to deal with 
climate change. . . resource managers within the Agri-
culture, Interior, and Commerce departments have lim-
ited guidance about whether or how to address climate 
change-without such guidance, their ability to address 
climate change and effectively manage resources is 
constrained.75 
The report elaborates on the evidence that climate change 
impacts “600 million acres of public lands and 150,000 square 
miles of waters managed by federal agencies—ranging from 
melting glaciers in Glacier National Park to rising sea levels in 
the Florida Keys.”76
The GAO report as issued includes responses from several 
federal departments as appendices; the Agriculture, Interior, and 
Commerce departments submitted comments on the GAO con-
clusions and recommendations. The federal agencies “generally 
agreed with the [GAO] recommendations,” noted the importance 
of climate change consideration and additionally highlighted 
climate change programs, initiatives, plans, and/or policies that 
the GAO report omitted.77 The comments from all three agen-
cies indirectly reaffirm the GAO conclusions: although climate 
change considerations may be an identified priority, there is an 
overall lack of consistent site-specific implementation guid-
ance.
For instance, the Department of Agriculture agrees that 
the adaptation plan for Chugach National Forest, discussed in 
the GAO report, does not specifically address the effects of 
climate change on programs and resources, but noted that the 
GAO report did not accurately 
represent the activities that are 
being pursued. The department 
notes that the “examination of 
one national forest. . . is inad-
equate as a proxy for an agency 
that manages diverse ecosystem 
across 193 million acres for 
multiple objectives. . . where 
a broader evaluation would 
have revealed [twelve] National 
Forest Plans specifically consider 
the effects of climate change on existing programs and local 
resource values.”78 However, the comments do not address if, 
or the extent to which, the National Forest Plans discuss site-
specific adaptation concerns. 
The Department of Interior recently initiated a task force to 
take “affirmative steps to assess the effects on our public lands 
arising from climate change and develop a process for antici-
pating and addressing these effects.”79 However, as noted in 
the comments, the department is currently exploring how new 
science can be focused to provide targeted information that its 
resource managers need. 
The Department of Commerce noted their involvement 
in the effort to “expand both observation systems and model-
ing capabilities” within ocean and coastal monitoring systems, 
integrated drought systems, and regional ecosystem planning. In 
addition, the department is expecting to release a Preliminary 
Review of Adaptation Options for Climate Sensitive Ecosystems 
and Resources by the end of 2007.80 
u.S. environmental protection aGency
In 2004 the EPA, in collaboration with other federal agen-
cies,81 initiated a process for the Preliminary Review of Adapta-
Early adaptation  
research was geared  
towards informing  
mitigation policy.
67 susTaInable DevelopmenT law & polIcy
tion Options for Climate-Sensitive Ecosystems and Resources to 
“review management options for adapting to climate variability 
and change in the United States, and to identify characteristics 
of ecosystems and adaptation responses that promote success-
ful implementation and meet resource managers’ needs.”82 
The report is being completed in response to SAP 4.483 of The 
Strategic Plan of the U.S. Climate Change Science Program 
(“CCSP”), which calls for the completion of “21 synthesis and 
assessment products to support policy making and adaptation 
decisions across the range of issues addressed by the CCSP,” to 
ultimately provide NGOs, individuals, federal, state, and local 
governments and agencies with adaptation options and informa-
tion.84 The assessment will focus primarily on climate sensitive 
ecosystem and resources located within federally protected and 
managed areas, including: national parks, national wildlife ref-
uges, wild and scenic rivers, marine protected areas, national 
forest systems, and the national estuary program. 
Consistent with the second generation assessments being 
conducted globally, the EPA project is implementing a process 
that is open to the public and engages stakeholders to provide 
valuable information about local systems. With diverse, multi-
disciplinary participation, the 
assessment is posing the follow-
ing questions: (1) What are the 
management goals in the selected 
systems, upon what ecosystem 
characteristics do these goals 
depend, what are the stressors of 
concern, what are the manage-
ment methods currently being 
used to address those stresses, 
and how could climate variabil-
ity and change affect attainment 
of management goals? (2) For selected case studies, what is the 
current state of knowledge about management options that could 
be used to adapt to the potential impacts of climate variability 
and change? (3) Looking across the case studies, what are the 
factors that affect the successful implementation of management 
actions to address impacts from climate variability and change? 
(4) For each case study, how should we define and measure 
the environmental outcomes of management actions and their 
effect on the resilience of ecosystems to climate variability and 
change?85 The report is expected in December 2007, and has 
the potential to lay the groundwork for future action by federal 
agencies, and will perhaps address concerns raised by the 2007 
GAO report. 
In March 2007, the EPA launched “an effort to assess and 
respond to the effects of global warming on water resources 
and regulators’ ability to meet requirements of numerous water 
related laws,” while specifically focusing on “development 
strategies to adapt to climate change, rather than on plans for 
limiting resources.”86 This new effort will be primarily adap-
tation—focused within the context of water resources and the 
ability to meet Clean Water Act Requirements “in a changing 
environment.” Implementation will be fostered through a Cli-
mate Change Workgroup and plan, expected to be released by 
the end of 2007.87 The plan will emphasize that “despite uncer-
tainty on the scope and timing of climate change effects, EPA’s 
water program and its partners should take prudent steps now 
to assess emerging information, evaluate potential impacts of 
climate change on water programs, and to identify appropriate 
response actions.”88
nexT sTeps: ImplemenTInG aDapTaTIon
Thus far, climate change adaptation efforts have been pri-
marily focused on gathering and synthesizing data to lay the 
groundwork for further studies and future implementation. Most 
initiatives are serving in a catalyst capacity—they are attempting 
to stimulate research, collaboration, discussion, and awareness. 
While excellent work has been done to identify vulnerabilities 
along with research and adaptive capacity gaps, little action has 
been taken based on the results of the reports. It is now imperative 
to move to the next step of the transition, an operational phase to 
implement adaptation considerations as a policy response. 
a balance of reactive anD proactive aDaptation
 The various vulnerability assessments conducted are 
intended to locate vulnerabili-
ties to implement action. Such 
actions represent sound politi-
cal will and good intentions. 
However, transitioning from the 
research and information gather-
ing phase to the implementation 
phase presents complex political 
and economic dilemmas that are 
familiar to climate change dis-
cussions. Particularly, the idea 
of allocating present resources 
to long term contextual conditions to anticipate and prevent 
potential future impacts versus waiting for impacts to occur and 
reacting to the situation. 
Conceptually, the difference between the two policy 
responses is represented in reactive and proactive adaptation. 
Reactive adaptation is the “ability to react to and deal with cli-
mate change” after an event and impacts have occurred, and is 
represented in the act of coping.89 Proactive adaptation is rep-
resented in the act of anticipation, taking action to prevent and/
or reduce future impacts. Choosing between the two in terms 
of policy responses presents complex challenges; however, we 
believe that elements of both proactive and reactive adaptation 
responses are necessary to effectively address adaptation to cli-
mate change. 
Historically, policy choices tended to lean towards reactive 
adaptation to climatic events, for in practice, “policy decisions 
are often easier to implement once a crisis has occurred than 
in anticipation of a crisis.”90 Reactive adaptation uses present 
resources to cope with events at the time they occur, however, 
such “coping may not be sufficient to fully restore the status 
quo because of irreversibilities.”91 For instance, “losses that are 
technically impossible to restore (such as sceneries, irrevers-
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ible biodiversity losses or disappearance of unique cultural arti-
facts) or economically too costly to restore…can be referred to 
as ‘remaining ultimate damages.’”92 In addition, it is noted that 
reactive responses, when used without proactive measures, tend 
to have higher long term costs because the low costs of preven-
tive action, or anticipative adaptation, are likely to dominate the 
higher costs of deferred action, or reactive adaptation, appropri-
ately discounted.93 
Although it is known that climate change impacts will hap-
pen and studies have estimated and located vulnerabilities, the 
details of future scenarios, in terms of timing, scale, and sever-
ity, cannot be known with certainty. The “degree of uncer-
tainty” argument has typically been used as a barrier to proactive 
adaptation, emphasizing the need to delay action until more 
certain data can be developed. However, even without precise 
knowledge of future events, proactive policy planning for cli-
mate change adaptation improves the overall preparedness by 
integrating adaptation considerations into the decision making 
process. More so, “experience suggests that, typically, proactive 
adaptation requires a greater initial investment but is more effec-
tive at reducing future risk and cost.”94
Proactive and reactive adaptation should be viewed as com-
plements and not conflicting 
options. For example, “rapid 
response teams need to be con-
stituted, trained, and set up in 
advance (proactive adaptation) 
so that they can be deployed 
when an extreme weather event 
occurs (reactive adaptation).”95 
In other contexts, proactive 
adaptation can occur through 
the construction of dikes and 
levees, irrigation systems, the building of more resilient homes 
in ‘at risk’ locations, and the construction of buffer zones, with 
reactive adaptation dealing with the remaining variabilities that 
proactive action did not effectively manage.
The key here is that proactive and reactive actions will not 
eliminate all associated impacts, but rather an optimal mix will 
attempt to minimize impacts wherever possible. It is necessary 
to implement the most educated proactive action, and to react 
and adapt to the variabilities. Decision makers must realize 
that adaptation to climate change is a manifestation of systems 
thinking and a process of active learning; we need to appreciate 
both proactive and reactive responses as we learn the new rules 
of game.
utilize anD expanD exiStinG methoDS
Adaptation considerations do not need to be developed from 
scratch. A large body of management procedures, processes, and 
applications exist in many different capacities and scales, both 
in developed and developing nations. It is necessary to evalu-
ate how populations currently manage climate risks and hazards, 
and build and expand upon existing measures where possible. 
The need for action is especially acute in developing nations, 
since the scale at which climate change will impact the vulner-
able populations is unprecedented, and traditional methods of 
adaptation lack the necessary scale and capacity. In many devel-
oped countries, stakeholder participation is a common practice 
where the lines of communication are open for local communi-
ties to voice their opinions across governmental scales, and be 
somewhat included in the decision process. On the other hand, 
many developing countries lack the political infrastructure to 
implement such a process; in the absence of developed politi-
cal regimes, many second generation projects and programs are 
providing the means for local communities to be included in the 
adaptation and development process by sharing their knowledge 
and revealing their developmental and adaptation gaps.
Adaptation to climate change is not only a concern for 
developing countries. Developed economies and societies are 
hardly immune to the anticipated impacts of climate change. 
While adaptation to climate change in developed countries will 
be facilitated because some of the infrastructure and basic tools 
are in place to deal with climate variabilities and associated 
hazards, there will clearly be a need to expand and build upon 
the preexisting management tools to deal with new hazards on 
varying scales. Such expanded considerations include: (1) with 
the threat of new disease and health risks, greater investment in 
health care systems; (2) enhance-
ment of hazard forecasting sys-
tems; (3) creation of networks to 
facilitate participation of local 
organizations in the development 
of plans to identify and manage 
the impacts of climate change 
on communities; (4) worse case 
contingency planning by busi-
nesses and municipalities; and 
(5) improving communications 
between communities and government regarding the impacts of 
climate change on livelihoods.96 Pervasive adjustments in policy 
and regulation, as well as the emergence of new processes and 
institutions for governance, should be anticipated as we adapt to 
climate change. 
conclusIon
It is clearly necessary to continue to pursue GHG mitiga-
tion strategies as aggressively as possible, but we must begin to 
implement adaptation strategies as a complement to mitigation 
efforts. Fortunately a dialogue on an adaptation and mitigation 
mix or “portfolio” has begun. For example, the IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report-Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation, 
and Vulnerability suggests “a portfolio of adaptation and migra-
tion can diminish the risks associated with climate change.”97 
The report recommends that a portfolio of strategies should 
include mitigation, adaptation, technological development, and 
research. This portfolio could combine policies with incen-
tive-based approaches, and actions at multiple scales, from the 
individual to national governments and international organiza-
tions.98
Researchers and scholars are beginning to explore, given 
the limited resources in terms of funding, time, and manpower, 
Another project in Tuvalu 
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the contents of an adaptation portfolio “that is justifiable from 
a social, environmental, and economic perspective.”99 But this 
is no longer an academic question. More enlightened business 
leaders already understand that the climate change equation 
includes both mitigation and adaptation components. As James 
E. Rogers, Duke Energy’s CEO and Chairman, stated in August 
2007, “mitigation of climate change is not going to happen fast 
enough. That is the reality. We need to think in a broad sense 
about both adaptation [to climate change] and mitigation [of 
it].”100 Adaptation and mitigation are complementary and ought 
to be inextricably linked as we plan for a carbon-constrained 
future.
Table 2
sTaTes pursuInG separaTe aDapTaTIon plans
 Alaska The Climate Impact Assessment Commission is responsible for developing adaptation consid-
erations. The commission is a legislative body that is “tackling adaptation issues, specifically 
associated with the protection or relocation of villages in the state at risk from coastal erosion 
and wave surges or flooding.”101 The commission is currently analyzing the relationship of cli-
mate change and adaptation to a variety of multi-disciplinary issues, including communities, 
infrastructure, fish, wildlife, forests, agriculture, disease, pests, and financing. A rural relocation 
report is expected to be completed by the end of 2007.
 Arizona Arizona developed a Climate Change Adaptation Strategy, which recommends that the Governor 
“appoint a task force or advisory group to develop recommendations for the state climate change 
adaptation strategy. Moreover, the Governor should direct state agencies and other appropriate 
institutions to identify and characterize potential current and future risks in Arizona to human, 
natural, and economic systems, including potential risks to water resources, temperature sensi-
tive populations and systems, energy systems, transportation systems, vital infrastructure and 
public facilities, and natural lands (e.g., forests, rangelands, and farmland).”102 
 California The California Energy Commission published a statewide assessment of climate change impacts 
and adaptation measures in the 2005 report Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation in Cali-
fornia. In addition, the California Climate Change Center has been conducting ongoing impact 
and adaptation studies within three main areas: (1) agriculture and forestry- including iden-
tification and analysis of vulnerable species; (2) Water resources- with particular attention 
placed upon stressors such as growing population and development; and (3) Public health- 
with the acknowledgment that increased frequency of extreme weather events will impact  
human health.103 
 Maryland The Maryland Commission on Climate Change formed the Adaptation and Response Working 
Group, which will recommend strategies for reducing Maryland’s climate change vulnerability, 
with attention paid to public health and the most vulnerable population segments.104 An updated 
plan of action, preliminary recommendations, implementation time tables, and draft legislation 
is expected in November 2007.
 Washington The Washington State Department of Ecology formed the Preparation/Adaptation Working 
Groups with a primary task to make recommendations to the Governor on how Washington can 
prepare and adapt to climate change impacts with respect to five sectors: Agriculture, Forestry 
Resources, Human Health, Water Resources & Quality, and Coastal Infrastructure. Addition-
ally, the working groups will identify vulnerabilities, recommend adaptive strategies, and note 
areas requiring additional research.105 
 Oregon The Climate Change Integration Group will prepare a preliminary report on adaptation to the 
impacts of climate change with initial recommendations to the Governor by the end of the year 
2007.106 
Endnotes: Preparing for the Day After Tomorrow 
continued on page 87
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For hundreds of years the people of the southwestern United States have hung chile ristras, bunches of red chile, from their homes and used the power of the sun to 
dry the chiles for cooking during the winter months. While the 
traditions of the past still hold sway, solar panels have found 
their way to the homes of native southwesterners. State govern-
ments are encouraging harnessing the sun a method of energy 
production in New Mexico, Arizona, and California.1 
The southwestern United States may not be nutrient or water 
rich, but it does have latent solar resources that have only begun 
to be exploited.2 Satellite measurements have confirmed that the 
solar energy available for exploitation in the U.S. southwest is 
second to none in the world.3 As the threats of energy security4 
and global warming5 have become more prescient, the appeal 
of solar energy has increased. The federal, state, and local gov-
ernments are reacting by promoting solar technologies through 
incentives and partnerships for both individuals and corpora-
tions.6
At the federal level, however, the amount of incentives 
available to individuals and corporations that use solar energy 
has been relatively small. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 estab-
lished a tax incentive of up to two thousand dollars for individ-
ual residents who install a solar electric system or water heating 
system.7 The goal of this program is to encourage consumers to 
install their own solar systems, but it is set to expire in 2008.8
New Mexico, Arizona, and California have passed legisla-
tion to supplement the two thousand dollar federal tax incentive 
and have added their own incentives and programs in addition to 
the federal tax incentive. State programs vary from greater tax 
incentives for individual homeowners in New Mexico to the cre-
ation of a multi-million dollar state-wide solar home program in 
California to tax breaks to businesses for installation and devel-
opment of solar infrastructure in Arizona.9
In New Mexico, Governor Bill Richardson declared that the 
state “must move our economy from limited oil resources to the 
unlimited resources of wind, biomass, geothermal, and solar.”10 
In response, the New Mexico legislature recently passed leg-
islation which added $9,000 dollars of potential tax credits for 
individual residents in addition to the federal credit.11 Arizona 
enacted a thousand dollar tax credit,12 while in California incen-
tives are given on a performance based formula which rewards 
high output renewable energy systems.13 
New Mexico and California have also been strong propo-
nents of making access to solar power a right for homeowners. 
California made access to latent solar energy a right for home-
owners in the Solar Rights Act of 1978. It was originally written 
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to bar homeowners associations from enacting rules that would 
prevent owners from installing solar power units. It was sub-
sequently amended in 2003 and 2004 to prevent public entities 
from doing the same.14 The New Mexico Solar Rights Act of 
1978 was also amended in 2007 to clarify the definitions of solar 
collectors and to prohibit homeowners associations and public 
entities from restricting use of solar collectors, with the excep-
tion of historical districts.15
Governor Richardson of New Mexico and Governor 
Schwarzenegger of California both pledged to increase clean 
energy by 30,000 megawatts, and to increase energy efficiency 
in their states by twenty percent.16 Governor Schwarzenegger 
has also made it a stated goal to have a “million solar roofs” in 
the state of California and has matched this rhetoric by spear-
heading the creation of a $400 million dollar program within 
the California Energy Commission called the New Solar Homes 
Partnership.17 The New Solar Homes Partnership systemizes and 
creates a process for how energy efficiency is measured, breaking 
available efficiency levels into two different tiers and rewarding 
those who create the most energy efficient buildings.18
While Arizona has arguably not promoted residential solar 
energy to the extent of New Mexico and California, it has cre-
ated a roadmap towards promoting growth in the private sector 
specifically in regards to solar energy plants.19 One of the four 
largest “central station solar power” companies, Stirling Energy 
has been a benefactor of Arizona’s roadmap.20 Stirling seeks to 
create large solar plants in the desert southwest and is an exam-
ple of cross state growth in the solar industry. For example, New 
Mexico’s Sandia National Labs recently teamed with Stirling to 
create and expand new solar technologies.21
Despite solar power’s current marginal status as a source of 
energy, the future of it is bright if the political leadership at the 
state level continue to promote it. Although the federal govern-
ment lags behind the promotion of solar energy in comparison to 
the southwestern states, the arrival of new solar technology and 
the growing individual interest in its use creates hope that solar 
energy can be capitalized to fruition in the solar rich southwest. 
It may, one day, become common to see both chile ristras and 
solar panels adorning the homes of southwesterners and if com-
panies are able to create large solar plants in this region, they 
may soon join the large chile fields in harvesting the power of 
the sun.
Endnotes: Solar Power in the Southwest continued on page 89
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On January 24th, 2007, President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13,423, “Strengthening Federal Envi-ronmental, Energy, and Transportation Management.”1 
The Executive Order requires federal agencies to meet the stan-
dards of green buildings, and “lead by example” in promoting 
green buildings in the United States.2 The U.S. federal govern-
ment, however, seems to have been “led by examples” of the 
states, industry, and the consumers. 
In 2005, the State of Washington became the first state to 
adopt legislation requiring all state-funded buildings over 5,000 
square feet to obtain the silver standard required by the Leader-
ship Energy and Environmental Design (“LEED”) Green Build-
ing Rating System. LEED is the nationally accepted certificate 
for the design, construction, and operation of high performance 
green buildings. Many other states and cities have adopted simi-
lar legislation to require or encourage state-funded buildings to 
meet green building standards.3 
In 2006, Washington D.C. 
became the first major U.S. city 
to require LEED compliance 
for private projects with D.C.’s 
Green Building Act of 2006.4 
Despite LEED’s growth, 
the standard is not without its 
limitations. One current limi-
tation is the LEED program’s 
inability to address whether the 
building is located in sustainable 
surroundings in rating the build-
ing. This phenomenon of having 
green buildings in an unsustain-
able context is called “green 
sprawl.”5 Green sprawl permits individual buildings to be certi-
fied as green buildings, yet overlooks the adjacent development 
pattern. In order to address the problem, the American Society 
of Landscape Architects recently announced its development of 
the Sustainable Sites Initiative, which will measure the sustain-
ability of designed landscapes of public, commercial and resi-
dential projects. The U.S. Green Building Council is supporting 
the project and plans to incorporate the Sustainable Sites metrics 
into its LEED system.6
Given that many states are already enforcing green building 
requirements for federal and private buildings, the federal policy 
should take an affirmative step to require every state to adopt 
building standards for federal buildings. Also, the federal policy 
should equally promote certification programs other than the 
LEED, such as the Green Globe, for the purpose of fair compe-
tition. For example, even though Energy Star does not provide 
the u.S. feDeral Green builDinG policy
by Eunjung Park*
* Eunjung Park is a J.D. Candidate, May 2009, at American University, Wash-
ington College of Law.
certification system that encompasses all aspects of green build-
ings, Energy Star should be utilized to strengthen the energy 
conservation factor of green buildings.
The High Performance Buildings Act of 2007, introduced in 
February 2007, is yet to be passed.7 The Act would be one step 
forward for the federal green building policy, as it would create 
the Office of High Performance Green Buildings and require the 
Office to identify federal facility procedures that inhibit existing 
and new federal facilities from becoming green by meeting the 
LEED standard. Along with improving certification programs 
and technology, the federal government’s “lead by example” 
approach should be reinforced by affirmative implementation of 
green building policies and effective use of green certification 
programs.
Endnotes:
1 Exec. Order No. 13,423, 72 Fed. Reg. 
3919, 3923 (Jan. 26, 2007).
2 Executive Order 13,423, id.
3 Alex Frangos, Green Building 
Practices Are Required by States, 
wall Street J. online (June 1, 
2005), available at http://www.real 
estatejournal.com/propertyreport/
architecture/20050601-frangos.
html?refresh=on (last visited Nov. 27, 
2007); John Ritter, Building ‘green’ 
reaches a new level, uSa toDay  
online (July 26, 2006), avail-
able at http://www.usatoday.com/
news/nation/2006-07-26-green-
construction_x.htm (last visited Nov. 
27, 2007).
4 Emily A. Jones, Washington, D.C. Enacts Green building Requirements for 
Private Projects, Apr. 16, 2007, available at http://www.constructionweblinks.
com/Resources/Industry_Reports__Newsletters/Apr_16_2007/wash.html (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2007)
5 Shari Shapiro, Losing the Forest to Save a Few Trees: The Problems Behind 
Green Sprawl, Sept. 6, 2007, available at http://greenerbuildings.com/news_
detail.cfm?NewsID=35868 (last visited Nov. 27, 2007). 
6 Sustainable Sites, Dexigner website, http://www.dexigner.com/architecture/
news-g12298.html. 
7 High-Performance Green Buildings Act of 2007, S. 506, 110th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2007).
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InTroDucTIon
On September 12, 2007 the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Vermont upheld a Vermont plan to adopt greenhouse gas 
(“GHG”) emission regulations for new motor vehicles sold in the 
state. Several motor vehicle industry parties filed the suit against 
George Crombie, Secretary of the Vermont Agency of Natural 
Resources, to challenge the validity of Vermont’s regulations, 
which are based on the California’s GHG emission standards.1
leGal backGrounD anD arGumenTs
At the trial in April and May of 2007, plaintiffs argued that 
Vermont could not adopt California’s GHG standards because 
the federal government’s right to regulate GHG emission pre-
empted Vermont regulations. Plaintiffs alleged three types of 
preemption: (1) preemption under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”); 
(2) preemption under the Environmental Protection and Conser-
vation Act (“EPCA”); and (3) foreign policy preemption.2 
Section 209(a) of the CAA prevents states from preemp-
tively establishing their own motor vehicle emission standards, 
delegating that responsibility to the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”).3 Section 209(b), however, does give Califor-
nia the opportunity to develop its own standards so long as it is 
given a waiver by EPA. California was given this exception so 
the state could better manage their unique severe air pollution 
problems.4 The CAA further allows for another state to adopt 
Californian, instead of federal, standards as long as an EPA 
waiver has been issued to California and that state notifies the 
administrator.5 
California passed its own set of GHG emission standards 
in 2004. Vermont, in the action that prompted this litigation, 
adopted those standards in 2005.6 EPA has yet to give Cali-
fornia the necessary waiver and California Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger has threatened to file suit if they do not answer 
the waiver request before October 2007.7 
Section 509(a) of EPCA prevents states from making laws 
related to fuel economy standards for new vehicles and del-
egates that responsibility to the Department of Transportation 
(“DOT”). The corporate average fuel economy (“CAFE”) stan-
dards are determined by considering technological feasibility, 
economic practicability, the need to conserve energy, and other 
federal motor vehicle standards.8
In Massachusetts v. EPA, earlier this year, the Supreme 
Court held that the EPA is responsible for regulating GHG 
emissions because the broad definition of “air pollutant” in the 
CAA includes GHGs—an idea EPA previously rejected.9 The 
court also reasoned that though fuel economy regulations are 
the responsibility of DOT and such regulations are a key part of 
GHG emission control, the overlap of fuel economy and pollu-
tion prevention does not diminish EPA’s duty to control pollu-
tion.10
While the Massachusetts case dealt with whether the EPA 
must regulate GHGs, the Vermont case dealt with a state’s right 
to adopt its own GHG standards under the California exemp-
tion of the CAA. The Massachusetts case was vital in the Green 
Mountain Chrysler decision because factual findings regarding 
the reality of global warming and the legitimacy of deeming 
GHGs as pollutants under the CAA—the same act under which 
Vermont’s new regulations were developed—bolstered Ver-
mont’s defense in this case.11
Plaintiffs also alleged that Vermont’s GHG regulation 
“intrude[d] upon the foreign policy of the United States and the 
foreign affairs prerogatives of the President and Congress of the 
United States.”12 Specifically, the authority to pursue multilat-
eral GHG agreements. The regulations would also, according to 
the Plaintiffs, “interfere[ ] with the ability of the United States to 
speak with one voice upon matters of global climate change.”13
holDInGs
Assuming that EPA will grant California’s waiver request 
and providing that, if EPA does not grant the waiver, its deci-
sion would become moot,14 the Court dismissed all three argu-
ments of preemption. The California exemption and the ability 
for other states to qualify for that exemption extinguished any 
violation of the CAA preemption clause.
Green mountain chrySler plymouth  
DoDGe Jeep v. crombie
by Addie Haughey*
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ington College of Law.
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Separation of EPCA responsibilities for fuel economy from 
the CAA pollution regulation under the Massachusetts decision 
made the EPCA preemption clause irrelevant in this case. Cali-
fornia CAA standards, as soon as they are sanctioned by EPA, 
are to be considered “other Federal motor vehicle standards” 
under EPCA criteria for fuel economy.15
The argument of foreign policy preemption was denied 
because Vermont’s GHG regulations do not “impair the effective 
exercise of the Nations foreign policy,” the necessary threshold 
for preemption when federal policy does not expressly prohibit a 
state’s actions.16 Though GHG emissions represent a wide body 
of foreign policy initiatives, those initiatives actually encourage 
action to curb GHG emissions, even on the state level, making 
Vermont’s regulations complementary, not conflicting, to for-
eign policy.17
The court found the auto industries’ scientific expert testi-
mony unconvincing, calling their baseline assumptions “unsup-
ported by the evidence.”18 Because that testimony served as the 
basis for many of the industries’ arguments, those arguments 
were equally unconvincing. Multiple motions throughout the 
trial attempted to discredit Vermont’s expert witnesses, but the 
court accepted their testimony as “simply more credible” regard-
ing climate change and its impacts on the state of Vermont, the 
ability of Vermont’s regulations to curb impacts, and the feasi-
bility for the auto industry to meet regulatory requirements.19
conclusIon
The court was “unconvinced [that] automakers [could] not 
meet the challenges of Vermont and California’s GHG regula-
tions.”20 While time will prove the accuracy of this statement, 
this case may serve as a powerful legal tool in the growing body 
of case law on global warming. California’s waiver from EPA 
depends on the feasibility of the regulations—something this 
case clearly supports. David Doniger of the Natural Resources 
Defense Council said the ruling in this case will “put a lot more 
pressure on EPA to grant the waiver.”21
The eleven other states that joined Vermont in adopting the 
California standards now have a strongly persuasive precedent 
that legitimizes their regulations and protects them from similar 
suits by automakers. Richard J. Lazarus of Georgetown Univer-
sity proclaimed that “[t]he district court’s opinion is a sweeping 
rejection of the auto industry’s claim that California and other 
states” lack authority to regulate GHGs.22
On October 6, 2007, automakers appealed the Green Moun-
tain Chrysler decision to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit.23 “I would have been shocked if they had not 
appealed,” said Vermont Attorney General William H. Sorrell, 
“I’d rather be arguing our side than theirs.”24
Certainly, other states will face similar aggressive challenges 
to their GHG regulations. In fact, a case like Green Mountain 
Chrysler is pending in Rhode Island. Another suit in California 
began on October 22nd of this year.25 Nonetheless, Sorrell called 
this “a big win” and a cause for celebration “for those concerned 
about a healthier environment and . . .  global warming.”26 
1 See Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, No. 
2:05-cv-302, 2007 WL 2669444 (D.Vt. Sept. 12, 2007), available at http://
www.atg.state.vt.us/display.php?pubsec=4&curdoc=1358 (last visited Oct. 31, 
2007) [hereinafter Green Mountain Chrysler].
2 Green Mountain Chrysler, id. at 1.
3 Green Mountain Chrysler, id. at 12.
4 Green Mountain Chrysler, supra note 1, at 4.
5 Green Mountain Chrysler, supra note 1, at 12 (citing 42 U.S.C. § § 7543(a), 
7521(a), 7501).
6 Green Mountain Chrysler, supra note 1, at 4.
7 Bob Egelko, Federal Judge Gives Boost to States on Limiting Vehicle Emis-
sions, S.F. chron., Sept. 13, 2007, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/
article.cgi?file=/c/a/2007/09/13/MNK2S4PLM.DTL (last visited Oct. 12, 
2007).
8 Green Mountain Chrysler, supra note 1, at 14.
9 Green Mountain Chrysler, supra note 1, at 21-22.
10 Green Mountain Chrysler, supra note 1, at 22.
11 Green Mountain Chrysler, supra note 1, at 17-18.
12 Green Mountain Chrysler, supra note 1, at 226.
13 Green Mountain Chrysler, supra note 1, at 222.
14 Green Mountain Chrysler, supra note 1, at 235.
15 Green Mountain Chrysler, supra note 1, at 237.
16 Green Mountain Chrysler, supra note 1, at 223.
17 Green Mountain Chrysler, supra note 1, at 226.
18 Green Mountain Chrysler, supra note 1, at 155.
19 Green Mountain Chrysler, supra note 1, at 192.
20 Green Mountain Chrysler, supra note 1, at 239.
21 Felicity Barringer, Automakers Lose Bid to Stop State Emission Curbs, 
N.Y. timeS, Sept. 13, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/13/
us/13cnd-emissions.html?hp (last visited Oct. 12, 2007).
22 Barringer, id.
23 Candance Page, Automakers Appeal Vermont Emissions Decision, burlinG-
ton free preSS, Oct. 6, 2007, available at http://www.burlingtonfreepress.com/
apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20071006/NEWS01/710060304/1009/NEWS05 
(last visited Oct. 12, 2007).
24 Page, id.
25 Dave Gram, Judge Rejects Carmakers’ Emission Suit, AP, Sept. 12, 
2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2007/09/12/AR2007091201377.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2007).
26 Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, Court Upholds Vermont’s 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards For New Motor Vehicles (Sept. 12, 2007), 
available at http://www.atg.state.vt.us/display.php?pubsec=4&curdoc=1358 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2007).
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Global climate chanGe anD u.S. law
Michael B. Gerrard, Ed.
Reviewed by Erin Overturf*
book review
Because the U.S. has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, many may see the title Global Climate Change and U.S. Law as an oxymoron. Yet, despite the political stubbornness 
of the U.S. in the international arena, the law of climate change 
in the U.S. is vast and fast-changing. This diverse body of law is 
thoroughly catalogued in Global Climate Change and U.S. Law, 
edited by Michael B. Gerrard on behalf of the American Bar 
Association’s Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources. 
This book provides an overview of all legal regimes and instru-
ments which directly regulate or can be used to regulate green-
house gas emissions and climate change.
This volume serves as a 
comprehensive desk reference 
of legal issues related to climate 
change, which any lawyer or 
policymaker in the environmen-
tal field would find useful and 
informative. The book provides 
an outstanding overview of the 
field, particularly helpful for 
individuals seeking an intro-
duction to climate change law. 
Kyle W. Danish’s chapter The 
International Regime offers a 
concise, approachable, nuts-
and-bolts introduction to the 
U.N. Framework Convention on 
Climate Change and the Kyoto 
Protocol, while John C. Dernbach’s chapter U.S. Policy and 
Johnathan S. Martel and Kerry L. Stelcen’s chapter Clean Air 
Regulation detail the directly relevant national climate change 
regulation.
Recognizing that the U.S. federal policy has largely been 
centered around inaction, the volume takes a broad look at the 
regional, state and local laws that have emerged to fill the void. 
Both David Hodas in State Initiatives and J. Kevin Healy in 
Local Initiatives discuss the types of approaches governments 
have taken and their relative benefits and drawbacks. The vol-
ume also contains an invaluable survey of State actions respond-
ing to climate change compiled by the Pace Law School Center 
for Environmental Studies. This section of the book would be 
extremely helpful for state and local government officials and 
environmentalists working to address greenhouse gas emissions 
at the local level. 
Gary S. Guzy’s chapter Insurance and Climate Change 
would also be of particular interest to policymakers. This chap-
ter examines the structure of the insurance industry and its 
response to the increased risk of natural disasters, such as Hur-
ricane Katrina, caused by climate change. The scope and nature 
of coverage offered by the industry will necessarily define the 
responsibilities of the public sector for responding to the finan-
cial and human costs of climate 
change, making insurance law 
an increasingly important field 
of study for public servants 
involved in emergency response 
and prevention.
Dennis Hirsch, Andrew 
Bergman, and Michael Heintz 
provide an accessible analysis of 
carbon trading schemes in their 
chapter Emissions Trading—
Practical Aspects. Carbon trad-
ing has succeeded in capturing 
the public imagination more 
than nearly any other aspect of 
the field and this chapter clearly 
explores these technical and, 
oftentimes, dauntingly complex programs from a lawyer’s per-
spective.
While this meticulous overview is helpful in orienting read-
ers, the volume’s real contribution is its thorough, creative com-
pilation of U.S. laws which, although not specifically related 
to greenhouse gas emissions, may be somehow implicated by 
climate change. Bradford C. Mank’s chapter Civil Remedies 
examines issues that may arise when a private party brings 
suit against a government or private entity for climate change 
* Erin Overturf is a J.D. candidate, May 2008, at American University, Washing-
ton College of Law.
Ultimately this volume 
serves as a clear and  
comprehensive overview 
of the intersection between 
issues of climate change 
and the U.S. legal  
system as a whole.
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related injuries. Mank examines difficulties plaintiffs may face 
in establishing Article III standing and goes on to discuss vari-
ous case theories for addressing climate change injures, such as 
the National Environmental Policy Act, the Endangered Species 
Act, international human rights instruments, and the Alien Tort 
Claims Act.
However, this volume goes 
beyond litigation logistics in 
assessing the potential applica-
bility of other U.S. laws. One 
particularly interesting example 
is a discussion by Jeffrey A. 
Smith and Matthew Morreale of 
the potential for Federal Trade 
Regulation oversight of “green” 
claims made by notoriously 
environmentally unfriendly 
industries in the chapter Disclosure Issues. While commercial 
speech may not immediately spring to mind when assessing 
legal aspects of climate change, it will certainly be interesting to 
This volume serves as a 
comprehensive desk refer-
ence of legal issues related 
to climate change.
see how these two fast-changing areas of law will intersect in an 
age of social marketing. 
Ultimately this volume serves as a clear and comprehensive 
overview of the intersection between issues of climate change 
and the U.S. legal system as a whole. But, as with any attempt 
to pinpoint a fast-changing area 
of law, it is difficult for this kind 
of volume to be fully up-to-date. 
It is notable that this volume 
went to press before the ground-
breaking Supreme Court deci-
sion in Massachusetts v. EPA. 
However, the ABA is compil-
ing updates to the volume which 
are available online and extend 
the volume’s usefulness. This 
publication would be useful for 
environmental lawyers, corporate counsel, government officials, 
policymakers, and anyone else interested in incorporating cli-
mate change issues into their existing practice. 
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africa
The South African government recently announced leg-
islation that will end canned hunting, the practice of breeding 
animals in captivity and then releasing them into an enclosed 
area to be hunted, virtually guaranteeing a successful hunt.1 
Over 50,000 animals were hunted by nearly 7,000 tourists in 
the 2003–04 season.2 In South Africa, the industry generates an 
estimated half a billion dollars annually.3 While environmental-
ists allege the legislation does not do enough, breeders say the 
law will destroy the hunting industry and they will be forced to 
slaughter many of the 5,000 captive lions in South Africa, as 
they can’t afford to feed the lions and there is not enough room 
for them in the wild.4
The South African Environment Minister Marthinus van 
Shalkwyk characterized the legislation as “putting an end, once 
and for all, to the reprehensible practice of canned hunting.”5 
The legislation was initially to take effect June 1, 2007, but is 
now postponed until February 1, 2008.6 The new laws require 
that lions roam free for a minimum of two years before they are 
hunted, bans hunting from vehicles, and prohibit using a bow 
and arrow to kill thick skinned animals and big predators.7
americaS
U.S. environmental organizations have petitioned the gov-
ernment to raise the status of the loggerhead sea turtle from 
“threatened” to “endangered” under the Endangered Species Act 
(“ESA”). The ESA requires National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration’s National Marine Fisheries Service to examine 
the scientific evidence presented by the petitioners and decide 
if it is compelling enough to take action.8 Loggerhead popula-
tions in Florida have declined by fifty percent in a decade, and 
experts cite a barrage of causes for sea turtle declines occurring 
all over the country.9 The turtles get caught in commercial fish-
ing gear, like lines, nets, and dredges, and coastal development 
impedes on loggerhead breeding grounds.10 Climate change may 
also stress turtle populations due to rising sea levels, which can 
damage beaches and change ocean temperatures, impacting the 
ratio of male to female hatchlings.11 
The Center for Biological Diversity and Oceana are two 
groups petitioning on behalf of the loggerhead sea turtles that 
live on the east coast, which are behaviorally and genetically dis-
tinct from loggerheads on the west coast, where the Turtle Island 
Restoration Network is pushing for an ESA status change.12 The 
groups are petitioning simultaneously, though the government 
could decide on the western and eastern subspecies of logger-
head sea turtles separately.13 If the sea turtles ESA listing is 
heightened to endangered, increased protections of the species 
and its habitat will be put into place.14
Representatives of the fishing industry claim that they are 
taking steps to decrease turtle deaths through their fishing prac-
tices, and also argue that many loggerheads are killed off the 
coasts of other countries, like Mexico, where the ESA will have 
no impact.15 Government officials have ninety days from the fil-
ing of the petition to make their decision.16 
aSia
The use of unregulated chemicals in Punjab, India’s most 
intensively farmed state, are causing health problems, includ-
ing cancer.17 According to an environmental report by the small 
state’s government, the people, water, animals, and agriculture 
are all afflicted.18 The report points to sources of the problem, 
such as improper chemical applications due to disregarding 
instructions and the success of the agricultural green revolution 
of the 1960s and 1970s, which increased dependency on fertiliz-
ers and pesticides.19 In Punjab, food grain production has grown 
almost ten-fold in the last forty years.20 However, growth rates 
are now slowing, and the report attributes an overall reduction in 
the soil’s fertility and soil erosion to the overuse of nitrogenous 
fertilizers.21 
In China, a different kind of toxin is causing health and 
environmental problems: used electronics sent to China for dis-
mantling.22 Skin rashes and respiratory problems are blamed on 
chemicals like mercury, barium, and cobalt that are either in 
the waste or used in processing the waste.23 The environmental 
group Basel Action Network reports that in one e-waste town, 
the lead in the river sediment is double European safety levels.24 
According Greenpeace in Beijing, China produces more than a 
million tons of e-waste each year, including five million televi-
sion sets, five million computers, and ten million cell phones.25 
Although many U.S. states require that disposed electronics 
be sent to recycling centers, because Congress has yet to ratify 
the Basel Convention, those recycling centers can send their 
waste abroad.26 However, while most of the Chinese e-waste is 
imported, domestic e-waste is on the rise.27 
*Addie Haughey is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University, Wash-
ington College of Law. Sarah Melikian is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at Ameri-
can University, Washington College of Law. Marcel De Armas is a J.D. candidate, 
May 2008, at American University, Washington College of Law. 
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europe 
With concerns over declining fish stocks environmental-
ists, fishermen, and politicians are realizing and seeking out the 
benefits of marine reserves.28 Surprisingly, fishermen, such as 
those from the Northwestern Spanish town of Lira, are requesting 
marine reserves in order to protect their livelihood.29 
Marine reserves usually set aside a part of the ocean and 
prohibit fishing for all or part of the year, in order to allow a 
sanctuary for fish to grow, reproduce, and spill over into areas 
where fishing is allowed.30 Marine reserves in other parts of the 
globe have proven successful in in recovering strained fisher-
ies. For example, in St. Lucia and Florida, marine reserves have 
increased adjacent fish catches by fifty percent, while a reserve 
in Sicily, Italy increased the fish catch “by a factor of 27 in only 
five years.”31 
polar reGionS 
A team of scientists monitoring the Arctic Ocean’s circula-
tion detected a change in the circulation from 2002 to 2006.32 
The Arctic Ocean’s circulation reverted to the clockwise pattern 
exhibited prior to 1990, from the counterclockwise pattern that 
dominated the 1990s.33 This finding suggests that some of the 
recent dramatic changes in the Arctic’s climate are not solely 
caused by climate change.34 
The scientists attributed the change in circulation to “weak-
ened Arctic Oscillation, a major atmospheric circulation pattern 
in the northern hemisphere.”35 Prior to 1970, the Arctic Oscilla-
tion was reasonably stable, and since then it has varied approxi-
mately on a ten year scale.36 This variation seemed to have ended 
in the late 1990s, a time when the Arctic environment noticeably 
changed.37 However, the recent reversal may be short lived as 
the scientists predict the Arctic Ocean is ready to swing back the 
circulation pattern of the 1990s.38 While the shifts in the Arctic 
Ocean’s circulation do not appear to be directly connected to 
climate change, “the events of the 1990s may well be a preview 
of how the Arctic will respond over longer periods of time in a 
warming world.”39 
South pacific
The ten-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(“ASEAN”) came together at its thirteenth ASEAN Summit in 
Singapore, joined by six other Asian countries, including China 
and Japan.40 While the crisis in Myanmar and the passage of an 
ASEAN legal charter topped the summit agenda, climate change 
was also addressed by a pact that sets the stage for a series of UN 
meetings on climate change to begin in December.41 While the 
pact fell short of setting numerical goals for emission cuts due to 
objection from poorer Asian countries, Australia’s Foreign Min-
ister Alexander Downer said “there has been a turning of the tide 
in China and India’s position—they’re saying ‘yes, we need to 
do something to stabilize emissions.’”42  
Despite the lack of clear numbers on emissions in the pact, 
Japan did offer $1.8 billion in loans to fund environmental proj-
ects in Asia, and the group pledged to plant 37.5 million acres of 
trees by 2020.43
1 See Green.view, Animal Rights in South Africa, economiSt.com (Apr. 16, 
2007), available at http://www.economist.com/research/articlesbysubject/ 
displaystory.cfm?subjectid=7933604&story_id=9023987 (last visited Nov. 
23, 2007); see also Bonnie Tsui, Trophies in a Barrel: Examining ‘Canned 
Hunting,’ N.Y. timeS, Apr. 9, 2006, available at http://travel2.nytimes.
com/2006/04/09/travel/09heads.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2007).
2 Tsui, id.
3 Sarah McGreggor, South Africa Moves to Limit Lion Hunts, newS.
com.au (Feb. 19, 2007), available at http://www.news.com.au/travel/
story/0,23483,21262138-27977,00.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2007).
4 Anthony Sguazzin, Hunting Lions Bred in Captivity May Soon Cost More 
Than $35,000, bloomberG (Nov. 7, 2007), available at http://www.bloomberg.
com/apps/news?pid=20601088&sid=asYPMpYDrS90&refer=home (last vis-
ited Nov. 23, 2007).
5 Sguazzin, id. 
6 Sguazzin, id. 
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2007), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17241401/ (last visited  
Nov. 23, 2007).
8 Environmental News Network, Conservation Groups Act to Protect Log-
gerhead Sea Turtle (Nov. 15, 2007), available at http://www.enn.com/wildlife/
article/25121 (last visited Nov. 23, 2007). 
9 Environmental News Network, id.
10 Environmental News Network, id.
11 David Briscoe, Feds Take Step Toward Protecting Turtles, waSh. poSt, 
Nov. 17, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2007/11/17/AR2007111700470.html.
12 Environmental News Network, supra note 8; Briscoe, supra note 11.
13 Briscoe, supra note 11.
14 Environmental News Network, supra note 8.
15 Briscoe, supra note 11.
16 Environmental News Network, supra note 8.
17 Green.view, Chemical Generation, economiSt.com (Sept. 24, 2007), avail-
able at http://www.economist.com/research/articlesbysubject/displaystory.
cfm?subjectid=7933604&story_id=9856023 (last visited Nov. 23, 2007)  
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19 Chemical Generation, id.
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